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ABSTRACT 
This thesis combines analysis of the political economy of Mexico with the global value 
chain approach to study the trajectory of the development of the Veracruz cluster and 
the governance structure of vertical inter-firm relationships in the locality.  
The petrochemical cluster located in the state of Veracruz is formed by a pool of state-
owned and local private companies and is arguably the largest agglomeration of 
industrial firms in southern Mexico. These firms are linked to one another through 
output-input relationships. State-owned petrochemical complexes, which are part of 
Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), Mexico‟s oil and natural gas company, supply 
industrial raw materials that local private firms use to process intermediate 
petrochemical inputs. Empirical evidence demonstrates that state-owned firms exercise 
a disproportionate degree of authority over input transactions. The latter assertion is 
illustrated by the fact that PEMEX-Petrochemicals is the only domestic producer (and 
therefore supplier) of a large number of inputs demanded in the locality. This, along 
with the hazardous nature of petrochemical inputs and spatial proximity, has contributed 
to locking local firms into captive transactional relationships.  
The significance of studying the Veracruz cluster and the nature of inter-firm 
transactional relationships lies in the fact that both are heavily influenced by drivers 
inherent in the development path the country has followed in past decades, which is 
characterised in the first place by the adoption of import-substituting industrialisation 
(ISI) policies in the 1960s and 1970s and later by the implementation of market-
orientated policies in the 1980s and beyond. The discussion is therefore situated in a 
much broader empirical setting that pays considerable attention to economic, political, 
and institutional factors. For instance, external determinants such as the extent of state 
intervention in economic planning in the 1960s and 1970s, the economic liberalisation 
process embarked on by Mexico in the 1980s and 1990s, the institutionalisation of 
sectoral regulatory policies, the reliance of the government on PEMEX revenues, and 
the implications of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), among 
others, will help us understand the trajectory of the petrochemical industry and the 
governance of inter-firm transactional linkages in southern Veracruz.  
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
PRESENTATION 
In recent years, scholars from different branches of learning have cast light on the 
development of industrial clusters in the developing world. At first, much of the 
analysis focused on the dynamics within localities, that is, co-operation between firms, 
the importance of local externalities, and the role of associated institutions. To a 
significant degree these lines of reasoning were opened by the work on industrial 
clusters and industrial districts carried out by scholars such as Becattini (1990, 2004), 
Porter (1990, 2000), and Pyke and Sengenberger (1992). Subsequently, as the 
geographical organisation of production continued to be reconfigured by the 
globalisation of the world economy, the debate threw light on the external linkages of 
industrial clusters; more specifically, on cross-national transactional relationships 
established with and governed by developed country firms, as illustrated by the 
contributions of Gereffi (1999), Bair and Gereffi (2001), Humphrey and Schmitz 
(2002), and Schmitz (2004). In this sense, the concept of global value chains (GVC) 
managed to account for some of the key implications these features of the world 
economy represent for firms in developing countries (Gereffi 1994, Kaplinsky 2004).  
In reviewing both schools of thought, what is important to observe is that existing 
literature underlines the prospects of firms to enhance their competitive performance in 
the light of the nature of prevailing linkages. While the theory of clusters emphasises 
the importance of local relationships, the global value chain approach stresses the value 
of external linkages (Humphrey and Schmitz 2000). In this way, work on industrial 
clusters and global value chains appears to take little notice of both the aggregate 
(economic, institutional, and political) context in which such relationships are rooted 
and the local policy setting that outlines development for clustered firms. The 
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petrochemical cluster situated in southern Veracruz, Mexico, embodies empirical 
evidence that contributes to addressing this gap in the literature.  
The Veracruz petrochemical cluster is made up of a pool of state-owned
1
 companies, 
which are part of Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), Mexico‟s oil and natural gas 
company, and a number of local private petrochemical firms that are connected to one 
another through output-input relationships, that is, state-owned petrochemical 
complexes produce and supply industrial raw materials that private firms
2
 use to yield 
intermediate inputs. Of the many empirical attributes of the Veracruz petrochemical 
cluster, the fact that private firms are locked into captive transactional relationships with 
state-owned firms is the most important one; and epitomises one of the two building 
blocks of analysis in this thesis. The other fundamental line of discussion centres on the 
range of external drivers - categorised as sectoral, national and supranational
3
 - 
shaping the quality of transactional linkages in the locality. This is to say that the 
significance of studying the Veracruz cluster and inter-firm relationships lies in the 
knowledge that both are heavily influenced by economic, political, and institutional 
determinants inherent in the development path Mexico has followed in past decades - 
characterised in the first place by the adoption of import-substituting industrialisation 
(ISI) policies in the 1960s and 1970s (Chapter 5) and later by the implementation of 
market-orientated policies in the 1980s and beyond (Chapter 6 and 7). 
That said, the objective of this thesis is twofold. The first one is to examine the 
trajectory of the Veracruz petrochemical cluster within the context of the political 
economy of Mexico. This means examining the degree of state intervention that 
permitted the establishment and expansion of the petrochemical industry in the 1960s 
and 1970s and the process of economic liberalisation the country embarked on since the 
1980s. This latter stage of development entailed the institutionalisation of sectoral 
policies that yielded rather questionable outcomes, hence, the second overarching 
                                                 
1
 The Cosoleacaque, Cangrejera, Pajaritos, and Morelos petrochemical complexes make up PEMEX-
Petrochemicals, which is one of the four divisions of PEMEX, Mexico‟s oil and natural gas firm. 
Throughout the thesis, I will be using the terms state-owned petrochemical complexes and PEMEX-
Petrochemicals interchangeably to refer to these four companies. Also, when it is clearly evident, I will 
use the term PEMEX to refer to these four firms.  
2
 Although the locus of the debate is on producer-driven linkages, Chapter 8 also sheds light on two 
examples in which a state-owned petrochemical complex is the buyer and the governor of the 
relationship. 
3
 External drivers are schematised in Chapter 3.  
9 
  
objective of this thesis is to analyse the extent to which external determinants have 
shaped governance structures prevailing in vertical transactional linkages between 
producer and buyers of petrochemical inputs in southern Veracruz. This means 
examining the extent of transactional dependency that private firms bear in relation to 
state-owned petrochemical complexes (PEMEX-Petrochemicals).  
In order to address both objectives, the discussion in this thesis is therefore situated in a 
much broader empirical setting that pays considerable attention to economic, political, 
and institutional factors that will help us understand the current standing of the 
petrochemical industry in general and the quality of inter-firm relationships in the 
locality in particular. To that end, it is necessary to briefly depict the empirical building 
blocks of our analysis.  
First, it is important to point out that the Veracruz cluster is embedded in a 
multidimensional, complex context (Chapter 6, 7). Over the course of recent decades, 
the development of the Veracruz petrochemical cluster has been weighed down by an 
array of sectoral, national, and supranational determinants. Of these, the economic 
liberalisation process embarked on by Mexico in the 1980s and 1990s; the 
institutionalisation of sectoral regulatory policies; the reliance of the government on 
PEMEX revenues
4
; the energy security strategy of the United States; and the 
implications of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) are among the 
most obvious. The impact of these on the locality has proved to be overwhelming in 
many regards since they have not only considerably shaped upgrading expectations and 
the type of transactional linkages between producers and buyers, but these external 
determinants have also led to sharp output contraction at state-owned firms. This 
contraction has, in turn, served to strangulate the production processes of many local 
buyer firms (Chapter 8). By and large, it is the intricate political economy of Mexico 
which has shaped the trajectory of the development of the Veracruz petrochemical 
cluster.  
Second, state-owned petrochemical complexes, also referred to as PEMEX-
Petrochemicals, produce and supply industrial raw materials that private firms in the 
                                                 
4
 According to the author‟s estimates, based on official figures from Banxico, Mexico‟s central bank, 31 
percent of government income came from PEMEX in 2009.  
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locality use to process intermediate petrochemical inputs
5
. With regard to this vertical 
relationship, PEMEX-Petrochemicals exercises a disproportionate degree of authority 
over input transactions and most vertical linkages in the Veracruz cluster are therefore 
acknowledged to be producer-driven
6
. A fundamental determinant in this sense is the 
fact that state-owned firms are the only domestic producers (and therefore suppliers) of 
a large number of inputs demanded locally. This, along with the hazardous nature of 
petrochemical inputs, means that the character of external determinants, and other 
important features discussed later, has contributed to locking local buyer firms into 
captive transactional relationships. Furthermore, such transactions, as the empirical 
evidence suggests, are shaped by PEMEX-Petrochemicals through certain practices 
considered detrimental for local buyer firms. A case in point is the role of the state-
owned complexes as erratic suppliers. Overall, the point here is that the latter scenario 
not only jeopardises the performance of private petrochemical firms (Chapter 8), it also 
minimises the significance of horizontal collective action.  
Another relevant attribute of the Veracruz cluster is the fact that both types of firms, 
state-owned and private, are significantly geared towards the domestic market. A large 
share of the output yielded in the cluster is believed to feed a wide range of national-
orientated value chains in which local firms are engaged. Regardless of the extent to 
which firms are engaged in extra-cluster relationships, the issue to be emphasised here 
is that forward and backward external linkages lie outside the boundaries of this 
analysis.  
With respect to conceptualising the governance structures of inter-firm linkages in the 
Veracruz petrochemical cluster, it must be pointed out that the global value chain 
(GVC) approach provides solid foundations for the construction of several related 
arguments. Despite the fact that this thesis analyses supplier-driven relationships within 
a (heavily) national-orientated industrial cluster and does not deal with external forward 
and backward linkages, the use of fundamental concepts of the GVC approach remains 
viable. Given that the GVC approach provides the conceptual underpinnings to study 
                                                 
5
 The only final product produced in the locality is fertilisers.  
6
 Whenever PEMEX-Petrochemicals plays the role of supplier, which is in the vast majority of cases, the 
relationship is considered producer-driven. At times local firms supply inputs to PEMEX-Petrochemicals 
and although this pattern is less frequent, PEMEX-Petrochemicals as buyer also wields a greater degree 
of control. In this case, the inputs transaction is deemed buyer-driven. Although the locus of the debate is 
on producer-driven linkages, Chapter 8 also sheds light on an example in which a state-owned 
petrochemical complex is the buyer and the governor of the relationship. 
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the governance of transactional linkages between producers and buyers, and PEMEX-
Petrochemicals links with local private firms provides one example of this, I contend 
that this school of thought offers an important framework for addressing the empirical 
evidence embodied by the Veracruz petrochemical cluster.  
In the light of these arguments, the question that arises is: what is value chain 
governance? To begin with, it must be acknowledged that governance is undoubtedly 
associated with the manner in which authority is exercised over value chain participants. 
In other words, which firm rules the transaction of inputs? In that regard two types of 
value chains are distinguished: those driven by producers and those in which buyers rule 
the transactions (Gereffi 1994: 97). The existing literature around GVC is 
predominantly enthusiastic about buyer-driven transactional relationships, in which 
firms in industrialised countries, normally referred to as buyers, set the parameters 
under which suppliers in developing countries must operate (Schmitz 2004). On the 
other hand, it is evident that producer-driven value chains have received little if any 
attention by this school of thought. In this form of industrial organisation „the state is 
believed to play a more interventionist role at the point of production‟, as argued by 
Gereffi (1994: 101), and the Veracruz petrochemical cluster is a case in point since the 
state - via PEMEX-Petrochemicals - is the player that governs the transaction of inputs 
in the locality. All in all, it is the governance structure of such transactional cross-border 
linkages that is at the centre of the discussion for, as explained by Humphrey and 
Schmitz (2001: 21-22), the notion of governance refers to the quality of relationships 
between firms and the mechanisms (practices, values, codes of conduct) that determine 
the non-market co-ordination of value-adding activities.  
This very issue of who exercises authority over chain participants leads us to ask: what 
determines the co-ordination of value-adding activities? In that regard there is a 
widespread consensus that the lead firm, or buyer, controls the production process 
through a set of parameters that basically establish: i) what is to be produced (product 
design and specifications); ii) how it is to be produced (the technology and quality 
systems to be employed as well as the labour and environmental standards to comply 
with); and iii) how much is to be produced and when (production scheduling and 
logistics) (Humphrey and Schmitz 2001: 21-22). As compliance with this set of 
parameters indicates that the capabilities to meet the demands placed by the buyer can 
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vary from one supplier to another, value chains embody different governance structures. 
A substantial wealth of empirical studies permitted Gereffi et al. (2005) to craft a 
comprehensive analytical framework that resulted in the categorisation of five patterns 
of governance, that is, market (inter-firm relationships are mostly associated with the 
production of standardised products, the cost to switch partner remains low, and as 
product specifications are easy to codify the supplier is competent at meeting the 
requirements set by the lead firm); modular (although the complexity of the transaction 
increases, the supplier possesses the capacity to interpret product and production 
specifications); relational (inter-firm relationships are complex, the exchange of 
information implies high degrees of co-ordination for mutual dependence and the cost 
of switching partners is high); captive (high level of transactional dependence means the 
supplier is locked into relationships that increase the cost of exiting the chain, and the 
degree of power asymmetry is high); and hierarchy (the firms vertically integrated 
firms).  
The pool of private petrochemical firms in the Veracruz cluster are viewed as captive 
buyers for a number of reasons, among which the fact that stands out is that PEMEX-
Petrochemicals is the only domestic supplier of certain petrochemical inputs and the 
hazardous nature of petrochemical inputs (which coerces firms into sourcing raw 
materials locally). As regards the former driver, for example, what must be elucidated 
is: what turned PEMEX-Petrochemicals into the only domestic supplier of certain 
inputs? This issue demonstrates that construction of a clearer picture of vertical linkages 
in the Veracruz cluster - characterised by a high level of transactional dependence and 
power asymmetry - requires us to include elements from the wider empirical context, as 
previously noted. Analysis of external factors not only helps us comprehend the 
character of local governance and what hampers the competitiveness of state-owned and 
private petrochemical firms, but it also validates the need to highlight the repercussions 
that the deteriorated standing of PEMEX (in particular its heavy tax burden) has over 
both the development of value chains of petrochemical origin and the wider economic 
landscape.  
This point can be elaborated by understanding that, since the oil boom in the late 1970s, 
a sizeable proportion of PEMEX revenues have been devoted to financing public 
expenditure. From 2000 to 2009, for example, PEMEX contributions represented 34 
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percent of the government budget, according to Mexico‟s central bank (Banxico n.d.). 
As Mexican authorities have failed to collect a larger proportion of GDP in the form 
taxes, a figure that roughly corresponds to just 9.4 percent as of 2008 (México, último 
lugar de AL en recaudación tributaria: CEPAL, 2010, May 31), oil revenues continue to 
plug the government‟s income gap. This heavy tax burden has prevented PEMEX from 
investing in key areas such as exploration and refining. Crude output has shrunk from 
3.383 mbpd in 2004 to 2.576 mbpd in 2010 – a slump of 24 percent over a period of six 
years (PEMEX 2010a, 2010b). In relation to the atmospheric distillation capacity, which 
refers to the process of turning crude into refined products, PEMEX reports that over a 
period of three decades, 1980 to 2009, the figure grew by only 21.26 percent, from 
1,270 thousand barrels per day to 1,540 thousand barrels per day (PEMEX 1990, 
2010a).  
Another consequence of the confiscation of hydrocarbon profits is observed in the case 
of PEMEX-Petrochemicals since Mexico‟s largest company continues to keep the state 
machinery running at the expense of upgrading its own petrochemical complexes, the 
installed capacity of which achieved little growth over a period of two decades. While 
in 1990 the overall installed capacity of the petrochemical division of PEMEX stood at 
12,353 thousand tonnes, by 2009 it had increased just 7 percent to 13,061 thousand 
tonnes. Output, on the other hand, plummeted from 13,447 thousand tonnes in 1995 to 
6,835 thousand tonnes in 2000, although it bounced back slightly to 7,587 thousand 
tonnes in 2009. With respect to installed capacity and output, it is worth noting that in 
the same year the four petrochemical complexes in the Veracruz cluster accounted for 
92.16 percent and 99.8 percent
7
 of PEMEX-Petrochemicals, respectively (PEMEX 
2001, 2003, 2010a). This state of affairs has wider repercussions. At the local level, it 
has constrained the availability of basic petrochemical inputs buyer firms request for 
their own production processes, as Chapter 8 illustrates; and by extension it has 
distressed the development of value chains of petrochemical origin. Nonetheless, the 
most detrimental consequence of a falling petrochemical output, at least from a national 
perspective, is the rapid pace at which imports are swelling. The profits made from 
crude exports are on course to being offset by imports of petrochemical inputs, goods of 
petrochemical origin, and refined products.  
                                                 
7
 Similar figures have been reported since the 1990s. From 1990 to 2009, the four petrochemical 
complexes represented 90.99 percent of the overall output of PEMEX-Petrochemicals. In relation to 
installed capacity, the proportion is estimated at 91.4 percent (PEMEX 2001, 2003, 2010a).  
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Any analysis of transactional linkages in the Veracruz cluster must take into 
consideration the scenario portrayed above. To a lesser extent, this thesis illuminates 
that the development of the Veracruz cluster is central to encouraging the articulation of 
value chains of petrochemical origin since this entails at the same time the vertical 
integration and expansion of the industrial apparatus of the country.  
Overall, the approach adopted to study inter-firm linkages and the trajectory of the 
Veracruz petrochemical cluster in this thesis seeks to demonstrate that enhancing the 
performance of developing country firms is not only associated with the type of 
governance structure characterising input transactions, as the GVC literature suggests, 
but also with the indigenous context of development.    
THE ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS 
It is worth reiterating that this thesis is not only focused on examining the type of 
vertical linkages in the locality. Much of the discussion also centres on the aggregate 
context that has, in one way or another, hampered the development of the Veracruz 
cluster. A large share of this thesis is, therefore, devoted to studying this latter aspect.   
The thesis consists of eight chapters and conclusions and is organised in the following 
way. After this introduction, Chapter 2 describes the methodology I utilised and 
provides a detailed outline of the main features of the case study. The first sub-section 
contextualises the way research techniques were put into practice, namely: how 
fieldwork was conducted; the use of semi-structured interviews; the gathering of 
information through secondary sources; and the challenges faced in the field. The 
second sub-section of the chapter elucidates the configuration of the Veracruz 
petrochemical cluster. 
Chapter 3 brings together the global value chain approach with empirical evidence from 
the Veracruz cluster and suggests that the conceptual underpinnings of governance 
structures found in cross-national inter-firm relationships can be used to distinguish the 
type of vertical linkages within an industrial cluster, which in our case study are for the 
most part captive in nature. The chapter also schematises both the dynamics that 
influence local transactional dependence and the external determinants (the aggregate 
environment) shaping the predominantly local pattern of governance.  
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Chapter 4 discusses the origins of PEMEX and focuses on the role played by foreign 
capital during the first decades of the 20
th
 century. It also touches on the rise of 
economic nationalism and the events that led to the expropriation of the oil industry in 
1938. The aim of the chapter is to elucidate both the early development of the oil 
industry in Mexico and the circumstances that laid the ideological, political, and 
economic foundations that validated the instrumentation of a state-led industrial strategy 
after World War II – the period when the petrochemical industry established itself.  
Chapter 5 focuses on the establishment and remarkable rise of the petrochemical 
industry in the context of import-substituting industrialisation policies. This helps to 
illustrate that under State tutelage the sector grew rapidly and in line with an approach 
favouring vertical integration of the country‟s industrial apparatus. In so doing, the 
debate identifies the drivers that help explain the current organisation of production in 
the Veracruz cluster. Similarly, the chapter describes how both the oil boom that 
Mexico experienced in the 1970s and the economic policy mismanagement on the part 
of the ruling elite which culminated in the 1982 debt crisis set the tone for the 
dismantling of the sector in the following decades.  
Chapter 6 demonstrates the complex scenario that arose as a result of market-orientated 
policies introduced by the Mexican authorities in the 1980s and 1990s within which the 
Veracruz cluster currently operates. The discussion follows a timeline that includes the 
strategy adopted by the government to stabilise the economy in the wake of the 1982 
debt crisis, increasing U.S. dependence on imported oil and the role of the Mexican 
hydrocarbon industry in relation to this dependency. The chapter analyses how these 
national and supranational determinants contributed to persuading government officials 
to reduce the scope of state intervention in the petrochemical industry on the one hand 
and determine the horizontal restructuring of PEMEX on the other. These political 
decisions (or rather sectoral determinants) are understood as a step towards the 
dismantling of the state-owned petrochemical sector. The post-NAFTA era context, and 
the threat of privatisation for PEMEX-Petrochemicals resulting from the 1994 peso 
crisis, are also discussed.  
Chapter 7 seeks to explain the repercussions of the aggregate setting on the current 
standing of PEMEX and its petrochemical division. In addition to the context provided 
in the previous chapter, the company‟s heavy tax burden and the nature of the country‟s 
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energy matrix (the increasing use of natural gas for energy generation) are mentioned 
here for the important role they have also played. To put this in perspective, the analysis 
emphasises the paradoxical scenario of the Mexican oil industry which is based on the 
fact that the country has become a mere supplier of crude, and a net importer of value-
added hydrocarbon inputs and refined products. In this respect, the chapter also briefly 
compares PEMEX with large international oil firms in terms of revenues and output.  
Chapter 8 serves to contextualise the empirical evidence from the Veracruz cluster with 
respect to the quality of relationships between PEMEX-Petrochemicals and the pool of 
private petrochemical firms. It describes the circumstances that indicate the extent of 
transactional dependence in the locality and the development trajectory of firms. This 
debate focuses on firms that demonstrate similar characteristics.  
Last but not least, the objective of Chapter 9 is to enumerate the array of conclusions 
regarding the trajectory of the Veracruz cluster, underline the contributions of this 
thesis, and indicate potential research directions that could be explored in the future.    
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2 
METHODOLOGY AND CASE STUDY OVERVIEW 
How fieldwork challenged pre-established conceptions 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is a continuation of the Master of Science (MSc) dissertation I completed in 
September 2006 at the University of Sussex. On that occasion I analysed the scenario of 
adverse condition of the state-owned petrochemical industry in Mexico in the recent 
past. This research, in many respects, represented a preliminary perspective on the 
political economy of development of the Veracruz petrochemical cluster – a subject I 
discuss in more detail in the present thesis.  
As I continued into the DPhil in 2006, I initially set my sights on broadening the range 
of the research I conducted during the MSc by linking it to the dynamics of economic 
development taking place in the locality. Nonetheless, early fieldwork inquires firmly 
indicated that these two subjects were inconsistent with one another because, even 
though the role of the petrochemical industry in driving local economic development 
was deemed a very important feature, the point to highlight is that it was not the 
foremost determinant as I had initially believed. It is worth underlining that this finding 
not only challenged pre-established assumptions in my research, it also served to 
illustrate the fundamental role of research methods such as fieldwork in discerning the 
extent to which certain issues are more important than others when studying the 
Veracruz petrochemical cluster.  
One of the objectives of this chapter is precisely to throw light on the importance of 
fieldwork and other research methods. Discussion is therefore not restricted to show 
how the locus of analysis of this thesis shifted from one preliminary hypothesis to 
another that emerged from interviews in the field, it also seeks to set out relevant 
research techniques and contextualise the way in which they were put into practice. The 
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second aim of this chapter is to describe comprehensively the most noteworthy features 
of the object of study.  
RESEARCH METHODS 
As a student performing geographical research, I can argue that the literature around 
research methods in the discipline in recent years provides fruitful support for this 
research. A handful of contributions explored here are those of Limb et al. (2001), 
Holloway et al. (2003), Hay (2005), Flowerdew and Martin (2005), and Clifford et al. 
(2010) who underline and explain the mixture of techniques and methods geographers 
and researchers from overlapping fields can resort to. This subsection intends to lay 
emphasis on the most important methods and techniques I employed to examine the 
trajectory of the Veracruz petrochemical cluster.   
Fieldwork  
I undertook fieldwork activities during two periods, with the main phase being late 2007 
and the first half of 2008 primarily in the cities of Coatzacoalcos, Minatitlán, and 
Cosoleacaque. As access to certain key figures was not obtained on that occasion, I 
planned a shorter phase of fieldwork for December 2008 and January 2009 in Mexico 
City and Xalapa, the capital of the state of Veracruz
8
.  
The initial argument of this thesis, as briefly mentioned at the start of this chapter, lines 
above, focused on demonstrating that despite the deterioration of the standing of the 
petrochemical sector during the second half of the 1990s and beyond, the industry 
played an important role in the expansion of other types of productive activities in the 
locality. During these years the growth of banking, retailing, construction, private 
education, leisure, urban infrastructure, and transport services was both noticeable and 
significant. This was the hypothesis I intended to explore while in the field. The first 
interviews, however, indicated that analysis of the Veracruz petrochemical cluster 
needed to follow another direction. Participants pointed out that economic expansion in 
the locality was to a significant extent connected to the process of economic 
liberalisation the country has experienced since the 1990s, which is illustrated by the 
                                                 
8
 I also managed to obtain two interviews on a visit to Mexico in July 2010.  
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fact that companies began to expand operations to cities where the supply of services 
demanded was either poor or non-existent. This phenomenon did not only occur in 
southern Veracruz; in fact most of the country was also experiencing the same type of 
service sector expansion. After understanding what lay behind economic expansion in 
southern Veracruz, there was little doubt that the petrochemical industry had been less 
influential in that respect than originally estimated.   
We can move now to consider the strategy behind the interviews conducted. By 
obtaining access to individuals related to the industry, local government officials (who 
had held high ranking positions at PEMEX-Petrochemicals in the past), and managers 
of petrochemical firms, the purpose was not only to understand the trajectory of the 
Veracruz cluster but also to further distinguish the policy setting and economic 
circumstances that would help place the adverse industry scenario in a broader 
perspective (Chapters 5, 6, and 7). In addition to revealing the drivers of local economic 
expansion, participants pointed out a problem that I had not considered; namely that the 
development of private petrochemical firms in the Veracruz cluster was hindered by the 
uncertain role of PEMEX-Petrochemicals as a supplier of basic inputs. This problematic 
was at the same time strongly associated with a number of external factors beyond the 
control of local actors. It therefore became apparent that the quality of transactional 
linkages between PEMEX-Petrochemicals and local petrochemical firms was distressed 
by the complexity of the external environment and that my thesis should pay 
considerable attention to this issue and abandon the path of research contemplated at the 
outset. In a broad sense, the locus of analysis switched from investigating how 
petrochemical firms are associated with local economic dynamics to examining the 
quality of vertical inter-firm relationships (Chapter 8) and the influence of external 
drivers on local governance structures. 
This change, however, had implications in relation to the fieldwork inquiries. It must be 
acknowledged that the value of certain sets of information gathered in the early stages 
was to a certain degree questionable, first and foremost with respect to the nature of data 
demanded by the approach I finally utilised. While interviews were originally outlined 
to cast light on the line of reasoning I intended to develop in the first place, what is 
essential to emphasize is that interviewees turned out to be eager to give a picture of the 
high degree of uncertainty prevailing in linkages between PEMEX-Petrochemicals and 
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local private firms. Despite the fact that these handful of interviews somewhat failed to 
problematise transactional linkages at length, the information exposed permitted an 
illumination of both the range of determinants affecting the quality of transactional 
relationships in the locality and the complexity of the context in which this industry is 
embedded. It was therefore certain that an analysis of the Veracruz petrochemical 
cluster should be framed within the political economy of Mexico and, from that moment 
onwards, interviews were delineated correspondingly. They were thus adapted to 
address issues such as the implications of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
and the institutionalisation of sectoral regulatory policies for the development of 
petrochemical firms in the locality.   
The most significant lesson I can draw from this experience is that in the process of 
preparing my research proposal I came up with a preliminary hypothesis that was later 
proved imprecise and incapable of capturing the reality of the case study. Without being 
aware of such inaccurate notion, the value and usefulness of the obtained information 
would have compromised construction of legitimate arguments in this thesis. Such a 
change in analytical approaches has been discussed in the literature around 
methodology. A case in point is Hope (2009: 169) who alleges that „fieldwork can give 
us direct experiences that challenge our preconceptions‟; and that is precisely the type 
of situation I confronted at the beginning of fieldwork in Minatitlán and Coatzacoalcos. 
More specifically, what I discovered in southern Veracruz through interviews was not 
what I presumed when I had originally designed my research.  
All in all, what is important to take notice of is that fieldwork is fundamental in the 
development of research in social sciences – notion that appears to be widely 
acknowledged among scholars from disciplines like geography (Clifford et al. 2010, 
Holloway et al. 2003, Kent et al. 1997).  
Semi-structured interviews 
Apart from some specific quantitative data I sought to obtain from firms, which 
requested a more straightforward response, interviews were first and foremost outlined 
to cover a set of broad topics with the deliberate intention of inducing participants to 
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elaborate answers in their own words
9
. To do so I systematised the range of topics in 
such a way that interviews ended up being appeared to be, unceremonious 
conversations. All topics were related to one another, so when I sensed that participants 
had disclosed as much information as necessary concerning a particular subject I drove 
the conversation towards the following topic according to my notes. One key point 
about this technique is that I had to learn by heart the order of topics I wanted to discuss 
with the informant, in that way conversations did not appear to be a labored exercise.  
Many of the points mentioned above, if not all, are discussed in the literature on 
geographical research methods. Dunn (2005: 80) indicates that even if semi-structured 
interviewing can be designed to cover issues in a systematic fashion, one important 
feature is that it embodies a certain degree of flexibility in the way issues are addressed 
by the informant. This flexibility is an attribute that has been highlighted by other 
scholars such as Longhurst (2010: 105) who similarly contends that „semi-structured 
interviews allow for an open response in the participants‟ own words rather than a “yes 
or no” type answer‟.  
Moreover, previous research experiences had already taught me that semi-structured 
interviewing is also a technique that could lead to the uncovering of facts initially 
unidentified. The literature on research methodology may not explicitly draw attention 
to the latter assumption, but it suggests that flexibility in conducting semi-structured 
interviews - which, briefly, refers to interviewees illustrating an issue without being 
exhorted to respond in a certain manner - greatly facilitates the obtaining of information 
that could be deemed as more revealing and accurate than initially expected, as Graham 
(1984) puts it. The analytical shift I exposed in the previous sub-section is a clear 
example of the latter. Generally speaking, this shift arose as a consequence of the use of 
semi-structured interviews, which permitted informants to put emphasis on subjects 
they viewed as important in shaping the development of the petrochemical industry.   
Having said this, I believe it is also necessary to portray some key points of the 
information gathering process in the field and the challenges it presented. It must be 
mentioned that analysis of the Veracruz petrochemical cluster significantly relies on 
thirty-one semi-structured interviews I conducted with actors in the locality and 
                                                 
9
 Longhurst (2010) offers a more detailed discussion in that regard.  
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elsewhere, who ranged from private and state-owned firms, government officials and 
union and industrial association leaders to former and current employees of PEMEX-
Petrochemicals, journalists, scholars, and specialised service providers.  
Of the twenty private firms I intended to interview, only thirteen agreed to participate. 
The information from nine of these companies is what enriched the discussion 
pertaining to the quality of vertical relationships in the locality, whereas the data made 
available by the other four firms served to construct arguments regarding broader 
political economy issues.  
In respect of state-owned firms, even if all the complexes under the administration of 
PEMEX-Petrochemicals granted me access, the quality of the data and that of the 
informant varied greatly from one another. I requested to interview the managers of 
Pajaritos and Cangrejera, but they claimed to be extremely busy and thus unable to 
spend time to discuss the topics set out in the questionnaire. In turn, I was offered to 
speak to individuals occupying a much inferior category within each firm – a condition 
that compromised the value of the information since participants failed to elaborate on 
the topics projected to be discussed and responses tended to rest on personal 
perspectives rather than on a more institutional outlook. Morelos and Cosoleacaque 
complexes lie on the other side of the spectrum. In both instances, informants played 
pivotal roles within their organisations and possessed the knowledge to illuminate the 
topics covered in the questionnaire. Despite these inconsistencies, the information 
acquired led me to reflect on the character of PEMEX-Petrochemicals as a provider of 
industrial raw materials and substantiated the restricted availability of local inputs, as 
well as on the sort of features making up the complex scenario of the petrochemical 
industry in Mexico.  
In addition to interviewing petrochemical firms, it soon became clear that it was 
essential to speak to actors associated in one way or another with the dynamics of the 
sector. I hence conducted interviews with individuals from different backgrounds such 
as government officials, former employees of PEMEX, scholars, journalists, and 
industry association leaders; and since a number of these were not exclusively 
established in the locality it was also necessary to visit Mexico City and Xalapa, the 
capital of the state of Veracruz. Even though gaining access to these actors was at first 
problematical, the networks I established in the field eventually facilitated the obtaining 
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of interviews. The overall aim of these interviews was to distinguish the array of 
external factors constituting the complex scenario in which local transactional linkages 
are embedded and corroborate facts provided by petrochemical firms. Interviews with 
scholars served to understand, for example, how the U.S. energy security strategy can 
be linked to the fact that PEMEX-Petrochemicals is processing less oil and natural gas 
than it did a decade ago. Moreover, interviews with former employees of PEMEX 
contributed to discerning the extent to which policymakers are responsible for the 
current standing of the state-owned petrochemical industry and how regulations have 
constrained at the same time the configuration of value chains of petrochemical origin, 
to which private firms in southern Veracruz are central.  
Turning now to the challenges I confronted in the field, the most notable one was that a 
number of prospective informants in private firms appeared to be reluctant to discuss 
certain issues. This is demonstrated by the fact that thirteen out of twenty firms 
responded favorably to interview requests. I established contact with all of them for the 
first time prior to arriving to the locality, attaching to emails an institutional letter 
describing my research as well as a concise personal introduction. Once settled in 
Minatitlán, I sought to get in touch with specific individuals at firms by means of emails 
and phone calls. By this time I had prepared a questionnaire that I also attached to 
emails. Despite these formalities, certain firms seemed to be reluctant to respond so that 
I presupposed that handing in the appropriate documents in person would help persuade 
them. This I did in some cases. In relation to those firms that rejected the request to be 
interviewed, it eventually became evident that what made companies decline my 
petition was the sort of information I requested in the questionnaire. I was not 
completely aware that certain questions would entail interviewees disclosing 
information commonly treated as confidential. This point was, in due course, raised by 
individuals who I interviewed in the early stages of fieldwork and held high ranking 
posts at other petrochemical firms. While it is certain that the questionnaire I provided 
may have deterred specific firms from participating, others adopted a much more 
flexible attitude and agreed to be interviewed on the basis of excluding those issues 
considered not appropriate to discuss. The latter did not imply fundamental changes 
with respect to the research process, on the contrary, it led to craft a down-to-the-point 
semi-structured questionnaire and for instance a less intrusive manner to approaching 
firms. In the end the information originally requested was found to be not as pertinent to 
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both contextualise and conceptualise vertical transactional linkages in the locality, but it 
did help in orientating position my research in the right direction.   
Secondary sources  
Although semi-structured interviews bestowed a generous share of empirical evidence 
to problematise inter-firm linkages in the Veracruz cluster and distinguish external 
determinants influencing local governance structures, there can be no hesitation in 
stating that the assembly of a comprehensive analysis in this thesis would have been 
impossible without having resorted to complementary sources of information, most of 
which was recommended and sometimes made available by a number of key 
informants. The literature on research methodology is equally assertive with respect to 
this statement. White (2010: 63) argues that „for many geographical investigations, 
secondary data are indispensable, since the project could not proceed without such 
data‟. As far as the discussion exposed in this work is concerned, secondary sources 
were fundamental since they contributed to establishing linkages between pertinent 
political economy issues (external determinants) and dynamics occurring in the locality 
(inter-firm transactional relationships).  
Hence the assortment of secondary sources on which analysis in this thesis rely 
stretches from existing publications around the Mexican economy and PEMEX, 
government official documents, and newspapers to specialised magazines and 
databases. As regards quantitative information, PEMEX yearbooks proved to be the 
most valuable source given that they made it possible to distinguish particular 
circumstances worth exploring in order to understand the Veracruz petrochemical 
cluster from diverse angles. The following examples illustrate the latter: i) annual 
reports made it possible to trace the extent to which output and installed capacity at 
petrochemical complexes in southern Veracruz grew larger under state intervention in 
the 1960s and 1970s and how the former indicator shrivelled while the latter stagnated 
under market-orientated policies from the 1990s onwards (Chapter 5 and Chapter 7); ii) 
PEMEX yearbooks also served to examine how policymakers have articulated crude 
output with the needs of the United States industrial machinery at the expense of 
yielding value-added hydrocarbon inputs at domestic state-owned processing facilities 
(Chapter 6); iii) figures made public by PEMEX similarly demonstrate the extent to 
which revenues are drained to finance government spending to the detriment of 
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upgrading petrochemical complexes in southern Veracruz and expanding the installed 
capacity of the national refining system (Chapter 7).    
While the substance of PEMEX annual reports is unquestionable, the value of other 
sources of quantitative information, namely the national office of statistics (INEGI), the 
U.S. Energy Information Agency (EIA), and the United Nations Trade Commodity 
Statistics Database, must not be underestimated since they served to complement and 
hence strengthen the crafting of arguments concerning scenarios such as those 
mentioned lines above.  
With reference to INEGI, trade figures of crude, petrochemical inputs, products of 
petrochemical origin (plastics, textiles, and other chemicals), and refined products 
(gasoline, diesel, jet fuel) led to reflections on the extent to which Mexico is 
increasingly becoming a simple supplier of crude to the U.S. and a net importer of 
hydrocarbon by-products processed north of the border. This paradoxical scenario is 
extensively examined in Chapter 7.  
Furthermore, discussion around the U.S. energy dependency is elaborated by making 
use of quantitative data computed by the EIA, which permitted a contextualisation of i) 
how U.S. policymakers viewed the hydrocarbon wealth of Mexico in the 1970s at a time 
when the political and economic repercussions of the 1973 Arab oil embargo lingered, 
and ii) the extent to which a growing oil dependency on hostile and volatile suppliers in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s may have coerced U.S. policymakers to sign a free trade 
agreement with Mexico, a much more friendly, trustworthy supplier and holder of 
sizeable hydrocarbon reserves at that point of time. Chapter 6 provides a more detailed 
discussion in that respect.   
Another important source of data was the United Nations Trade Commodity Statistics 
Database, whose figures contributed to tracing imports of a number of petrochemical 
inputs PEMEX-Petrochemicals ceased to produce in southern Veracruz. The aim of 
doing this was to contextualise the erratic role of state-owned complexes as suppliers of 
inputs and the degree of transactional dependency local buyer firms endure. Chapter 8 
elaborates these two issues in a more specific manner.   
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In relation to qualitative data, the official gazette of the Mexican government
10
 (Diario 
Oficial de la Federación, DOF, in its Spanish acronym) stands out as important. While 
PEMEX annual reports served to illustrate how petrochemical output and installed 
capacity grew under state intervention, information published in several issues of the 
DOF made it possible to distinguish i) how policymakers orchestrated the withdrawing 
of the state from the petrochemical industry (Chapter 6), and ii) elucidate the roots of 
output contraction at state-owned petrochemical complexes in the 1990s. The impact of 
this new regulatory framework on both the petrochemical industry and the Veracruz 
cluster is further examined in Chapter 7.  
Snowballing 
In attempting to gain access to participants who appeared to be reluctant at first, I also 
resorted to snowballing. Flowerdew and Martin (2005: 177), for example, make clear 
that such a method refers to „using one contact to help you recruit another contact, who 
in turn can put you in touch with someone else‟. The initial contact, as the authors 
describe, is usually „a friend, relative, neighbor, or someone from a social group or 
formal organisation‟ (Flowerdew and Martin 2005: 117) whose own network may 
facilitate the process of recruiting prospective participants.  
At one point in time I approached the Director-General of an automobile retailer in 
Minatitlán who turned out to be a past employee of PEMEX-Petrochemicals and 
therefore a well-connected individual in the local industrial scene. Conversation with 
this informant was at the beginning related to his view on the local economy, but it 
quickly shifted towards the dynamics of the petrochemical industry given his expertise 
on it. As we ran out of time on that first occasion, he invited me to visit him again some 
days later in order to continue our discussion. He eventually became more interested in 
the research and inquired whether I had found it problematic to gain access to managers 
of petrochemical plants and government officials. I then revealed the identity of those 
who had not replied to my interview requests up to that point. After I mentioned the 
situation arising from the sort of questions I initially incorporated to the questionnaire, 
he suggested he would contact these potential participants by email and insist on the 
importance of the research I was carrying out. I am not entirely certain of the extent to 
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 DOF stands for Diario Oficial de la Federación, the official gazette in which government stipulations 
and decrees are made public.  
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which his intercession was successful, nor of the information he wrote down in those 
emails, though I must concede that, in the end, I did interview some of the individuals 
he got in touch with.  
Another important feature of such a snowballing experience is that this initial contact 
also identified who I should speak to at particular organisations, that is, local 
governments and industry associations. Thanks to his intervention I managed to 
interview a government official at the economic development department of the 
municipality of Coatzacoalcos, who also was a former employee of PEMEX. The point 
to emphasise is that this informant served to provide a more institutional perspective in 
relation to external determinants affecting inter-firm relationships in the locality.  
It was not only contacts I came across while in the field who helped me obtain access to 
participants, but my own set of connections also contributed to recruiting prospective 
informants. By the time fieldwork was coming to an end, of the four state-owned 
petrochemical complexes, only one had not responded favorably to interview requests. 
In this specific case, however, I first need to reveal that some of my own relatives either 
have worked, or are working, at this firm. This said, I now wonder whether my surname 
prompted the potential interviewee to speculate how I was related to employees under 
his authority. I first took for granted that this subject would significantly facilitate 
access to the manager of the petrochemical complex, but it turned out not to be the case. 
Interview requests continued to go unanswered. Nonetheless, a window of opportunity 
appeared a while later given than a relative drew attention to the fact that the manager 
was on holiday and that one of his subordinates had temporarily taken over. I 
established contact with this person and introduced myself once again. The fact that I 
relied on an insider made the interview possible a few days before I returned to 
England.  
Another occasion in which snowballing emerged as an important technique was when a 
interviewer in Mexico City, a journalist and scholar, contacted on my behalf a highly 
respected former employee of PEMEX who at present is a key figure in a pressure 
group opposing many of the changes the current administration plans to put into action. 
The interview with this individual turned out to be the most challenging of all since it 
ended up being an exchange of questions, where the participant tested my technical 
knowledge of the industry as I inquired about certain topics related to the petrochemical 
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division of PEMEX. At the same time, this interview turned out to be one of the most 
rewarding ones not only in terms of the quality of information obtained, but also due to 
the amount of secondary sources provided. This individual, for example, shared digital 
copies of several presentations he and other colleagues had performed before members 
of the Congress and at other forums, as well as a book he had written on PEMEX, 
which contains data that later allowed for the construction of very valuable arguments in 
this thesis.   
Analytical approach 
As fieldwork came to an end, there was no doubt that discussion in this thesis must 
centre on the quality of transactional linkages between PEMEX-Petrochemical and local 
private firms. To have a much more lucid understanding of the latter, as pointed out by 
informants, it was fundamental to look at the wider picture and take into consideration 
certain political, institutional, and economic factors associated with the development 
path Mexico has pursued in recent decades. For instance, analysis with respect to the 
trajectory of the Veracruz petrochemical cluster was built upon crafting a systematic 
manner to study such factors and determining how the external environment influences 
inter-firm relationships in the locality.  
Upon establishing what constitutes the aggregate context in which the petrochemical 
industry is embedded, it became apparent that external determinants could be 
categorised in three dimensions of analysis, namely sectoral, national, and 
supranational.
11
 The sectoral dimension, for example, encompasses the regulatory 
framework that government officials instigated in the 1980s and 1990s as a result of 
embracing market-orientated policies. The heavy tax burden of PEMEX is also 
contemplated in this category. The national dimension illustrates the extent to which 
economic crises in 1982 and 1994, economic liberalisation in the 1990s, the increasing 
use of natural gas for electricity generation, and the country‟s weak tax collection serve 
to outline inter-firm dynamics in southern Veracruz. The supranational dimension of 
analysis mostly refers to both the U.S. energy security strategy and the role of 
multilateral institutions in shaping Mexico‟s economic foundations. This said, the point 
                                                 
11
 Figure 3.4 schematises the dimensions of analysis. The reason why such figure is not included in this 
subsection is because Chapter 3 conceptualises the case study.   
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to highlight is that governance structures of vertical transactional linkages in the 
Veracruz cluster are in one way or another embedded in these three dimensions.  
Given the complexity of the external environment, the question that arises is as to how 
the trajectory of the Veracruz cluster and the nature of inter-firm relationships are to be 
assessed. The former required developing a systematic way to present the contextual 
and empirical evidence. For instance, discussion in this thesis could have been 
organised by focusing on one dimension of analysis at a time, but this proved 
problematic as a number of factors are linked to one another in a sequential fashion. For 
example, regulations encouraging participation of private firms (at the expense of state 
intervention) in the petrochemical industry materialised in the context of economic 
liberalisation put into practice in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which is 
simultaneously rooted in the debt crisis of the early 1980s. From this point of view, the 
most appropriate method to contextualise the aggregate environment was by 
establishing a timeline. While Chapters 4 and 5 discuss the origins of the oil industry in 
Mexico and the establishment of the petrochemical industry under the tutelage of the 
state, respectively, Chapters 6, 7, and 8 concentrate on the range of economic, political, 
and institutional factors above mentioned in a somewhat chronological manner, 
exposing analytical dimensions indistinctively.  
With regard to assessment of the nature of inter-firm relationships in the Veracruz 
cluster, Chapter 9 casts light on this topic. It can hence be observed that discussion in 
this thesis first seeks to discern the complexity of the external environment and then 
illustrates the impact of it on the development of the Veracruz petrochemical cluster. 
What is the rationale behind this approach to examining our case study? The answer 
rests on the fact that it sets out beforehand the determinants that help understand the 
profound degree of transactional dependence that private firms bear with respect to 
state-owned complexes – the most important feature of the Veracruz petrochemical 
cluster. That being said, it is worth noticing that contextualisation of these complex 
relationships, which entails to depict the trajectory of private firms and how linkages 
with suppliers have evolved over time, serves to illuminate the determinants that lock 
private firms into captive transactional relationships.  
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THE OBJECT OF STUDY  
The group of firms dedicated to the production of hydrocarbon-derived products in the 
neighbouring municipalities of Coatzacoalcos, Minatitlán and Cosoleacaque in the state 
of Veracruz is arguably the largest geographical agglomeration of industrial firms in 
southern Mexico, with this area being home to four state-owned petrochemical 
complexes (PEMEX-Petrochemicals), one state-owned refinery (PEMEX-Refining), 
twenty private petrochemical firms, and an array of local institutions such as 
universities, industry-orientated associations, a pool of specialised service firms, and an 
infrastructure network that facilitates the distribution of inputs throughout and beyond 
the cluster. The horizontal and vertical linkages connecting this range of actors to one 
another are reflected in the following definition of our case study: the Veracruz cluster 
is a spatially concentrated group of public and private petrochemical firms that are 
linked through output-input transactions, yield raw materials required by a wide range 
of industrial sectors (value chains), and operate alongside a pool of local institutions in a 
rather complex environment. 
As one observes, this definition encapsulates the two fundamental features of the 
Veracruz cluster, that is, vertical transactional linkages embedded in a complex 
aggregate environment. In order to understand the scope of our case study, I contend 
that it is essential to situate the description of such features in a somewhat broader 
setting. This section will therefore briefly describe the external (backward and forward) 
linkages of the cluster, introduce the drivers that lead to state-owned firms controlling 
input transactions, and underline the role of the petrochemical industry in the 
development of value chains. Nonetheless, before starting this discussion, a concise 
description of the location of the Veracruz cluster is required.  
Southern Veracruz 
The character of southern Veracruz as an industrial enclave can be traced back to the 
first decade of the 20
th
 century. S. Pearson & Sons, a British engineering firm, built the 
first Mexican refinery in Minatitlán in 1905
12
 (Brown 1987). Several decades later, 
more precisely in the 1960s and 1970s, government officials sought to encourage the 
development of infant industries through the industrialisation of hydrocarbon resources. 
                                                 
12
 This point is briefly discussed in Chapter 4.  
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To that end, the petrochemical industry was viewed as determinant. At that time, the 
relative wealth of southern Veracruz with respect to natural gas, crude oil, and water 
drew the interest of policy makers and private investors for the establishment of 
petrochemical plants. Similarly, from the government perspective, it was an alternative 
for ameliorating the spatial concentration of activities import-substituting 
industrialisation policies had led to. The Echeverría government (1970-76) considered 
creating growth poles to encourage industrial development away from the traditional 
sites. The southern region of Veracruz (Figure 2.1) is a rather illustrative example of 
such state-led development (Blanco 1981, Snoeck 1986).  
Figure 2.1 Location of the Veracruz petrochemical cluster 
 
   
  Source: Adapted from Sistema de Información Geográfica de PEMEX (SICORI n.d.). 
Our case study is in the south of the state of Veracruz, which is geographically situated 
in the north of the Tehuantepec Isthmus
13
, a region that represents the shortest distance 
                                                 
13
 At its narrowest point, the Isthmus of Tehuantepec covers a distance of 220 km (Encyclopaedia 
Britannica n.d.)  
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between the Gulf of Mexico and the Pacific Ocean. The relative importance of the 
locality, which is formed by the municipalities of Coatzacoalcos, Minatitlán, and 
Cosoleacaque, also rests on the fact that it is strategically positioned. A few kilometres 
to the south of the Veracruz cluster, the motorway and railway
14
 network that connects 
the south-eastern states, the southern Pacific coast, and the central highlands converges. 
Additionally, the locality borders the Gulf of Mexico where petrochemical firms have 
access by means of a specialised port infrastructure. The point to address here is that 
such a location and the existing transport infrastructure not only facilitate the supply of 
local production to user firms in the more industrialised states in the highlands and 
northern Mexico, it also favours access to hydrocarbon inputs from the energy-rich 
southern states
15
.   
Another noteworthy characteristic of the locality is that it houses the two largest urban 
centres of southern Veracruz and the Isthmus of Tehuantepec. The city of 
Coatzacoalcos ranks first with an estimated population of 235,983
16
, according to 
INEGI, the national office of statistics, while the city of Minatitlán ranks second with an 
urban population of 159,545 inhabitants
17
. With a population of 22,454
18
 as of 2010, 
Cosoleacaque is the smallest of the three urban centres (INEGI n.d.). Needless to say, 
Coatzacoalcos is the epicentre of the locality in many respects and the city not only 
possesses a thriving service sector that dwarfs those of Minatitlán and Cosoleacaque, it 
is also home to the headquarters of PEMEX-Petrochemicals, three state-owned 
petrochemical firms (Cangrejera, Pajaritos, and Morelos), several private 
                                                 
14
 The Veracruz cluster lies just a few kilometres from the Compañía de Ferrocarriles Chiapas – Mayab 
crossing, which connects the southern states, Ferrocarriles del Istmo de Tehuantepec, which runs south to 
the Pacific coast, and Ferrosur, the company that links the former and the latter with the rest of the 
country, as indicated by the Ministry of Communications and Transport (SCT 2009). 
15
 With respect to natural gas and crude, the states to the south of Veracruz and the territorial waters 
bordering these states accounted for 63.89 and 96.34 percent of the overall production of PEMEX, 
respectively (PEMEX 2010a). 
16
 This figure refers to the population of the city of Coatzacoalcos. The population of the entire 
municipality, which encompasses several communities, stands at 305,260 inhabitants according to the 
2010 General Census of Population and Housing (INEGI n.d.).  
17 
The city of Minatitlán has expanded beyond its political boundaries. Of these 159,545 inhabitants, 
47,499 live in areas corresponding to the municipality of Cosoleacaque. Without taking into account this 
number, the aggregate population of the municipality of Minatitlán, which includes outlying 
communities, is 157,840 inhabitants, according to the 2010 General Census of Population and Housing 
(INEGI n.d.).   
18
 However, most of the population of the municipality of Cosoleacaque, which totals 117,725 
inhabitants, live in outlying communities. 47,499 residents, for example, live in the metropolitan area of 
Minatitlán (INEGI n.d.).  
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petrochemicals firms, and a port infrastructure specialising in the handling of bulk cargo 
and petrochemical products
19
.  
The scope of transactional linkages of the Veracruz cluster  
Even though the Veracruz cluster includes a number of actors, two of these are central 
to this thesis, namely state-owned firms and the pool of private petrochemical 
companies. The first group of firms refers to the complexes of Cosoleacaque, 
Cangrejera, Pajaritos, and Morelos, which constitute the petrochemical division of 
PEMEX and represent over 90 percent of the installed capacity and output of the 
subsidiary, as previously indicated. The second group includes twenty private firms 
which are clustered around these complexes and further process the inputs yielded by 
the first group
20
.  
The Veracruz cluster is embedded in a broader network of backward and forward 
linkages that indicates the range of industries fed by local firms. Figure 2.2 illustrates 
how actors inside and outside the cluster are linked. To begin with, attention must be 
paid to the different divisions of PEMEX situated in the first nodes of the input-output 
scheme shown.  
Backward linkages, for instance, refer to the players that supply the precursors 
(naphthas and natural gas) of petrochemical value chains. The role of the different 
divisions of PEMEX
21
, situated in the first nodes of the input-output scheme described, 
are central in this respect (Figure 2.2). The process begins with the extraction of crude 
and natural gas by PEMEX-Exploration and Production (PEP). After that stage, 
PEMEX-Refining (PR) and PEMEX-Gas (PG) perform further processing activities for 
both inputs. Crude, for example, is not only processed into fuels such as gasoline and 
diesel, it is also used to yield other by-products such as sulphur and naphthas. The 
Minatitlán refinery, which belongs to the refining division of PEMEX, supplies sulphur 
to local firms for the making of fertilisers. Naphthas, which is one of the main value 
chain precursors in the locality, is supplied by the Minatitlán refinery to the complex of 
                                                 
19
 Information obtained from fieldwork interviews and the Coatzacoalcos port authority website 
(APICOATZA n.d.).  
20
 For 2008, it is reported that economic activities associated with the production of petrochemicals and 
fertilisers in the three municipalities employed 16,037 workers. If the number of workers at the Minatitlán 
refinery is taken into consideration, the figure stands at 19,772 (INEGI 2009).  
21
 Since 1992 PEMEX has been organised into a central holding with four subsidiaries (Chapter 6).  
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Figure 2.2  The structure of the Veracruz cluster and linkages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Source: The author‟s database.  
  Note: Bold arrows indicate linkages central to this thesis. Dashed arrows denote secondary 
  links that lie outside our analysis. The vertical dashed arrow to the left of buyer firms refers 
  to transaction relationships within this group of companies. 
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La Cangrejera
22
 for the making of aromatics
23
 - one of the most commercially important 
families of compounds in the petrochemical industry (Burdick and Leffler 1990: 12). 
With regards to natural gas, once this is extracted by PEMEX- Exploration and 
Production, it is necessary to separate the different associated compounds. This process 
is carried out by PEMEX-Gas, which subsequently distributes the input to the different 
subsidiaries of PEMEX and other users for their own industrial processes. Once natural 
gas and naphthas reach the petrochemical complexes of Cosoleacaque, La Cangrejera, 
Morelos, and Pajaritos, both inputs are then turned into petrochemical building blocks 
such as ethylene, styrene, ammonia, and aromatics. 
Figure 2.2 also illustrates the backward linkages that local buyer firms establish with 
external suppliers. At times, as discussed in Chapter 8, PEMEX-Petrochemicals fails to 
supply certain inputs demanded locally and buyers have no alternative but to find 
providers abroad. The Tereftalatos company, which uses paraxylene to produce 
terephthalic acid in the municipality of Cosoleacaque, is a case in point. As PEMEX-
Petrochemicals ceased production of paraxylene, this input is sourced in the United 
States. Fefermex faces a similar situation since PEMEX has also ceased production of 
cumene and drastically reduced that of acrylonitrile, forcing Fefermex to devise a 
scheme to import these compounds for the making of acetone phenol. This issue is 
further contextualised in Chapter 8.  
Vertical linkages in the locality, which are one of the two building blocks of this thesis, 
reflect the way value-adding activities are organised. Put simply, the state-owned 
petrochemical complexes produce (supply) the basic inputs that local private firms 
(buyers) use to yield intermediate petrochemical inputs. Even though private firms at 
times supply inputs to PEMEX petrochemical firms, it is worth reiterating that this 
scheme occurs to a lesser extent. Figure 2.2 in fact depicts the prevailing pattern of the 
organisation of production in the Veracruz cluster. One of the features that the bold, 
solid arrow pointing towards private firms indicates is that the state-owned firms usually 
play the role of producer (supplier). The point to emphasise here is that the way 
                                                 
22
 It is worth pointing out that the Minatitlán refinery is not the only supplier of naphthas to La 
Cangrejera.  
23
 Benzene, toluene, and xylenes are among the most representative compounds of the aromatics family 
(Burdick and Leffler 1990).  
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production is organised in the Veracruz cluster is rooted in the regulations that previous 
governments laid down during the infant stages of the industry.  
In the interests of developing the petrochemical industry, the government had to 
distinguish the scope of public interest from that of the private sector. The presidential 
regimes of Ruiz Cortinez (1952-58) and López Mateos (1958-1964) gave PEMEX the 
exclusive right to produce basic petrochemicals, while allowing private firms to 
transform these primary inputs into both intermediate inputs and final products (Snoeck 
1986). Regulations ensured the state was entitled to produce basic industrial raw 
materials, which are derived from „petrochemical processes based on the first important 
chemical transformation of hydrocarbon resources and its sub-products‟, while those 
„products derived from subsequent petrochemical processes (secondary petrochemical 
products) are subject to being indistinctly produced by either the state or private 
participants‟ (DOF 25/08/1959) 24.  
In the subsequent decades, the expansion of the petrochemical industry, particularly in 
the Veracruz cluster, was in line with these government stipulations; state-owned firms 
are devoted to producing and supplying the basic petrochemical inputs that clustered 
private companies use in their own production processes.  
In this vertical relationship, the most pervasive characteristic is that state-owned firms 
wield a disproportionate amount of authority over transactional relationships with local 
private firms. In this sense, the regulations introduced by market-friendly governments 
in the 1980s and 1990s, the fact that state-owned complexes are the only producers and 
hence domestic suppliers of several inputs, the state-owned nature of the producer, the 
hazardous nature of petrochemical inputs, and the capabilities on the buying end have 
reinforced the leading position of PEMEX-Petrochemicals. The bold, solid arrow in 
Figure 2.2 also illustrates the dominant role of PEMEX-Petrochemicals in relationships 
with buyers.  
It is also important to underline that this scenario has turned local private firms into 
captive buyers. Despite the extent of trade liberalisation in the country and the existence 
of competitive suppliers at the other end of the Gulf of Mexico, buyers appear to favour 
                                                 
24 
DOF stands for Diario Oficial de la Federación, the official gazette in which government stipulations 
and decrees are made public.  
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sourcing inputs locally. In addition to the logistical capabilities that the import of 
materials demands, the concerns that also seem to lock buyers into captive relationships 
are spatial proximity in relation to suppliers and the hazardous nature of petrochemical 
inputs (the fact that inputs are transported over distances where risks can be minimised 
and supply delivered promptly).  
In addition to these factors, it is important to make a parenthesis to reiterate that analysis 
of vertical linkages in the Veracruz cluster must be situated in the context of the 
political economy of Mexico. In doing so, this thesis embeds the use of GVC ideas in a 
set of economic, political, and institutional factors associated with both the path of 
development Mexico has followed and the crossroads at which the country has found 
itself in recent decades. It is certain that the trajectory of the Veracruz cluster would be 
difficult to understand without discussion of subjects such as the wider implications of 
market-orientated policies and the sectoral regulatory framework that Mexican policy 
makers have implemented since the 1980s. In this context, however, the issues that also 
deserve attention are i) the significance of the Mexican hydrocarbon industry for the 
United States energy security strategy, with this being related to oil dependency on 
(OPEC) volatile suppliers and the vertical integration of U.S. oil firms, and ii) the 
repercussions of the 1994 peso crisis for the petrochemical industry. This is to say that 
governance and upgrading prospects in the Veracruz cluster are strongly determined by 
sectoral, national, and supranational drivers
25
.  
Back to the discussion on linkages, local firms also engage in transactional relationships 
with downstream players. While these are beyond the concerns of this thesis, I believe it 
is relevant to shed light on two features of the Veracruz cluster in this sense. First, most 
local firms are predominantly geared towards the domestic market and generally began 
operations in the locality with the aim of encouraging the development of associated 
domestic industries (national value chains). This feature is in line with the industrial 
policy that prevailed in the 1960s and 1970s when the government sought to promote 
the development of infant industrial sectors (orientated to meet domestic demand) by 
providing subsidised petrochemical inputs (Chapter 5). In recent times, as the size of the 
Mexican petrochemical market has outstripped local output, firms in the cluster appear 
                                                 
25
 These „external determinants of local governance‟ are schematised in Chapter 3.  
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to have little incentive to engage in export activities and hence tend to market their 
products locally.  
Second, the extent of fragmentation of the petrochemical industry is considerable. A 
certain number of basic inputs (PEMEX-Petrochemicals) may be transformed into a 
much wider number of intermediate raw materials (local buyer firms) that at the same 
time feed a rather broad spectrum of industrial sectors (value chains).  
At phases further downstream it is indicated that firms situated elsewhere use the 
intermediate inputs yielded in the Veracruz cluster to produce either further 
intermediate inputs or final goods. The assortment of user industries linked to local 
petrochemical output stretches from fertilisers and plastics to textiles and consumer 
goods (Figure 2.3). This means that local firms, apart from those dedicated to the 
production of fertilisers, which are regarded as final products, carry out well-defined 
value-adding activities associated with the early sequences of such value chains. As 
shown in Figure 2.3, a large number of value chains are represented in the Veracruz 
cluster.  
To sum up the information provided by Figure 2.3, the state is heavily involved in 
upstream activities with bold squares (and Figure 2.2) indicating that the scope of 
PEMEX extends from crude and natural gas extraction to the production of basic 
petrochemical inputs.  
At this stage it should be noted that the latter is in keeping with Gereffi‟s claims (1994: 
101) that „the role of the state at the point of production tends to be more interventionist 
in producer-driven chains‟ and the indications are that this is the role of the Mexican 
government with respect to transactional linkages in the Veracruz cluster.  
Local private firms, on the other hand, indicated with dashed squares in Figure 2.3, 
process basic petrochemical inputs into either intermediate raw materials or fertilisers. 
Firms outside the locality, depicted by the squares to the extreme right of the scheme, 
are devoted to the making of further intermediate inputs and the manufacture of final 
goods.  
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Figure 2.3  Main basic and intermediate inputs yielded at the Veracruz petrochemical 
cluster and final applications 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Source: Adapted from Cervantes Polanco (2005)   
 and the author‟s database.  
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Similarly, with regard to the different value chains of petrochemical origin shown in 
Figure 2.3, it is also possible to identify a pattern for the location of private firms with 
those firms transforming primary inputs into secondary ones (local private 
petrochemical firms) being situated close to the source of raw materials, clustered 
around PEMEX-Petrochemicals. Firms turning intermediate inputs into either further 
raw materials or final goods (forward linkages that are beyond the concerns of this 
thesis) are situated close to the largest consumer markets.  
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This chapter has demonstrated that research methods were at the centre of the process of 
gathering relevant data for the construction of legitimate arguments in this thesis. 
Fieldwork activities, as has been noted, were crucial to distinguishing the pre-
conceptions held at the time of designing the present research which failed to capture 
the range of dynamics occurring among firms in the Veracruz cluster, and this turned 
out to be one of the most important empirical findings that served to indicate the path of 
analysis that should be pursued in this work. In that respect, the use of semi-structured 
interviews was what permitted me to discern that the link between the petrochemical 
industry in southern Veracruz and the extent of economic expansion the locality had 
been experiencing up to that moment was not as apparent as I had at first assumed. It 
was the flexibility of this kind of interviews that eventually brought to light empirical 
evidence of greater weight, namely, the nature and importance of transactional 
relationships between supplier and buyers of petrochemical inputs and the complex, 
aggregate (political, economic, and institutional ) context in which these relationships 
were embedded.  
This chapter also went on to explore the fundamental characteristics of the case study, 
revealing the degree to which firms are connected to one another within the cluster and 
how local companies are at the same time engaged in backward and forward external 
linkages. The aim was to illustrate how processing activities are organised in the locality 
- as depicted in Figure 2.2 - and that state-owned and private petrochemical firms 
situated in southern Veracruz play a critical role in the composition of a wide range of 
value chains – an argument elucidated in Figure 2.3.  
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3 
CONCEPTUALISING LOCAL GOVERNANCE 
Producer-buyer linkages in the Veracruz cluster 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Why is it necessary to analyse the Veracruz cluster from the perspective of vertical 
inter-firm linkages? Firms in the Veracruz cluster, more specifically the pool of private 
petrochemical companies, are concerned about their prospects for attaining higher 
degrees of productivity in a globalised economy. Even though it is recognised that the 
majority of firms in the locality are heavily involved in national value chains, the 
economic liberalisation Mexico has experienced since the 1980s has not only 
established new regulations, it has also permitted the involvement of foreign firms 
through imports. This is to say that companies in the Veracruz cluster participate in the 
petrochemical domestic market as part of a globalised setting. Firms from throughout 
the world also face the same predicament concerning productivity and profitability; first 
and foremost those inserted in the global circuits of production, distribution, and 
exchange. In attempting to discover what helps firms enhance performance, it is claimed 
(Porter 1990, Kaplinsky 2000, cited in Humphrey and Schmitz 2002: 1017) that a 
fundamental avenue for achieving this is by means of upgrading. In other words, „to 
make better products, make them more efficiently, or move into more skilled activities‟, 
as Humphrey and Schmitz put it (2002: 1017). The answer to the initial question 
therefore lies in the fact that the main local driver for buyer firms to enhance 
performance is related to the quality of their transactional linkages with PEMEX-
Petrochemicals.  
With regard to the co-ordination of inter-firm relationships, an influential stream of 
literature has emerged in recent years. The global value chain approach
26
 has 
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 Gereffi (1994) in his influential paper on how U.S. retailers shape overseas production networks uses 
the term global commodity chains. At a workshop in Bellagio, Italy, in September 2000, scholars 
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considerably widened our understanding as to what triggers (or limits) upgrading across 
firms, with particular reference to those situated in less advanced economies (Gereffi 
1999, Dolan and Humphrey 2000, Schmitz and Knorringa 2000, Fleury and Fleury 
2001). For the GVC approach, the main focus of analysis, and arguably the most 
important empirical foundation, is the cross-national transactional linkages that firms in 
industrialised economies establish with their counterparts in the developing world. 
Using this view, a considerable number of studies have been devoted to analysing value 
chains in which the first group of firms (buyers in industrialised economies) tend to set 
the parameters for other participants in the chain (suppliers in developing countries) 
(Schmitz 2004).  
How does the study of intra-cluster vertical linkages fit into this body of literature? 
Given the complexity and the multi-dimensional character of the context in which the 
Veracruz cluster is embedded, which local firms wield no influence over, I believe that 
the most important local determinant for enhancing competitiveness, at least for buyers, 
is the quality of relationships these firms have with PEMEX-Petrochemicals, the local 
supplier of inputs. The type of vertical relationship in the locality affects the competitive 
performance of firms. As the GVC approach provides the conceptual underpinnings to 
study the governance of transactional linkages between producers and buyers, at the 
international level, I contend that this line of reasoning offers an important framework 
for addressing the empirical evidence provided by the Veracruz cluster.   
It is of great importance to remember that the development of the Veracruz cluster is 
embedded in the context of the complex political economy of Mexico. This 
environment, formed by a range of intertwined policies and economic junctures I label 
“external drivers of local governance”27, has shaped not only the character of vertical 
linkages in the locality but also affects the upgrading possibilities for the entire cluster. 
That is to say, the prospects for state-owned and private petrochemical firms to boost 
competitiveness are rooted in the complex external setting. This statement serves to 
reiterate that this thesis focuses on analysing the trajectory of the Veracruz cluster and 
                                                                                                                                               
interested in the study of transnational production systems agreed to use the term global value chains 
(Gereffi et al. 2001). I will therefore use this term throughout the thesis.  
27
 Such determinants are schematised in subsequent sections of this chapter.  
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the nature of local transactional relationships through the lens of the peculiar political 
economy of Mexico on the one hand and the global value chain approach on the other.  
The aim of the present chapter is to therefore propose a framework based on key 
conceptual underpinnings of GVC theory in order to examine the transactional 
dynamics between PEMEX-Petrochemicals and the pool of local buyer firms. In so 
doing, it is necessary to bear in mind the role of external drivers in shaping governance 
in the locality. As to the operationalisation of the global value chain approach, the point 
to underline here is that this body of literature must not be underestimated with respect 
to determining the governance of vertical linkages in clusters that are not predominantly 
engaged in cross-national and/or buyer-driven relationships.  
Even though the conceptual approach used in this thesis focuses on GVC ideas, it is 
important to concisely describe alternative schools of thought. The organisation of the 
chapter is as follows. It begins with a review on the competing approaches to industrial 
clustering such as the Marshallian industrial district, the growth pole concept, the new 
economic geography, industrial districts, and business studies. Here the intention is to 
illustrate the conceptual evolution of the topic over time. The discussion continues 
throwing light on a string of theories in which the role of the firm is central. The 
literature around networks of value, global production networks, local production 
systems, varieties of capitalism, and local governance serves to elucidate alternative 
views on how firms relate with each other and with associated institutions. The rest of 
the chapter concentrates on explaining the drivers behind the emergence of the GVC 
approach, core concepts of this school of thought, and how this is associated with the 
empirical evidence found in the Veracruz cluster.  
INDUSTRIAL CLUSTERING IN THE LITERATURE  
Scholars in the fields of geography, development studies, economics, business strategy, 
and regional science are increasingly interested in studying the geographical distribution 
of production. This academic trend is believed to have gained popularity as a result of 
globalisation of the world economy – a phenomenon that has led to firms and countries 
interacting in a competitive global environment. In the realms of scholarship and 
policymaking, the search for more effective mechanisms to shore up economic growth 
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and productivity soon became apparent. In this respect, the notion of industrial clusters 
represents a fascinating opportunity to reflect on the forces underlying competitiveness.  
Nevertheless, the concept of industrial clustering is not recent and its origins can be 
traced back to Alfred Marshall‟s Principles of Economics28, in which the author 
examined „the concentration of specialised industries in particular localities‟ (Marshall 
1959: 222). In reviewing the existing literature, it is evident that the work of Marshall is 
considered the first documented effort to explore the character of industrial 
agglomerations – an endeavour undertaken towards the end of the nineteenth century in 
England.  
It is not until the 1950s that there was a noticeable increase in academic production on 
the subject, a process that has become even more pronounced over the course of the last 
two decades. Perroux (1955), Becattini (1990), Porter (1990), and Krugman (1991a, 
1991b) are just some of the authors who have studied the factors leading to the 
clustering of economic agents in specific geographic areas. In all of these cases, the 
authors have adopted distinctive approaches that clearly respond to the economic 
circumstances prevailing at given times, leading to the emergence of an array of theories 
such as growth poles (Perroux 1955), industrial districts (Becattini 1990, 2004, Pyke 
and Sengenberger 1992), industrial clusters (Porter 1990), and new economic geography 
(Krugman 1991a).   
At this point it is necessary to briefly describe these schools of thought in order not only 
to elucidate the theoretical and analytical evolution of the topic over time, but also to 
link particular characteristics of the Veracruz cluster to these ideas:  
 The Marshallian industrial district 
Alfred Marshall, a British economist, first introduced the term industrial district in 
the tenth chapter of his Principles of Economics, in which the author discusses 
patterns of industrial organisation in nineteenth century England. Much of 
Marshall‟s interest was linked to the economic drivers of industrial districts with his 
analysis focusing on the „fortunes of groups of skilled workers who are gathered 
within the narrow boundaries of a manufacturing town or thickly peopled industrial 
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 The Principles of Economics was first published in 1890.  
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district‟ (Marshall 1959: 225). Note that the author makes use of the term industrial 
district and associates it with the existence of a local system where the local 
community is at the core leading to the idea that economic determinants are as 
important as social contexts. On the one hand, this interaction demonstrates that both 
workers and firms are mutually beneficial since industrial districts are in a better 
position to compete with rivals by having access to a skilful workforce, which is 
determinant in attracting more firms into the locality. Workers also benefit as firms 
offer a constant market for their skills. On the other hand, the social component of 
the industrial district also implies that the local community includes channels that 
allow the dissemination of information. In view of this, ideas and values prevailing 
in the district may be reproduced and upgraded by community members (Marshall 
1959).   
That said, an industrial district is not only an agent that encourages the reproduction 
of capital, productive specialisation, and the division of labour; it also fosters the 
construction of social spaces in which individuals coexist and exchange information. 
However, one of Marshall‟s most significant contributions was to study the process 
of industrial clustering from a spatial approach, being aware of the fact that certain 
economic activities lie within the confines of bounded geographical areas containing 
a pool of skilful individuals (Marshall 1959). To a significant degree, this viewpoint 
continues to be valuable in contemporary debates.  
 The growth pole concept 
The growth pole concept is attributed to Alfred Perroux, a prominent figure in the 
French school of spatial economics. His paper Note sur la notion de pole de 
croissance
29
 (1955) proved to be influential since it stimulated discussion on both 
sides of the Atlantic with regard to industrial organisation in the decades that 
followed (Lausen 1969: 137). The rationale of the growth pole was to interpret the 
nature of growth in a national economy from a local viewpoint. Perroux insists that 
industrial output is the force behind growth, which is at the same time associated 
with the performance of what he calls propulsive industries. Output from these 
industries is understood to expand at a faster pace and is capable of sending growth 
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 Note on the concept of growth poles.  
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waves across a broader economic landscape, that is, the national economy. Much of 
the allure of the growth pole concept lies in the fact that economic gains are 
transmitted through intra-firm input-output schemes, where the propulsive industry, 
by increasing its own output, has the capacity to foster output expansions in related 
sectors (Perroux 1955). 
Despite the pioneering character of the growth pole concept, it was similarly 
recognised as being plagued by imprecision. For example, Perroux disregards the 
geographical sense of economic growth, but at the same time he appears to be aware 
of the spatial nature of productive activities (Semple et al. 1972). Lausen (1969: 13) 
underlines how the definitions of core concepts offered by Perroux are both 
imprecise and incomplete. Notwithstanding the conceptual shortcomings of Perroux, 
a considerable number of social scientists (Boudeville 1966, 1972, Lausen 1971, 
Penouil 1972, Petrella 1972, Parr 1965, 1973, Kuklinsky 1970, 1972, Buttler 1975, 
Paelinck 1975) sought to moderate the elusiveness of the theoretical guidelines of 
the French school of space economics and the concept of growth poles set the tone 
of the debate on spatial planning in the 1960s and 1970s.  
 New economic geography 
Even though the location of production is a pervasive feature of the world economy, 
economists overlooked the subject at least until the early 1990s. Krugman (1991a, 
1991b), who attributed the latter to analytical gaps, created a collection of 
quantitative instruments based on the notions of increasing returns, imperfect 
competition, and transport costs. This set of analytical tools for the study of 
industrial agglomerations proved to be important in many respects. On the one hand, 
it offered a window of opportunity for the emergence of a genre of research 
commonly referred to as new economic geography (Krugman 1998). It also 
prompted a heated debate among geographers as to the scope of the discipline and 
the direction it was heading (Brulhart 1998, Amin and Thrift 2000, Martin and 
Sunley 2001, Yeung 2001). On the other hand, Krugman‟s analytical approach was 
well received by economists working on spatial topics to the point that the transport 
cost function is now standard practice in most new economic geography models 
(Eckey and Kosfeld 2004, Neary 2001, McCann 2005).  
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 Industrial districts 
The literature on industrial districts is associated with the pattern of development 
that emerged in the centre-northeast provinces of Italy, where clustered small- and 
medium-sized companies comprise the main driver of the local economies. To a 
great extent, this form of industrial organisation drew the attention of scholars for 
two fundamental reasons. First, these regions helped Italy counterbalance the 
slowdown in economic growth experienced by other large capitalist countries for 
much of the last quarter of the twentieth century. Second, this slowdown in growth 
was thought to be rooted in the crisis of the Fordist industrial model. Consequently, 
the district concept was viewed as an „alternative to this system of mass production 
and a way out of the crisis of Fordism‟ (Dunford 2006a: 5-6).  
Becattini, an Italian political economist, was one of the early researchers who sought 
to formulate the theoretical underpinnings of the district. The author defines 
industrial districts as „a socioterritorial entity which is characterised by the active 
presence of both a community of people and a population of firms in one naturally 
and historically bounded area‟ (Becattini 2004: 19). In a similar way to Marshall‟s 
nineteenth century remarks, Becattini also argues that firms are embedded in a 
geographical space where the local community is central. The existing literature 
regards the local community, and the cohesion of its constituents (people and 
institutions), as an important asset. The local community is viewed as the channel 
that facilitates the dissemination of values, which refers to widespread beliefs that 
individuals put into practice in all the main aspects of their lives such as work and 
the family. These value systems are perceived as „one of the preliminary 
requirements for the development of a district, and of the essential conditions of its 
reproduction‟ (Becattini 2004: 20). In the absence of these beliefs, it is concluded 
that the district and the local community could be interpreted as two diminished, 
divergent entities revealing an area of socioeconomic stagnation (Becattini 2004: 
20).  
Regarding the social context in which industrial districts are embedded, Dunford 
(2006b: 28) argues that this factor has recently received substantial attention and has 
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„opened the way to a large literature dealing with the social, cultural, political and 
institutional foundations of the district mode‟30. 
 Business studies 
The issue of industrial clustering has also gained importance in the field of business 
studies. In addressing what makes particular countries (and firms) more competitive 
than others on the international scene, Porter (1990) argues that industrial clusters, 
which are defined as geographic concentrations of interconnected economic agents 
(companies, specialised suppliers, service providers, and associated institutions), 
constitute the driving force behind such phenomenon. The author developed an 
analytical framework claiming that local factors, that is, rivalry, demand, physical 
endowments, and supply networks, determine the extent of the competitive 
advantage of clustered firms (Humphrey and Schmitz 2000).  
To varying degrees, the Veracruz petrochemical cluster possesses particular 
characteristics that may be associated with the above mentioned arguments. In clear 
reference to Becattini‟s remarks, for example, our case study is embedded in a system of 
values embraced by workers and union leaders as well as a sizeable proportion of the 
local community. This tends to be more prominent in the state-owned wing of the 
cluster where individuals have established mechanisms and strong links to protect each 
other‟s status quo. Union leaders have, for example, maintained their positions in the 
different constituencies of the oil workers‟ union and the local political scene despite 
claims of wrongdoing and lack of accountability. Likewise, certain workers‟ privileges 
and practices that could be subject to scrutiny continue to be widely tolerated. 
Nevertheless, the local system of values does have a more positive side as it has also 
fostered reproduction of the cluster. The emergence of specialised service providers is 
attributed to entrepreneurs whose technical skills, in many cases, were acquired in the 
cluster. All this suggests that the social notion of the industrial district concept is an 
attribute that may be present in industrial agglomerations regardless of the size of firms.  
Furthermore, analysis of the dynamics leading to the establishment of the petrochemical 
industry in the 1960s and 1970s (Snoeck, 1986: 46) suggests that policy makers may 
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  For a more detailed discussion of industrial clusters, see, for example, Pyke et al. (1990), Pyke et al. 
(1992), Becattini et al. (2003).  
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have established petrochemical complexes in southern Veracruz on the basis of the 
concept of growth poles
31
. Additionally, if one considers the output-input scheme 
depicted in Figure 2.2, it is possible to link the assumptions of Perroux to empirical 
evidence concerning the Veracruz cluster. One basic correlation is the forward linkages 
between local firms and user industries located elsewhere. Given that the petrochemical 
industry yields value chain precursors, it can be concluded that the Veracruz cluster 
possesses the capacity to generate output growth waves throughout an extensive 
economic hinterland.    
When reviewing the evidence for this case study it becomes clear that it possesses many 
of the attributes of industrial cluster theory. Nevertheless, the question remains as to 
why this body of literature does not form the cornerstone of the conceptual framework 
being constructed in the present chapter. There are two fundamental reasons why this 
approach is not used. First, it is claimed that „the combination of rivalry and co-
operation between local enterprises and the partnership of public agencies and private 
organisations in supporting local enterprises‟ are factors that help strengthen the 
competitive advantages of localities (Schmitz 2004: 2) and there is widespread 
consensus in scholarly circles on this point, as the contributions of Bazan and Navas-
Alemán (2003), Pietrobelli and Rabelloti (2006), and Gomes (2006) illustrate. It 
therefore becomes apparent that the theory of clusters places a great deal of emphasis on 
horizontal linkages and does not problematise vertical inter-firm relationships. In 
relation to the development of the Veracruz cluster, evidence indicates that the weight 
of vertical co-operation outstrips that of horizontal relationships and that the quality of 
the former is at best questionable. The second reason to take into consideration is that 
the work on industrial clusters is much less enthusiastic about theorising the governance 
structure of output-input transactions in the locality
32
 and in fact „plays down public 
governance issues‟, as Humphrey and Schmitz (2000: 7) claim. In reviewing empirical 
studies of vertical linkages in the existing literature, it turns out that while the emphasis 
is on how such relationships help firms in developing country clusters respond to 
structural changes (Rabelloti 1999, Nadvi 1999), little if any attention is paid to the 
prevailing type of governance structure. Given that this thesis focuses on the co-
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 During this period, United Nations offshoot offices in Latin America were particularly enthusiastic 
about the dissemination and study of growth pole policies in the region (Boisier 1974).  
32
 While vertical relationships in developing country clusters have been documented, it appears that much 
of the focus is on inter-firm subcontracting arrangements associated with the production of final goods in 
labour intensive sectors, as in the work of Nadvi and Schmitz (1994).    
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ordination of transactional linkages between state-owned petrochemical complexes and 
local private petrochemical firms, rather than on horizontal relationships, the theory of 
industrial clusters is unable to provide the theoretical keystones required by the 
discussion.  
In a similar tone, despite the rest of the schools of thought, that is, growth poles, 
industrial districts, business studies, and new economic geography, have greatly 
contributed to widening our understanding of industrial agglomerations, what must be 
pointed out with respect to the Veracruz cluster - and considering the concise 
descriptions above presented - is that they are unable to provide the conceptual 
underpinnings for addressing the main empirical feature of our case study: the nature of 
vertical transactional linkages between suppliers and buyers of industrial inputs. That is 
why the conceptual framework developed in subsequent sections of this chapter has 
played down this wealth of literature.  
This does not mean that the global value chain approach is not linked to any of the 
academic works here mentioned. On the contrary, it can be argued that these may 
overlap when it comes to dealing with industrial clusters dynamics. For example, 
Humphrey and Schmitz (2000) demonstrate that the notion of industrial clusters is 
somewhat connected with the global value chain approach since the intersection of both 
permits to elucidate the „interaction of the local and the global in industrial clusters in 
developing countries (Humphrey and Schmitz 2000: 3). In that respect, some scholars 
such as Pietrobelli and Rabelloti (2006) have effectively combined concepts of the 
theory of industrial clusters with arguments of the global value chain approach to 
determine the prospects of developing country firms to compete globally.  
ALTERNATIVE ANALYTICAL APPROACHES  
In addition to the conceptual frameworks described above, it is worth reviewing other 
schools of thought that are in some measure related to the empirical evidence presented 
in this thesis. For example, the literature around networks of value (Smith et al. 2002) 
and global production networks (Henderson et al. 2002, Coe et al. 2004) hold certain 
similarities with respect to the global value chain approach in that both also aim at 
capturing and elucidating the ways by which globalisation of the world economy has 
contributed to determining the spatial configuration of production. Furthermore, these 
51 
  
two alternative approaches appear to converge in considering that the set of inter-firm 
relationships leading to the production of final goods or services is influenced by 
different economic actors and embedded in a context of multidirectional relationships. 
Both need further illumination.  
In a more specific account, the notion of networks of value aims at exploring how 
increasing degrees of integration and interdependency within macro-regional economies 
(North America and Europe) on the one hand and within the world economy on the 
other have accelerated the appearance of diverging/converging patterns of production 
and the geographical distribution of value added economic activities (Smith et al. 2002: 
41). At the centre of the debate is the notion of flows of value, or rather how value is 
reproduced, distributed, and appropriated by different actors situated in different 
locations. A number of scholars consider that, if this question is to be addressed, 
attention must be paid to those drivers lying behind such processes, that is, state 
governance, labour organisation, corporate practices, among others. Although this 
approach acknowledges that „commodity chains‟ - understood as a „network of labour 
and production processes whose end result is a finished commodity‟ (Hopkins and 
Wallerstein 1986: 159) - are instruments through which value can be transmitted, it 
claims that „commodity networks‟ – which encompass the drivers mentioned above – 
are structures that encapsulate a broader range of instruments allowing for the 
reproduction, distribution, and appropriation of value. This string of literature therefore 
claims that by concentrating on networks of value the reconfiguration and (unequal) 
dispersion of production in macro-regional economies can be better discerned (Smith et 
al. 2002).  
Likewise, the concept of global production networks (GPN) is similarly worth 
appraising. In addressing the distribution of production within an increasing globalised 
context of development, this strand of work contends that it is necessary to move 
beyond a firm-centred analytical approach and embrace a network-focused approach. 
This fundamentally claims that analysis of production activities must incorporate the set 
of (horizontal, vertical, and diagonal) relationships that economic actors (firms, 
governments, consumers, labour and trade unions and so on) establish with one another 
within different geographical scales (Henderson et al. 2002, Coe et al. 2008). Cross-
national value-adding activities, or rather global production networks, are therefore 
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viewed as being deeply rooted in a broad variety of globally organised „nexus of 
interconnected functions and operations by firms and non-firm institutions through 
which goods and services are produced, distributed and consumed‟ (Coe et al. 2004). 
From this perspective, it is maintained that the GPN framework allows for transnational 
production systems to be analysed in such a way that it captures the degree of 
complexity, broad geographical scope, and multidirectionality of transnational dynamics 
among different economic players (Henderson et al. 2002, Coe et al. 2008).  
The question that arises is: how industrial clusters are perceived by these both analytical 
frameworks? In relation to networks of value, industrial clusters can be interpreted as 
sub-national structures in which economic agents (firms, organised or unorganised 
labour and supranational, national, and local states) contribute to creating and 
transmitting value (to a much wider economic hinterland) through participating in 
macro-regional commodity chains (Smith et al. 2002). The global production networks 
approach similarly distinguishes such global-local interplay. Coe et al. (2004: 471), for 
example, assert that „firm-centred production networks are deeply influenced by the 
concrete socio-political context within which they are embedded‟, where industrial 
clusters are one territorial manifestation of this.  
For the purpose of this thesis, these two schools of thought (networks of value and 
global production networks) carry a limited utility from a spatial and analytical 
perspective. Both approaches concentrate on the one hand on the global-local interplay 
of production networks, while the main dimension of analysis in this thesis relates to 
intra-cluster dynamics between suppliers and buyers, paying significant attention to 
local drivers that shape governance structures and strengthen transactional dependence. 
Furthermore, both frameworks consider that articulation of value-adding activities is as 
important as the networks in which they are embedded, where (horizontal, vertical, and 
diagonal) relationships between firms and other economic actors are observed. In the 
case of the Veracruz cluster, however, the weight of horizontal relationships is 
weakened by the disproportionate degree of power PEMEX-Petrochemicals wields over 
the rest of the actors.  
Additionally, it can be argued that the operationalisation of the global production 
network paradigm can be rather useful when studying the external linkages of the 
Veracruz cluster. But the analysis on the nature of relationships that state-owned and 
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private firms hold with external users lies outside the boundaries of this thesis. This 
issue was not addressed as it would have demanded more resources (beyond existing 
capabilities) to investigate the constellation of value chains that local firms serve and 
the production of final goods (of petrochemical origin) which involves two or more 
subsequent value-adding activities (located elsewhere) down the chain.  
Another body of literature that offers important insights is that of local production 
systems. This is an approach that pays attention to small- and medium-sized firms 
(SMEs) embedded in economic activities concentrated on geographical localities. One 
key concern of this work is to illuminate how changing economic systems in advanced 
economies, that is, the decline of traditional industries like steel and the emergence of 
high-tech economic activities like information technologies, influences the behaviour of 
firms and the way they relate to each other as well as the governance of local 
economies. Since different responses (summarised in the form in which SMEs are 
organised: industrial districts, networked firms, empirical agglomerations) have been 
found across different settings, the point to highlight is that the role of small- and 
medium-sized firms in production systems continue to be fundamental (Crouch et al. 
2004). 
Turning now to the arena of comparative political economy, the work on varieties of 
capitalism deserves particular consideration. This approach served to underline that the 
market-orientated framework advanced by the United States and other western 
economies prevailed over the communist ideology championed by the Soviet Union. 
While some viewed capitalism as the predominant model of economic development, 
other specialists such as Albert (1991) began to point out the existence of two 
competing branches of it: „a socially co-ordinated [capitalist] model typical of 
continental Europe and the classical neoliberalised path of the Anglo-American 
countries‟ (Peck and Theodore 2007: 732). A similar interpretation of capitalism was 
given by Soskice (1990, 1991) who made a distinction between „co-ordinated market 
economies (like Germany, Japan, Sweden, Austria, and Norway) and the liberal market 
economies (modelled on the USA, but also including the UK, Canada, and Ireland)‟ 
(Peck and Theodore 2007: 736). The traditional perspective of this body of literature 
concentrates on comparative institutional advantages chiefly in developed economies, or 
rather on exploring the extent to which varying social and institutional foundations 
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across developed countries can shape the structure and dynamics of different national 
models of capitalism and, by extension, determine the specialisation and the trajectory 
of national economies (Dunford 2011: 24). Almost in parallel, on the American side of 
the Atlantic a string of ideas on industrial governance materialised under the rubric of 
varieties of capitalism, shedding light on how the institutional configuration of the U.S. 
economy influenced the behaviour of firms and the governance of relationships among 
actors (Campbell et al. 1991, Hollingsworth et al. 1994). In a neo-liberal economy like 
that of the United States, it comes as no surprise that the government was not accorded a 
„privileged economic position‟ (Lindberg et al. 1991: 31), thus playing an „outsider role‟ 
in the governance arrangements put in place, as illustrated by Peck and Theodore (2007: 
767). Conversely, the firm, along with external institutions shaping the organisation of 
production, is the player situated at the centre of the discussion (Hall and Soskice 2001).  
Although this wealth of literature is relevant for the study of inter-firm relationships on 
the one hand and institutional advantages on the other, the operationalisation of 
concepts in relation to analysis in this thesis seems to be narrow. First, the work on 
varieties of capitalism, as widely recognised, seeks to understand how firms and 
institutions collaborate not only in different globalised settings, but also in contexts of 
highly developed markets – a perspective that is also characteristic of the concept of 
local production systems described earlier. The Veracruz cluster, on the contrary, is 
deeply rooted in and influenced by a complex and fairly adverse developing country 
setting, as discussed in Chapters 5, 6, and 7 of this thesis. And these empirical features 
differ from the logic of analysis proposed by these alternative approaches.  
As regards industrial governance, two fundamental restrictions are distinguished. The 
first is that the participation of the state is restricted to the setting of rules for 
encouraging inward investment and competition among firms so that most of the 
decisions are made by the firm, or rather market forces. This perspective widely differs 
from how the state participates in the development of the Veracruz cluster. In the case 
of the Veracruz cluster, for example, the state is an agent who exercises a 
disproportionate degree of control over inter-firm relationships through ownership of 
economic units (PEMEX-Petrochemicals). The second limitation is that even though 
governance structures are contextualised within „a matrix of interdependent social 
exchange relationships that occur among organisations... [...] a wide range of 
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interdependent actors, including producers and suppliers of raw materials, researchers, 
manufacturers, distributors, and many others, who must routinely solve various 
problems, such as raising capital, setting wages, standardising products, and establishing 
prices in order for economic activity to continue‟ (Campbell 1991: 6), this body of 
literature fails to develop the captive type of relationships that prevail in southern 
Veracruz.  
Beyond the developing country context in which the Veracruz cluster is embedded, 
what is seems to be more important in limiting the applicability of arguments here 
reviewed is the peculiarities of the national economy. While Mexico instrumented 
policies that allegedly functioned in advanced economies, Mexican policy makers 
assumed that these could be replicated despite differences in the national (economic, 
political, and institutional) configuration. The operationalisation of this array of 
approaches in the case of the Veracruz cluster is, to a significant degree, constrained by 
the concerns they aim to deal with and the empirical evidence this thesis is concerned 
about: the trajectory of the Veracruz petrochemical cluster and the governance of 
vertical transactional relationships.  
MAPPING GLOBAL TRANSACTIONAL LINKAGES 
In the post World War II period, opposing sets of economic strategies were adopted by a 
significant number of developing countries. In Latin America, the largest economies 
accelerated the implementation of inward-looking development policies. This economic 
model entailed the erection of barriers to trade and the hindering of competition from 
foreign firms with the aim of fostering the development of infant industries heavily 
orientated to meeting domestic demand for goods
33
. Several Asian countries, however, 
opted for a different path to industrial development and created an economic model in 
which linkages to external markets were at the core.  
As several countries either abandoned inward-looking development strategies or further 
accelerated internationalisation of their productive structures, principally over the last 
three decades, there was a profound shift in the configuration of the world economy. 
Not only is the resulting increase in cross-national mobility of goods, individuals, and 
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As contextualised in Chapter 5, this approach helps to explain why the Veracruz petrochemical cluster, 
which can be traced back to the 1960s, is at present heavily orientated towards the domestic market.  
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services one of the many faces of the globalisation of the world economy, the spatial 
dispersion of manufacturing activities, as a result of the insertion of the economic 
structures of less advanced countries into global production networks, is similarly one 
of the most obvious attributes of today‟s world economy.  
The latter did not go unnoticed in academic circles. In the contemporary context of 
development, the need to understand the globalisation of production led to the 
emergence of the notion of global value chains which is defined as the sequence of 
cross-national value adding-activities required to bring a product or service from 
conception to final consumers and on to recycling (Gereffi et al. 2001, Sturgeon 2000, 
Kaplinsky 2004). The concept of GVC is based on the contributions of Gereffi (1994), 
who in his influential paper “The organisation of buyer-driven global commodity 
chains: how U.S. retailers shape overseas production networks” identified the 
mechanisms through which large U.S. apparel and marketer firms became a driving 
force serving to determine production structures in East Asian economies. While the 
focus of the analysis is on buyer-driven chains, in which brand marketers and retailers 
from developed countries (the buy end of the chain) tend to determine the parameters of 
the production process that supplier firms in the developing world must comply with, 
Gereffi also emphasises that the co-ordination of activities along the chain is a 
perspective that had attracted little if any attention up until then. The author claims that 
a fundamental dimension of global value chains is the governance structure; or rather 
the mechanisms through which such authority and control are exercised by buyer firms 
(Gereffi 1994: 97).  
As it soon became apparent that the manner in which cross-national inter-firm linkages 
are co-ordinated has repercussions for firms from developing countries, the value chain 
approach drew the interest of scholars and a sound body of literature promptly emerged. 
Recent empirical studies on buyer-driven global value chains have considerably 
broadened our understanding on how gains reaped from engaging in global production 
and distributions networks are distributed among participants (Kaplinsky 2001) and the 
extent and nature of the co-ordination of activities in transnational production processes 
(Gereffi 1999, Dolan and Humphrey 2001, Bazan and Navas-Alemán 2003).  
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GOVERNANCE IN VALUE CHAINS  
Is the value chain approach adequate for the analysis of intra-cluster transactional 
linkages? This point may be thought-provoking in the strict sense of what the theory 
stipulates. However, while value chain analysis chiefly focuses on buyer-driven cross-
national relationships, within the Veracruz cluster inter-firm relationships are producer-
driven and shaped by a complex economic, institutional, and political environment. 
Even though the operationalisation of the concepts of governance and upgrading may be 
open to discussion, what is certain is that the GVC approach establishes the guidelines 
for distinguishing and understanding the type of linkages in the locality and helps 
identify possible upgrading scenarios in the existing aggregate environment. To this 
end, it is first necessary to elucidate what governance is and how existing studies link it 
to the concept of upgrading in developing country clusters.  
Core theoretical building blocks of the GVC approach 
In the current context of development, in which countries and firms coexist in a more 
competitive environment, the crafting of more effective mechanisms to shore up 
productivity and growth is central to policy making (Humphrey and Schmitz 2002). 
Trade liberalisation, for example, is one fundamental policy through which developing 
countries have attempted to cope with the challenges and opportunities brought by 
globalisation of the world economy. Firms from industrialised countries, alternatively, 
have sought to increase their competitive edge by farming out manufacturing activities 
to low cost countries. Both trade liberalisation and outsourcing are phenomena that have 
gained momentum recently, creating strong ties between less advanced countries and 
the industrialised world. It is increasingly acknowledged that trade is not only bolstered 
through the transnationalisation of companies since the establishment of transactional 
cross-border linkages between legally independent firms has also come to play a 
significant role, as Humphrey and Schmitz (2004: 96) have long asserted. 
The mechanisms through which activities along transactional cross-border relationships 
are co-ordinated, the type of relationships that are formed when firms engage in global 
production networks, and the implications of these relationships for upgrading in 
developing country firms are among the main issues the GVC approach seeks to 
address. All in all, it is the governance structure of such transactional cross-border 
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linkages that is at the centre of the discussion for, as explained by Gereffi (1994: 97), 
the notion of governance refers to the „authority and power relationships that determine 
how financial, material and human resources are allocated and flow within a chain‟.  
The question that subsequently arises concerns which player exercises this authority. In 
this respect, Gereffi (1994: 97) distinguishes two prevalent types of value chains; those 
driven by producers and those in which buyers rule the transactions. It is maintained 
that the former is associated with large multinational firms that control the production 
system
34
 and that this is characteristic of capital- and technology- intensive industries 
such as automobiles and computers. In buyer-driven chains, in contrast, authority is 
exercised by large retailers, brand-named merchandisers, and trading companies whose 
role in the chain is to focus on „the highest value-added segments‟ such as „innovation, 
product design, and marketing‟ (Gereffi et al. 2005: 79). This type of chain is 
commonly identified with labour intensive and consumer goods industries (Gereffi, 
1994: 97).  
A widely acknowledged case that serves to demonstrate both the above mentioned 
definition and the nature of buyer-driven chains is the influence of UK supermarkets on 
the structure of the horticultural industry in Kenya and Zimbabwe. Dolan and 
Humphrey (2001: 147) discovered that large retailers not only possess the authority to 
indicate the requirements (quality, cost, type of product) to be met by producers, they 
also decide which producers are allowed to enter the supply chain. To a great extent this 
case reflects the prevalent pattern of transactional relationships that firms in developing 
countries establish with their counterparts in advanced economies.  
Given that similar conclusions are drawn from a wide range of studies on labour 
intensive industries, it is evident there is a widespread uncontested consensus claiming 
that the concept of governance is undoubtedly associated with the manner in which 
control is exercised over chain participants. This situation raises the question as to what 
determines the co-ordination of upstream activities, or the role of participants in the 
chain. Once more, the existing literature appears to agree on this point. It is contended 
that the lead firm, or buyer, coordinates the different value-adding activities through a 
set of parameters that essentially determine: i) what is to be produced (product design 
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 In this sense, Humphrey and Schmitz (2001: 22) further elaborate on this idea. The authors conclude 
that the locus of authority lies in the fact that producers „control key product and process technologies‟.  
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and specifications), ii) how it is to be produced (the technology to be used, the quality 
systems to be employed, and the labour and environmental standards to be complied 
with), and iii) how much is to be produced and when (production scheduling and 
logistics). In this way, governance becomes a concern as the lead firm seeks to enforce 
compliance with these parameters since they indicate the course of action to be taken by 
the remaining players in the chain. The conclusion derived from the latter postulation is 
that governance refers to the quality of relationships between firms in the chain and the 
mechanisms (practices, values, codes of conduct) that determine the non-market co-
ordination of value-adding activities (Humphrey and Schmitz 2001: 21-22). 
With respect to the nature of relationships in buyer-driven chains, it is noticeable that 
this is to some extent influenced by the ability of suppliers to meet the demands set by 
the lead firm. As these abilities vary from case to case, value chains display different 
governance structures. In the first instance, Humphrey and Schmitz (2000: 15-16) 
indicate that governance takes the form of network relationships (co-operation between 
buyer and supplier is on fairly equal terms), quasi-hierarchy (the buyer wields a high 
degree of control over the relationship since the supplier lacks the abilities to meet the 
requirements of the production process), and hierarchy, (operations on the supply end of 
the chain are owned and controlled by the buyer). But chain governance continued to 
evolve as indicated by a wealth of empirical studies. In response, Gereffi et al. (2005: 
83) crafted an even more comprehensive analytical framework that resulted in the 
categorisation of five patterns of governance. The contribution of the new 
conceptualisation was to further specify the different types of network relationships, that 
is, modular, relational, and captive. Market and hierarchy governance continued to be 
at both ends of the spectrum (Figure 3.1).  
In constructing this analytical framework, Gereffi et al. (2005: 83-87) incorporated three 
types of determinants that help outline the possible modes of inter-firm co-ordination. 
The first is the complexity of transactions, which basically refers to the flow of 
information and knowledge needed to undertake a particular transaction. The second 
determinant is the ability to codify transactions. More specifically, firms can reduce the 
degree of explicit co-ordination through the design and application of technical and 
process standards that facilitate the interpretation of product specifications. The third 
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factor is capabilities in the supply-base, which elucidates the competences of suppliers 
in relation to the requirements of the transaction.  
Figure 3.1 Types of governance structure 
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  
   
  Source: Taken from Gereffi et al. (2005). 
Based on these determinants, the authors conceptualised five types of governance:  
 Market: this involves inter-firm relationships mostly associated with the 
production of standardised products, where the cost for firms to switch partners 
remains low. This type of governance arises when product specifications are 
easily codified and the supplier is able to meet the requirements placed by the 
lead firm.  
 Modular: as products become more sophisticated, the complexity of the 
transaction increases. The supplier, however, possesses the capabilities to 
interpret product and process specifications with little if any explicit co-
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Relational 
End use 
Materials 
Price 
 
Customers 
Lead firm 
Turn-key 
supplier 
Component 
and material 
suppliers 
Suppliers 
Lead firm 
Relational 
supplier 
Component 
and material 
suppliers 
 
Core 
firm 
Captive 
suppliers 
Integrated 
firm 
Captive Hierarchy Modular Market 
Degree of explicit co-ordination 
Degree of power asymmetry 
Low High 
61 
  
capable of providing „turn-key services‟, which greatly reduce the need for 
monitoring by the buyer. The cost of switching is low for both players.  
 Relational: as the high capabilities of the supplier problematise the development 
of technical and process standards, the relationship with the buyer tends to be 
complex. The exchange of tacit information implies high degrees of explicit co-
ordination and asset specificity, which at the same time leads to mutual 
dependence. For instance, the cost of switching partners is viewed as high.   
 Captive: a high level of transactional dependence characterises this type of inter-
firm co-ordination. As the supplier firm lacks the capabilities to interpret the 
complex codification of process and product instructions, a great deal of 
intervention on the part of the lead firm is needed. Since the buyer invests to 
help the supplier enhance competences, the latter is locked into relationships that 
significantly increase the cost of exiting the chain. The degree of power 
asymmetry is high.  
 Hierarchy: given that products are highly sophisticated, competent suppliers are 
not found. The firm is therefore compelled to develop in-house capabilities. This 
type of governance fundamentally refers to vertically integrated firms.    
All things considered, it is important to point out that the form of inter-firm co-
ordination this thesis mostly focuses on is that of captive. Local buyer firms in the 
Veracruz cluster are locked into transactional relationships that greatly discourage the 
switching of suppliers. Nonetheless, before attempting to operationalise the captive 
mode of inter-firm co-ordination in relation to the vertical linkages in the locality, it is 
necessary to demonstrate how governance structures and upgrading are linked. In doing 
so, a brief review of the literature on developing country clusters is given below.  
Governance and upgrading in developing country clusters 
The point to underline in this section is that the way cross-national linkages are co-
ordinated is an issue deeply intertwined with the prospects for firms to upgrade, 
particularly in the case of suppliers (Bazan and Navas-Alemán 2003: 3). Humphrey and 
Schmitz (2002: 1020) acknowledge that there are three main approaches to upgrading, 
namely: process (firms transform inputs into outputs in more efficient manners), 
product (moving into more sophisticated product lines), and functional (firms move 
downstream to carry out higher value added activities such as design and marketing.  
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In a book edited by Pietrobelli and Rabelloti (2006), several studies on clusters and 
value chains in Latin America further illustrate how the upgrading prospects for firms 
are associated with the type of relationship (governance) that determines the 
participation of firms in value chains. Artola and Parrilli (2006), for example, examine a 
dairy products cluster in Nicaragua and the authors contend that small- and medium 
producers have managed to upgrade production processes and move into more 
profitable activities as a result of engaging in cross-national value chains. Similarly, 
Maggi (2006) studies the development of the salmon cluster in southern Chile which 
offers an example of how globalisation serves to encourage different types of upgrading 
for firms. While during the first two stages of development of the cluster (initial 
learning and maturation) upgrading was the result of co-operation with local public 
institutions and joint action, respectively, in the third phase of development, in which 
salmon producers became more orientated to serve external markets, upgrading 
materialised in the form of undertaking more sophisticated value-adding activities.   
Furthermore, studies such as that conducted by Bair and Gereffi (2001) in the Torreon 
blue jeans cluster exemplifies the evolution that local productive structures undergo as a 
result of engaging in value chains of cross-national dimensions. The authors examine 
the evolution of an industry whose external linkages were limited at a time when trade 
between Mexico and the United States faced restrictions. As the two countries, along 
with Canada, signed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994, the 
cluster drew the interest of U.S. lead firms. The paper argues that one of the features 
that best describes the evolution of the Torreon cluster is precisely the linkages that 
local companies established with U.S. brand marketers (Levi‟s, Wrangler, Polo, Calvin 
Klein, Liz Claiborne, Old Navy, Donna Karan, Guess, Chaps, among others) and 
retailers (Gap, K-Mart, Wal-Mart, JC Penney, Sears, Target, etc.) in the wake of trade 
liberalisation. Upgrading at the local level occurred as suppliers introduced production 
standards enforced by U.S. firms, which at that time „began to change their sourcing and 
production networks to take advantage of new activities gradually liberalised under 
NAFTA‟ (Bair and Gereffi 2001: 1894). According to the authors, this led Torreon 
firms to move from assembly activities to more value added ones.  
A study that also claims the scale of upgrading is determined by the type of relationship 
firms are engaged in is that of the Sinos Valley footwear cluster in Brazil. Bazan and 
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Navas-Alemán (2003) analyse the value chains in which local firms participate and how 
particular governance structures encourage (and limit) certain upgrading patterns. 
Relationships with U.S. buyers, for example, fall into the category of quasi-hierarchy, 
which favours high degrees of process and product upgrading but holds back the 
prospects of firms to perform other chain functions (functional upgrading). In the case 
of European buyers, who are also identified as chain governors, the evidence indicates 
that the form of co-ordination tends to be less hierarchical in comparison to the U.S. 
chain, thereby broadening the spectrum for upgrading. Local firms also feed into 
domestic and Latin American chains where relationships are market-based. Local firms 
in these chains undertake more value-added functions such as marketing, design, and 
branding (functional upgrading); although quality gains derived from process and 
product upgrading tend to be outperformed by those in more hierarchical linkages.  
Drawing on these empirical studies, there is no doubt that the way inter-firm 
transactions are governed greatly influences the upgrading prospects of firms. At the 
same time, one can also incorporate the roles played by the capabilities of the supply 
end and the demands of the buyer. Concerning the latter, the Veracruz cluster poses 
fundamental questions. Do buyer requirements drive the performance of producers and 
the supply of inputs? Do producers contribute to enhancing capabilities on the buyer 
end?  The following section responds to these questions.  
GOVERNANCE IN THE VERACRUZ CLUSTER 
It has previously been underlined that one of the two central subjects of discussion in 
this thesis is the nature of vertical linkages between PEMEX-Petrochemicals and local 
buyer firms. In this section, I attempt to relate the captive type of governance that GVC 
literature sets out to the characteristics of vertical transactional relationships in the 
locality. In doing so, I explain the extent to which local buyer firms are transactionally 
dependent on state-owned petrochemical complexes.  
The other central subject of analysis in this thesis is the complex, multi-dimensional, 
aggregate context that has shaped the development of the Veracruz cluster in recent 
decades. This section is therefore also devoted to mapping out the external determinants 
of local governance.  
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Captive governance - transactional dependence in the locality 
The evidence embodied by this case study indicates that buyer firms are locked into 
captive relationships with producers. This form of local inter-firm co-ordination, 
however, may not fully address what the GVC literature claims with regard to the 
complexity of transactions, the ability to codify transactions, and the capabilities in the 
supply-base. Instead, it highlights that buyers are captive due to a number of factors 
rarely contemplated in value chain analysis. Of these, the regulations established by 
market-friendly governments in the 1980s and 1990s, the fact that PEMEX-
Petrochemicals is the only producer and supplier of several inputs, the state-owned 
nature of the producer, the hazardous nature of petrochemical inputs, and the 
capabilities on the buy end stand out. For instance, I must briefly contextualise the 
nature of the relationships between PEMEX-Petrochemicals and local buyer firms.  
Up to the mid-1980s, the policy framework with regard to hydrocarbon resources 
favoured industrialisation under the tutelage of the state. PEMEX was therefore granted 
the exclusive right to produce and market a large number of value chain precursors. 
With the liberalisation of the economy in the 1980s and 1990s, the government decided 
to deregulate the sector and permitted the participation of the private sector in the 
production of those basic petrochemical inputs that were once reserved for the state. 
This policy failed as private firms did not establish new production facilities and output 
fell. As a result, PEMEX-Petrochemicals continues to be the only domestic supplier of a 
sizeable number of inputs. Drawing on data provided by the Asociación Nacional de la 
Industria Química (ANIQ 2008), the association that brings together most of the 
chemical and petrochemical firms in Mexico, and fieldwork findings, PEMEX-
Petrochemicals is the only domestic producer of ammonia, ethylene, ethylene oxide, 
vinyl chloride, methanol, styrene, paraxylene, acrylic nitrile, high-density polyethylene, 
and low-density polyethylene, among other compounds. All of these feed the industrial 
processes carried out by local buyer firms. Therefore, one of the most detrimental 
consequences of this situation is that most private firms in the Veracruz cluster are 
heavily transactionally dependent on PEMEX-Petrochemicals.  
The predicament of limited sourcing alternatives in the Veracruz cluster is exacerbated 
by the fact that the role of PEMEX-Petrochemicals as a reliable supplier is questionable. 
First, it is widely recognised in the locality that prices of inputs supplied by state-owned 
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firms are not competitive and that the quality is considered standard. Second, the erratic 
supply of inputs is further aggravated as the production of certain raw materials has 
ceased over the course of the last decade or so. Environmental regulations, the lack of 
national demand, and the alleged obsolescence of industrial processes are arguments 
used by policy makers to justify such divisive decisions (Rey Roman 1996). In these 
circumstances, buyer firms are forced to source inputs elsewhere. Third, buyer firms 
tend to schedule maintenance works in parallel to those at state-owned petrochemical 
plants. The problem arises when the completion of works at PEMEX takes longer than 
initially estimated – a common problem. As supply is interrupted for longer periods, 
buyer firms are obliged to either remain shut until production on the supply end restarts 
or import raw materials. Fourth, using a much broader perspective, the availability of 
primary inputs is also influenced by the constitution of the energy matrix of the country 
and the international price of crude. In recent years, the use of natural gas to generate 
electricity has sharply increased. With respect to crude, the government favours exports 
with the intention to capitalise on high prices. As the amount of natural gas and 
naphthas (crude) destined to be processed at state-owned petrochemical plants is put at 
risk in the light of these scenarios, the production of certain petrochemicals is 
hampered.  
By and large, these circumstances lead us to reflect on the rigidity of vertical 
relationships between participants in the Veracruz cluster. Building on the arguments 
presented by Gereffi and other scholars (2005), the rigidity of output-input linkages in 
the locality is associated with the ease for local buyer firms to switch suppliers. Given 
the shortcomings on the supply side, it can be deduced that private firms in the Veracruz 
cluster may seek suppliers elsewhere. Given the extent of trade liberalisation of the 
national economy and the spatial proximity to the northern coast of the Gulf of Mexico, 
where „the largest, most modern and most successful collection of petrochemical plants 
of the world‟ is situated (Gilmer et al. 1999), the logical alternative would be to import 
raw materials from Texas and/or Louisiana. It is worth mentioning that this is generally 
the case for buyer firms that have been affected by the cessation of specific production 
lines at PEMEX-Petrochemicals, as noted above. But the allure of sourcing raw 
materials from abroad weakens when these can be obtained locally since to a certain 
extent local buyers find it more convenient to maintain PEMEX-Petrochemicals as their 
supplier. So, what prevents buyer firms from switching suppliers? The answer lies in the 
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hazardous nature of petrochemical inputs and the capabilities on the buy end. In 
addition to PEMEX-Petrochemicals being state-owned, these determinants help us 
understand why transactional linkages in the Veracruz cluster are producer-driven as 
well as the captive nature of buyers.  
If a buyer firm decides to source inputs from abroad, it is expected to possess certain 
capabilities to undertake the activities that the import of hazardous materials involves. 
The import of petrochemical inputs requires firms to consider transport logistics and the 
organisation of a consumption schedule. How much of a particular imported input is 
needed to feed the production process of the buyer firm throughout an estimated period 
of time? To make the import of inputs economically viable the firm must take into 
consideration, for example, that the amount imported (normally transported by sea) is 
sufficient to guarantee the running of the firm‟s plants for a given period. This is a 
concern that must be addressed carefully. The planning of how much is imported and 
how much is consumed is usually less complex when the firm possesses storage 
facilities since cargo can be offloaded and transported to the firm. However, when the 
buyer lacks storage infrastructure the alternative is to charter storage facilities at the port 
of Coatzacoalcos and devise a consumption program in conjunction with the service 
provider. This entails transporting a certain quantity of the imported input from the 
service provider storage facility at Coatzacoalcos to the firm‟s plants in accordance with 
a pre-determined consumption program. It is worth pointing out that most buyer firms 
in the locality do not own storage facilities due to the fact that when investors 
established plants in the locality PEMEX-Petrochemicals was a more trustworthy 
supplier and the idea was for PEMEX to provide inputs over short distances through the 
use of pipelines, rail, or specialised road transport. Since the company was able to 
guarantee a consistent supply, buyer firms did not consider investing in storage 
infrastructure. However, bearing in mind that PEMEX has become a less trustworthy 
supplier, the point to highlight is that the import of inputs is at times more appealing for 
the buyer firm than sourcing raw materials from PEMEX-Petrochemicals despite the 
logistical implications since U.S. suppliers offer price concessions based on how much 
is shipped while PEMEX-Petrochemicals fails to extend such benefits to local buyers. 
All in all, what must be underlined is that price is not necessarily the most important 
determinant since firms also take into consideration the hazardous nature of 
petrochemical inputs. The transport of petrochemical inputs entails a risk not only for 
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the buyer firm and the carrier, but also for the communities the input is transported 
through and the individuals associated with the procedure, not to mention the 
environmental risks in the case of an industrial disaster. Together, these factors force 
buyer firms to insure cargo and, even when prices in the locality are arguably less 
competitive than those offered by U.S. suppliers and the quality of local inputs is 
considered standard, buyer firms are keen to source inputs from PEMEX-
Petrochemicals. At first glance, one may infer that the rigidity of linkages between 
state-owned petrochemical complexes and local private petrochemical firms may be 
loosened by the price factor. However, what in the end appears to shape the scope of 
transactional dependency, in addition to PEMEX being the only domestic supplier, is 
spatial proximity (the fact that inputs are transported over a distance for which risks can 
be minimised and supply delivered promptly), capabilities on the buy end (the lack of 
storage facilities), and the hazardous nature of petrochemical inputs.  
It is in the latter setting that the prevailing form of governance in the Veracruz cluster 
can be conceptualised as captive. Nonetheless, distinctions must be made. While the 
analytical framework set out by Gereffi et al. (2005) draws on cross-national buyer-
driven linkages, the empirical evidence given above indicates that local relationships are 
supplier-driven. Figure 3.2 situates the lead firm at the bottom of the square, in clear 
contrast to Figure 3.1 where the buyer is found at the top. In the case of the captive 
agent of the relationship, the supplier plays that role, according to the GVC approach. 
For the Veracruz cluster Figure 3.2 - which is drawn on the types of governance 
structures developed by Gereffi et al. (2005) - also illustrates that the captive player is 
the buyer.  
Figure 3.2 Governance of transactional relationships in the Veracruz cluster 
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So, is this the main governance structure of vertical linkages in the Veracruz cluster? It 
is the case for those firms that source basic inputs from PEMEX-Petrochemicals, 
especially when this is the only national supplier. Nevertheless, it is important to note 
that not every private firm in the locality is supplied by state-owned petrochemical 
complexes. As PEMEX ceased the production of certain inputs, firms were forced to 
develop other sources of supply
35
. The type of governance in that relationship, however, 
lies outside the concerns of the debate detailed here.  
Another relationship that is also contextualised in Chapter 8 is that of local firms 
playing the role of supplier. However, when such transactional pattern arises, PEMEX-
Petrochemicals continues to dominate the relationship since the supplier is 
transactionally dependent. In this case, captive buyer-driven chains are similar to those 
indicated in GVC literature (Figure 3.1).  
Returning to the discussion of the prevailing form of governance in the locality, another 
important line of discussion is that related to upgrading prospects for firms. In this 
respect, it is clear that the quality of transactional linkages hinders the performance of 
buyer firms. For instance, it is worth considering the possible upgrading scenarios for 
the Veracruz cluster in terms of what is described in GVC literature.  
The scope of each local firm for upgrading is variable, not only due to the competences 
and power of PEMEX-Petrochemicals, but also due to factors such as the different value 
chains firms feed into. At this point it is also important to remember that buyer firms 
take in inputs that are transformed into an even larger number of intermediate products 
that either serve different industries or have specific applications (Figure 2.3). 
In the wake of the intra-cluster captive linkages contextualised above, process 
upgrading may be pursued in relation to the efficient use of energy since it is recognised 
that the running of petrochemical plants is energy-intensive. According to interviewees, 
the cost of energy in the country is believed to be one of the factors that inhibit the 
competitiveness of firms on the domestic market and this creates a gloomy scenario for 
IDESA, a firm that uses ethylene oxide to produce glycols. The company operates at 
roughly 50 percent of its installed capacity as PEMEX output is insufficient to meet its 
requirements. This hampers the firm‟s competitiveness given that the amount of energy 
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 There is also discussion of this topic in Chapter 8.  
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the plant consumes is constant regardless of the rate of capacity utilisation and the 
energy cost per tonne increases as utilised capacity drops (Chapter 8).  
As for product upgrading, value chain literature states this is achieved by installing 
more sophisticated production lines (Humphrey and Schmitz 2002: 1020). In relation to 
the Veracruz cluster, for firms this would entail production of petrochemical products 
that have specific industrial applications and Petroquímica BETA is an example of this. 
The company set up production lines that have specific applications for the cosmetic, 
detergent, metallurgy, textile, and agricultural sectors (Chapter 8).  
The interpretation of functional upgrading, in the strict sense of the term, would imply a 
push for downstream or upstream vertical integration for petrochemical firms producing 
intermediate goods. Mexichem, a conglomerate that owns facilities for the making of 
caustic soda and chlorine in Coatzacoalcos, has embarked on an aggressive crusade to 
integrate operations vertically. In order to merge the upstream links of the value chain, it 
acquired a company in the neighbouring city of Jaltipán with deposits of sodium 
chloride – the input that feeds its main production lines. Another example is Alpek, the 
petrochemical holding that controls Tereftalatos, a firm situated in Cosoleacaque. Alpek 
bought DAK Americas, a firm also situated in the area and which processes 
Tereftalatos‟ terephthalic acid into polyethylene terephthalate.  
Figure 3.3 encapsulates these examples of upgrading as defined by the literature. The 
column to the right, on the other hand, also shows what upgrading means for firms in 
the locality. The characteristics the Veracruz cluster embodies lead us to identify this 
approach to upgrading. 
The literature on value chains assumes that the supply of inputs is driven by the 
requirements of the buyer. In other words, the flow of inputs to the buyer firm is taken 
for granted. However, one of the features that distinguishes the Veracruz cluster is that 
input supply is at times erratic so a major upgrading, if not the most important 
upgrading, at the local level would be a more consistent and adequate supply of basic 
raw materials for the pool of private petrochemical firms. Without a doubt, this would 
significantly boost both the quality of transactional linkages and the performance of 
firms.  
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Figure 3.3  What does upgrading mean for local firms? 
 Global value chains Veracruz petrochemical cluster 
Process upgrading To transform inputs into output 
more efficiently by re-organising 
the production system or 
introducing superior technology 
Energy efficiency 
Technical overhauls  
Increase output and/or installed capacity 
Product upgrading To move into more sophisticated 
product lines 
To enhance the quality of the inputs and 
yield intermediate petrochemicals with 
specific applications in order to reach more 
sophisticated users and markets 
 
Functional upgrading To acquire new functions in the 
chain (design, marketing) 
Acquisition of user firms (downstream 
vertical integration) 
The quality of 
transactional 
relationships 
Categorised 
Driven by the capabilities of the 
producer and the demands of the 
buyer 
To regulate the relationship with local input 
suppliers 
Price factor  
Driven by the capabilities of the producer 
Demands of the buyer are frequently played 
down 
Better timing co-ordination with respect to 
maintenance works 
   
  Source: Based on Humphrey and Schmitz (2002: 1020) and the author‟s findings. 
Nonetheless, the quality of the relationship between supplier and buyer is not only 
restricted to a more reliable provision of raw materials, it is also related to the 
particularities of the relationship that PEMEX-Petrochemicals holds with each local 
firm (Chapter 8). In the end, clearer, fairer rules, practices, and transactional 
mechanisms are badly needed to reduce the degree of uncertainty resulting from the 
questionable role of PEMEX-Petrochemicals as supplier.    
External determinants of local governance 
In a paper that links industrial cluster and value chain research, Humphrey and Schmitz 
(2000: 15) argue that both schools of thought tend to „underplay the limits to 
upgrading‟. Hence, the question asked by the authors is: „if upgrading is so easy, why is 
not pervasive in developing countries?‟ Drawing on our case study, I contend that the 
answer may lie in the complexity of the economic, political, and institutional context in 
which firms operate.  
Before attempting to briefly describe the complex political economy of Mexico, it is 
important to establish how the locality is associated with it. State-owned petrochemical 
complexes are the bond that links the locality with the larger setting with the 
Cosoleacaque, La Cangrejera, Pajaritos, and Morelos complexes making up the 
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petrochemical division of PEMEX. The importance of PEMEX, at the same time, lies in 
the fact that its revenues finance a third of government spending. PEMEX is managed 
with a fiscal-driven approach that seeks to compensate the resources the government is 
unable to collect from other sectors of the economy. As PEMEX is treated as the 
country‟s cash cow, upgrading at the company‟s subsidiaries has long been 
compromised.  
Figure 3.4 demonstrates the extent of this multifaceted setting. In analysing the external 
environment, I distinguish three dimensions with the first referring to the determinants 
inherent to the sector. The opening up of the petrochemical industry in the 1980s and 
1990s required trimming the number of basic inputs reserved for the state. The 
government took several petrochemical products off the list and reclassified them as 
secondary products – a move aimed at allowing private participation. A second aspect 
of this dimension is the heavy tax burden for PEMEX, as mentioned above. Likewise, 
the policy of pricing inputs should be mentioned. In line with the horizontal 
restructuration of PEMEX decreed by the government in 1992, policy makers 
introduced pricing mechanisms that compelled subsidiaries to trade inputs (natural gas) 
between them at international prices – an approach that overlooked the comparative 
advantages of PEMEX in terms of production costs.  
The second dimension of the external environment is determined by a number of 
national determinants. The economic setting of the country in the 1980s, for example, 
led to the institutionalisation of a development model in which the role of the state is 
limited and the above mentioned sectoral policies are to a great extent rooted in this 
context. Similarly, the collapse of the peso in the mid-1990s is believed to be 
responsible for the fall in output suffered by PEMEX-Petrochemicals during the second 
half of the decade. The escalating use of natural gas for energy generation and the 
priority given to crude exports are also factors to be considered since both have placed 
the availability of the most important precursors of industrial processes in the Veracruz 
cluster at stake. Another aspect is the national tax system for since the government is 
unable to capture a larger share of GDP in the form of taxes, PEMEX is used to cover 
this shortfall and its revenues finance a third of government spending. 
 
72 
  
Figure 3.4  Determinants of governance in the Veracruz cluster 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
  Source: the author‟s database.  
 
 
   
 
Source: the author‟s database. 
The third dimension of the aggregate setting is related to supranational determinants. 
For much of the 1980s and 1990s, international organisations such as the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund played a significant role in shaping Mexico‟s 
economic and institutional foundations as the implementation of market-orientated 
policies occurred under the tutelage of both institutions. A second determinant to 
consider is the energy security of the United States since a barrel of oil (naphthas) 
processed at petrochemical plants in Mexico can be interpreted in the following ways: it 
is a barrel that does not feed the industrial apparatus of the United States; it is a barrel 
that is not turned into petrochemical inputs and/or refined products that could later serve 
the growing Mexican market; and it is a barrel that the U.S. would probably have to 
source from volatile regions. As a result, Mexico has become a mere supplier of crude 
oil to the U.S., while becoming a net importer of refined and petrochemical products.  
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By and large, this adverse multi-dimensional context has a number of implications. For 
the Veracruz cluster, not only a severe drop in output and productive investment at the 
four petrochemical complexes over the past two decades is worthy of mention, it has 
also contributed to a deterioration in the quality of local vertical relationships (and 
hence the development of value chains of petrochemical origin). Transactional linkages 
between PEMEX-Petrochemicals and local buyer firms are governed by questionable 
practices and mechanisms rooted in a lack of capabilities at the supply end. Ultimately, 
there is no doubt that all of the above is associated with the complex context in which 
the Veracruz cluster, or rather the petrochemical industry, is embedded.   
CONCLUDING REMARKS  
The analysis presented here claims that arguments used to examine the co-ordination of 
transactional linkages that firms in developed countries establish with their counterparts 
in less advanced economies provide an important framework for addressing the 
empirical evidence embodied by the Veracruz cluster. In that respect, one of the aims of 
this chapter was to apply the global value chain approach to the type of inter-firm 
relationships prevailing between PEMEX-Petrochemicals and local buyer firms. To do 
so, it was first necessary to discuss the rationale behind distinguishing the governance 
structure of cross-national inter-firm linkages, elucidate the core conceptual 
underpinnings of this school of thought, and briefly illustrate how the quality of 
transactional linkages helps enhance performance in firms from developing countries.  
On the other hand, the discussion also shed light on the way local governance, in this 
case study, is greatly influenced by external determinants that in one way or another are 
associated with the petrochemical industry. In that respect, the point to underline is that 
GVC literature tends to overlook the role of the aggregate (economic, institutional and 
political) environment with respect to the governance structure of inter-firm 
relationships. Even though the discussion in the present chapter was centred on 
conceptualising the predominant form of governance in the Veracruz cluster, it also 
emphasised that the analysis proposed in this thesis must pay a great deal of attention to 
the (aggregate setting ) political economy of Mexico. The subsequent chapters will do 
precisely that.  
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4 
NOTES ON THE ORIGINS OF PEMEX 
The rise of economic nationalism 
 
  
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis analyses how the development of the Veracruz cluster is shaped by the 
complex political economy of Mexico. Since the role of PEMEX and its petrochemical 
division are central to that end, it is important to expose historical events that not only 
led to the expropriation of the oil industry and creation of PEMEX in 1938, but also laid 
down the ideological, political, and economic foundations that validated the 
instrumentation of a state-led industrial development after World War II – period in 
which the establishment of the petrochemical industry took place. With respect to the 
period depicted in this chapter, it is also important to note the degree of economic 
nationalism that permeated the social and political scene at a time foreign capital 
dominated several productive sectors of the economy.  
One of the attitudes that best describes the idiosyncrasy of the Mexican society is in fact 
the extent of its nationalist character. The position adopted by various groups towards 
the exploitation of natural resources, specifically hydrocarbon resources, is perhaps the 
most outstanding example of this. In this respect, PEMEX, the state-owned oil and 
natural gas firm, is considered the instrument that made possible both the Mexican 
nation itself and the country‟s social and economic progress over the course of the last 
century. The company symbolises emancipation from foreign interests - a perception 
shared by both broad social factions and political syndicates. The contemporary 
economic history of Mexico is for the most part therefore coupled with that of PEMEX. 
Much of the social and economic progress the country has accomplished over the last 
seven decades or so is widely attributed to the enormous revenues Petróleos Mexicanos 
has handed over to the Ministry of Finance. The making of modern Mexico is 
inconceivable without the wealth yielded by the exploitation of hydrocarbon resources. 
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Nonetheless, as discussed in subsequent chapters, the standing of PEMEX and its 
subsidiaries has dramatically deteriorated over the last two decades. In the wake of this 
deterioration, some argue that the participation of private capital is desperately needed 
and that the company must focus on specific areas of the industry. Even though these 
statements have provoked heated debates on both extremes of the political and social 
spectrum, recent administrations have acted in accordance with market-orientated 
policies. In the 1990s, for example, the government of Ernesto Zedillo (1992-2000) 
attempted to privatise a large share of the petrochemical assets of the company – 
allegedly the most significant link in the hydrocarbon chain in terms of value added to 
inputs. Unsurprisingly, the affair became highly politicised and controversial. Political 
and social opposition brought the plan to a halt, making government officials desist. The 
point to underline here is that when it comes to PEMEX, a large dose of economic 
nationalism permeates both the political debate and the decision making process. The 
questions raised by this situation include: Is economic nationalism what prevented the 
privatisation of PEMEX-Petrochemicals in the 1990s? Where does economic 
nationalism come from? Did the context in which PEMEX was created establish the 
conditions for state-led industrial development in the following decades? To address 
these questions it is necessary to examine the critical developments that led to the birth 
of Petróleos Mexicanos in 1938.  
This chapter seeks to elucidate the developments that marked i) the origins of the 
national oil industry, ii) the circumstances that led to the instrumentation of a state-led 
development in the following decades, and iii) the rise of economic nationalism in 
Mexico. It is necessary to focus on both the economic and political contexts prevailing 
through much of the first half of the 20
th 
century and the historical background behind 
the conception of PEMEX - the parent company of the sector studied. The organisation 
of the chapter is as follows. It begins by describing the importance of foreign capital in 
encouraging economic development. Here it is necessary to illustrate the context that 
drew the attention of foreign oil companies in the times of Porfirio Díaz, the long-term 
dictator of Mexico until 1910, when links between the political elite and U.S. and 
European entrepreneurs determined the economic fate of the country. The latter is a 
factor that has long marked the way in which capitalism became institutionalised in 
Mexico. The discussion continues by throwing light on the inclination of the Díaz 
administration to find a manner to counterbalance the disproportionate influence 
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exercised by the U.S. over the country. To that end, Díaz resolved to invite British 
businessmen, who turned out to play a distinguished role in the early development of 
the oil sector in Mexico. The overriding participation of foreign firms in a wide range of 
economic sectors, along with the detrimental living conditions of a large section of the 
population, progressively fuelled nationalistic attitudes in social groups. The analysis 
therefore continues with an examination of the episodes that provoked the rise of 
economic nationalism and eventually led to nationalisation of the oil industry.  
FOREIGN CAPITAL IN THE TIMES OF PORFIRIO DIAZ 
At the end of the 19
th
 and beginning of the 20
th
 centuries, Mexico was ruled by a 
dictatorial regime led by Porfirio Díaz, a high-ranking army officer who came to power 
in 1876. His leadership persisted over a period of three decades, coming to an end in 
1911 in the wake of social and political discontent. This period of Mexican history is 
known as the Porfiriato, a controversial regime that allegedly brought a certain degree 
of economic prosperity and political stability to the country under authoritarian 
practices. During this period, it is acknowledged that key sectors of the economy such 
as mining, the railways, oil and public services attained a certain degree of development 
due to Diaz‟s determination to modernise the country, a task largely associated with the 
participation of foreign capitals (Brandenburg 1964, Meyer 1985a, Vázquez 1985). 
Throughout the Porfiriato, U.S. and European firms perceived Mexico as an attractive 
place to invest. This is understood as the outcome of a number of domestic factors. The 
forceful control Díaz exerted over most of the country‟s affairs resulted in a professed 
internal stability - a context which helped build a perception in the international scene 
that Mexico offered a favourable business climate. Also, as the economic strategy of the 
regime critically relied on foreign capital, the ruling elite took advantage of weak legal 
enforcement to favour the interests of foreign firms, permitting the manipulation of 
markets towards the maximization of benefits. In the light of these circumstances, U.S. 
and British entrepreneurs, mainly, eventually acquired a very privileged position in 
political circles on the one hand and assumed a prominent role in an array of economic 
sectors on the other (Brandenburg 1964, Brown 1987) 
The success of U.S. and British businessmen in Mexico is not only attributed to the 
aforementioned factors. The decisive factor was the political shelter provided by Díaz. 
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As the national environment was highly politicised, the business elite easily took 
advantage of this situation by cultivating close dealings with high ranking government 
officials as a means to expand their interests. In reality, the key determinant for foreign 
entrepreneurs to do extremely well in Mexico was to have a foot firmly planted in 
politics (Wasserman 1985, Brown 1987). Such a practice, in retrospect, has had long-
lasting consequences for the manner in which capitalism has become established in 
Mexico.  
The presence of foreign capital proved beneficial to Diaz‟s interests. By and large, both 
social stability and economic progress were perceived by many Mexicans as 
achievements of his administration, an impression that suited his political aspirations. In 
this regard, the partnership between Mexican government officials and foreign 
businessmen was opportune as it came to serve the objectives of both sides. 
Nonetheless, it presented a downside that worried Díaz. In spite of the need for foreign 
investment, Mexican politicians were sceptical about the dominant position of U.S. 
capital in sectors such as the railways and mining (Brown 1987). In 1911, towards the 
end of the Díaz administration, U.S. capital accounted for 38 percent of total foreign 
investment in the country. With respect to railroads and mining, U.S. firms were 
responsible for 47.3 percent and 61.7 percent, respectively, of the total foreign capital 
invested (Meyer 1985a). 
Mexico perceived the U.S. as an imperialist power. To both Díaz and the ruling elite, 
the significant influence of United States capital in the country and its expansionist 
history represented a national security concern. The regime interpreted such factors as 
jeopardising not only its own status quo, but also national sovereignty. Due to these 
concerns, national security affairs were part of the rationale used by the Díaz 
administration to pursue economic development (Díaz Duffo 1918). For historical 
reasons the regime could not afford to be solely dependent on the United States and this 
led President Díaz to reflect on the appropriateness of diminishing the weight of U.S. 
interests and encouraging the participation of European businessmen in key areas of the 
economy (Brown 1987). In 1911, for example, British interests accounted for 35.5% of 
the total investments in railways, second only to the United States. With regards to 
mining, French capital represented 21.8 percent of foreign interests (Meyer 1985a). 
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In the same year, at the time the Porfiriato came to an end, it is claimed that government 
efforts to attract foreign investment began to pay off. Direct foreign investment and 
loans stood at an estimated $1.7 billion, while income per capita is calculated to have 
grown at an annual rate of 2.3% from 1877 to 1910, recovering its pre-independence 
levels. All this suggests that the partnership between the regime and U.S. and British 
companies drove economic progress and, more importantly, delivered long-term 
consequences with respect to the subsequent development of the abovementioned 
economic sectors (Brown 1987). In that sense, it is in the interest of this academic work 
to highlight in a few words the legacy of British capital in relation to the emergence of 
the oil industry - a sector that largely explains the making of modern Mexico. 
BRITISH INTERESTS IN THE MEXICAN OIL SECTOR 
Towards the end of the 19
th
 century and during the first decade of the 20
th
 century, 
Standard Oil stood as the most prominent oil firm in the United States with the power to 
shape the structure of the U.S. oil industry through monopolistic practices
36
. In the same 
fashion Standard Oil, along with its Texas-based subsidiary the Waters-Pierce Oil 
Company, dominated the marketing of oil-related products in Mexico, constituting a 
monopoly that did not benefit the political interests of President Díaz. It has been 
mentioned that many sectors of the Mexican economy through the Porfiriato were 
controlled by U.S. firms. Leading figures of the ruling elite considered it inconvenient 
to permit U.S. businessmen to gain further prominence in the country‟s economic 
affairs. Accordingly, European capital represented a window of opportunity for Díaz to 
counterbalance U.S. influence (Brown 1987, Skirius 2003, Meyer 1985a).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
 
As the rationale of this stage is to shed light on both the origins of Petróleos Mexicanos 
and on the role of foreign firms in its conception, particularly British capital, a case in 
point is Sir Weetman Pearson, a British engineer whose firm S. Pearson & Sons was of 
great economic and political importance for the Díaz regime. The firm attracted the 
attention of the government as it had long-standing expertise in the construction of rail 
lines, docks, harbours, and drainage systems throughout the world. President Díaz in 
                                                 
36
 For a more detailed account of this matter see, for example, Tarbell, I. M. And Chalmers, D. M. (2003) 
The History of the Standard Oil Company: Briefer Version. Dover Publications, New York. See also 
Montague, C. H. (2005) The Rise and Progress of the Standard Oil Company. Kessinger Publishing. 
Bringhurst, B. (1979) Antitrust and the Oil Monopoly: the Standard Oil Cases, 1890-1911. Issue 8 of 
Contributions in Legal Studies. Greenwood Press. 
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fact sent emissaries to New York in 1889 to meet Pearson and persuade him to come to 
the country to conclude the construction of the Mexico City drainage system, a project 
that had been abandoned by a U.S. firm. As Pearson eventually completed the project he 
found himself in an enviable position as he had direct access to Díaz. This situation 
prompted the government to partner with Pearson in succeeding projects, with the latter 
providing the financing and the former the engineering (Brown 1987).  
Over the years, S. Pearson & Sons assembled a competent staff in Mexico and firmed 
up its association with the regime to expand its holdings in the country. It is in this spirit 
that Díaz appealed to Pearson once again in 1898 to intervene in the upgrading of the 
Tehuantepec
37
 railway, a major infrastructure project whose concession was granted to 
another British firm. Although the railway had been completed, it presented serious 
technical flaws that prevented it entering into operation. The overhaul entailed 
construction works throughout a vast region. In the end, „a new roadbed, a flood control 
system, extensive bridging and breakwaters and docks at the Pacific terminus of Salina 
Cruz, and dredging and dockwork at the Gulf terminus of Coatzacoalcos‟ were erected, 
allowing the firm to accumulate extensive knowledge of the Tehuantepec region – 
knowledge that turned out to be decisive with regard to the interests of Sir Weetman 
Pearson in the oil industry (Brown 1987: 398-399). 
In 1901, on a trip from Mexico to New York, Pearson spent a night in Laredo, close to 
the Texas Gulf Coast, one of the epicentres of U.S. oil fever. Once there, Pearson „made 
inquiries about this new oil business and learned that prospectors had been attracted to 
Spindletop
38
 by the same kind of tar pools that his staff had found along the route of the 
Tehuantepec railway‟. In the light of such evidence, it is reported that Pearson wired his 
staff in Mexico to secure rights on land along the railway and elsewhere. By the end of 
the year, his firm had men exploring the Tehuantepec Isthmus and the adjacent state of 
Tabasco under the expertise of Anthony Lucas, the engineer responsible for the first 
successful oil well at Spindletop (Brown 1987, Clark et al. 2000). 
Even though Pearson bought and leased vast tracts of land, hired workers with oil 
drilling experience, and created a favourable political climate for his enterprises, the 
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 The Tehuantepec area lays between the states of Veracruz, on the Gulf of Mexico coast, and Oaxaca, 
which is situated on the southern Pacific coast. 
38
 Spindletop is an oil field situated in Beaumont, Texas. As a result of the beginning of oil production in 
1901, Beaumont became one of the first boomtowns in the U.S. (Clark 2000). 
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technical requirements of the oil industry along with the lack of a major oil discovery 
challenged the success he was accustomed to. Nevertheless, expectations remained 
high. In 1905, the British engineering firm began the construction of a 3,000 barrel per 
day refinery at Minatitlán, and a year later, Pearson‟s close relationship with the regime 
paid off as his firm „received the biggest oil concession the government had to offer, a 
fifty-year contract covering all national land, lakes and lagoons in the state of Veracruz‟ 
(Brown 1987: 402).  By 1908, after a fire damaged the Minatitlán refinery, he decided 
to expand it to process 40,000 barrels a day. In spite of all this, as of 1908 S. Pearson & 
Sons was not making any profits. The lack of a major oil discovery prevented the 
British company from stocking up the Mexican market of refined products, which was 
monopolised by the Waters-Pierce Oil Company from the U.S. To secure the supply of 
oil for its refinery, Pearson approached other entrepreneurs, however, negotiations were 
never gratifying as potential providers were either involved in legal disputes (Standard 
Oil) or limited by a sort of oil Pearson‟s refinery could not process. Pearson then 
realised he had to change his strategy in order to compete against the monopoly of 
refined products in Mexico. By April 1909 he had set up the Compañía Mexicana de 
Petróleo “El Águila”, whose structure on the one hand „provided Pearson with the 
political resources to attack the Waters-Pierce monopoly‟ and on the other its “national” 
character „met the political goals of the Díaz regime‟ (Brown 1987: 408-409). 
As a “national” company, the government sought to protect the interests of El Águila in 
the domestic market by increasing import tariffs, which came to directly affect the 
leading position of Waters-Pierce. In addition, Pearson‟s friends in high government 
positions guaranteed for El Águila a contract to supply one-third of the National 
Railways‟ requirements for lubricating oils. Previously, Waters-Pierce had been the sole 
supplier. What is more, the government granted contracts for the exploration and 
operation of deposits in several Mexican states, including Veracruz. As the facts 
suggest, the expansion and formation of El Águila occurred under a form of political 
shelter provided by the Díaz government, breaking the U.S.-led monopoly and 
eventually capturing half of Mexico‟s oil market (Brown 1987, Skirius 2003).  
Nonetheless, as late as 1910, El Águila still relied on imported oil from Texas to meet 
its requirements. Having hired geologists from the United States and formed skilled 
drilling crews, Pearson felt confident that his company would soon discover domestic 
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sources of crude to substitute imports. On 27 December 1910, after conducting 
extensive exploratory work at a hacienda called Potrero del Llano in the state of 
Veracruz, El Águila drilled a well that helped increased Mexico‟s oil output fourfold, 
from 3,634,080 barrels in 1910 to 12,552,788 barrels the following year. Along with the 
production of U.S. firms, Pearson helped make Mexico a net exporter of hydrocarbons 
in 1911 and turned the Anglo-Mexican company of El Águila into the largest oil 
producer in the country. However, it was precisely at this time that President Díaz faced 
social and political turmoil that compelled him to step down and flee into European 
exile (Brown 1987). 
THE RISE OF ECONOMIC NATIONALISM 
The expropriation of the oil industry in 1938 is not only attributed to a given set of 
circumstances prevailing at the time, it is also believed to be the result of the nationalist 
sentiment that lingered after the Mexican Revolution. The goal of this chapter is not to 
determine the extent to which both factors contributed to the nationalisation of foreign 
oil assets, but to briefly depict the context in which nationalism rose. 
For these purposes it is necessary to take the Porfiriato into account since this is a period 
of Mexican history that allegedly brought in a certain degree of progress in terms of 
industrialisation and modernisation at the expense of the impoverished majority. The 
international bourgeoisie resident in Mexico greatly benefitted from the conditions 
created by the Díaz administration, constituting a privileged class that fuelled nationalist 
attitudes throughout the working class, peasants and the like (Hart 1997). In the same 
way, what also nourished nationalism was the widespread economic penetration of 
foreign capital in the country‟s domestic affairs, a situation perceived by government 
and society as menacing.  
The abovementioned scenario fed perceptions that a change in power was needed, 
although Díaz had something rather different in mind. He ran for his seventh 
presidential term in 1910 - a move that increased political restlessness among regional 
elites and rival political groups (Hart 1997). When Díaz proclaimed himself victor in the 
1910 presidential elections in the midst of widespread perception of electoral fraud, 
Francisco I. Madero, the opposition candidate, headed an uprising that unleashed the 
Mexican Revolution (1910-1920), an armed confrontation involving numerous factions 
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whose ultimate interest was to reverse the disadvantageous conditions suffered by the 
most vulnerable sectors of the population during the presidency of Porfirio Díaz.  
Madero (1911-1913) became Mexico‟s President a year after Díaz was ousted. The 
constant struggle for power amidst rival factions condemned his presidency to be short 
lived and precarious. In a similar fashion, the subsequent administrations of Victoriano 
Huerta (1913-1914) and Venustiano Carranza (1914-1920) were usually challenged by 
both rebel political groups seeking to further different social causes and by foreign 
investors in the hunt for endorsing the party that best served their interests (Hart 1997). 
It is important to observe that Madero, Huerta and Carranza became president not only 
through their own belligerent actions since it is also claimed they benefited from the 
indirect support of British and U.S. investors. Although there is no sound evidence that 
international businessmen were directly involved in the conflict, it is clear that some 
actions undertaken by competing groups of businessmen were intended to favour one or 
another revolutionary leader in order to gain future economic rewards (Meyer and 
Morales 1990, Skirius 2003). This is believed to have „contributed significantly to the 
attitudes in official Mexican circles that led to the railroad and oil nationalisation in 
1937 and 1938‟ (Skirius 2003: 51).  
With regard to the oil industry during the Porfiriato, it is worth noting that its 
development was at a very early stage. Mexico‟s potential as an oil producer came with 
the discovery of major oil fields in 1911 since these would substantially boost the 
importance of the oil industry in subsequent years. Nevertheless, the importance of the 
oil industry for much of the first two decades of the 20
th
 century was dwarfed by that of 
the railroads which, in sharp contrast, embodied a far more strategic character since they 
represented a valuable instrument for Díaz and subsequent revolutionary governments 
in terms of economic prosperity, national security, and political and social control. For 
instance, the character of the railroad in the rise of nationalist sentiments by the time of 
the Revolution is critical and worth reviewing.  
In view of U.S. expansionist history and economic influence, the railroad was seen as a 
means to strengthen territorial cohesion. The loss of half of the country‟s territory in the 
preceding century had not been forgotten or forgiven so it was a top priority for the 
government to wield greater political control over remote regions and to make the 
displacement of troops throughout the country possible. For this purpose the railroad 
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proved decisive. Furthermore, by connecting outlying states to one another and to 
Mexico City the government promoted trade and economic dynamism throughout the 
country (Grunstein 1996). Nevertheless, the fact that most railroad employees were of 
U.S. origin appeared to jeopardise government targets with Díaz, for instance, so 
displeased with the situation that he considered it vital to bring the railroads under the 
control of his administration (Quirk 1981).  
Bearing in mind the implications of being in command of the railroad, Porfirio Díaz 
constituted the National Railways of Mexico by merging the Mexican Central Railroad, 
owned by Henry Pierce
39
, and the National Railroad, controlled by the Speyers
40
 of 
New York and London. This new Mexican company represented fifty five percent -or 
6,987 miles - of the existing mileage of railways in operation in the country in 1909. 
Full control, however, was not attained since Henry Clay Pierce, who also had 
noteworthy interests in oil, retained half of the bonds of the new firm and the right to 
appoint members of the board of Directors. But what is worth pointing out is that Díaz 
took a step towards establishing a major government role in the railroads. Diaz‟s 
decision illustrates that economic nationalism during his term was driven by the need to 
shield the country‟s sovereignty as fears of a U.S. intervention persisted. Similarly, in 
the final years of the Porfiriato and beyond, the disadvantageous living conditions of the 
majority of the population are also believed to have contributed to this (Skirius 2003) 
There was therefore significant pressure on revolutionary governments to Mexicanise 
the railroads. In the U.S., leading voices pushed for military intervention south of the 
border, raising concerns in Mexico. It was perceived that in the case of a U.S. invasion – 
such as that of April 1914 - U.S. railroad managers would be keen to support their 
fellow countrymen. This panorama prompted Madero and Huerta to plead for a major 
number of Mexicans at railroad companies while removing foreign personnel. In this 
sense, it was Carranza, the third revolutionary president, who took the toughest 
measures. Upon entering Mexico City in August 1914, his forces occupied the offices of 
                                                 
39
 Henry Pierce was the owner of Waters-Pierce, the company that held the monopoly for distributing oil 
products imported from the United States. 
40
 The Speyer family had interests in U.S. and British railroads, as reported by the press of the time. 
Speyer Unites London Lines (1912, November 20) New York Times. London Traction Merger Arranged. 
Sir Edgar Speyer combines general omnibus and underground electric companies (1912, January 19) New 
York Times. 
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the National Railways of Mexico, seizing the company at the expense of Pierce share 
holdings (Skirius 2003).  
As can be seen, given the circumstances the country faced the railroad represented the 
most strategic asset for revolutionary governments. Similarly, with regard to oil, the 
importance of this sector increased as output soared towards the end of the civil war, as 
did the clashes between authorities and foreign firms. This corroborates the idea that 
both society and political elites adopted a more nationalist approach towards economic 
assets, without this creating a sense that a nation was in the making. It was therefore 
essential to convert that impetus into a framework that both placed the national interest 
first and delivered a sense of nationhood. It was the Constitution of 1917, put into force 
by President Carranza, which embodied all the Mexican Revolution stood for (Meyer 
1985c).  
The Constitution of 1917 embraced a nationalist nature which was unsurprisingly 
interpreted as anti-capitalist, raising concerns in business and political circles in the 
United States given that it laid the legal foundations for further government 
intervention. More specifically, the Constitution epitomised the legal precept of 
expropriation in article 27, stipulating that „private property may be nationalised on 
account of public utilities and through indemnification‟ (Thomson 1938). By that time, 
Mexico‟s oil output represented 25 percent of the world‟s supply, the second largest 
producer after the U.S. (Haber et al. 2003). The new Constitution was therefore set to 
change the rules, albeit the government found itself powerless in enforcing its 
observance. As a result, foreign oil firms continued to operate as if there were no 
changes to the law, a condition favoured by the fact that subsequent administrations 
sought the recognition of the U.S. government (Macmahon and Dittmar 1942a). 
Since it was widely acknowledged that the oil sector lacked regulation and that the 
government had little to say with regard to output, exploration and other matters, the 
Mexican authorities took tentative steps towards playing a more active role in the sector. 
In 1925 the government established the Control de Administración del Petróleo 
Nacional, an agency allegedly entrusted with broad power over the national oil, reserves 
and concessions. In 1933, a mixed company called Sociedad de Petróleos de Mexico 
was formed, and dissolved in 1937 in order to set up the Administración General del 
Petróleo Nacional, an agency with an entrepreneurial-orientated character. In the end, it 
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is rather unclear to what extent the government exerted more control on the sector 
through these initiatives, but the implementation clearly signalled an increasing interest. 
As yet, the creation of the aforesaid agencies was not aimed at seeking nationalisation 
of foreign oil assets. Instead, what is believed to have prompted President Lázaro 
Cárdenas (1934-1940) to expropriate oil holdings was a development of a somewhat 
different nature; a legal dispute between employees and firms in relation to wages and 
working conditions (Macmahon and Dittmar 1942a, Woolsey 1932). 
THE ROAD TO EXPROPRIATION 
By the time expropriation occurred in 1938, Lázaro Cárdenas had become President of 
Mexico and the political landscape seemed to encompass values that had arisen during 
the civil war two decades earlier. His administration was characterised by furthering 
two of the causes of the Revolution: agrarian reform and workers‟ rights. The 
instrument that smoothed the institutionalisation of these policies was the National 
Revolutionary Party, funded in 1929 and whose main objective was to hold in line the 
factions constituting the new regime (Portes Gil 1954, Meyer 1985b). At that time, the 
government itself „began large-scale expropriations of rural property and actively 
supported the workers‟ organisation‟. In response to this renewed nationalist spirit, one 
of the developments that stands out is the creation of the Union of Oil Workers of the 
Mexican Republic (STPRM), an organisation that increased the bargaining power of 
Mexican oil workers and their leaders (Meyer 1985b). 
In 1936, one of the first actions taken by the newly formed STPRM was to present a set 
of demands for discussion with oil companies. Workers claimed higher wages and 
benefits amounting to 65 million pesos a year and firms strongly disagreed with the 
figure, offering just a fraction of this amount. This dispute was set to be solved through 
negotiations, but these failed and the union struck in May 1937. The government of 
Cárdenas was aware of the devastating effects an oil strike would have for the economy 
and mediated to call it off. From that moment onwards, the government became more 
involved in the quarrel and decided to carry out a financial analysis to determine the 
amount the companies were able to afford without putting at risk their financial 
viability. The report concluded that they could offer wage and benefit increases totalling 
26 million pesos, which was more than they were willing to offer. The verdict was 
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accepted by the union but rejected by the companies, who took the case to the courts 
(Macmahon and Dittmar 1942a, Meyer 1985b).  
On March 1, 1938, the Supreme Court ruled in favour of workers and granted the 
companies seven days to comply with the resolution. Shortly after, the U.S., British and 
Dutch governments expressed their concern about the situation and began to lobby 
Mexican authorities. On March 16 the oil companies agreed to pay the 26 million but 
President Cárdenas had already made a decision: „on 18 March, he announced to an 
astonished world his determination to seize virtually all the foreign oil holdings in 
Mexico‟ (Meyer 1985b: 149).   
With the expropriation the Mexican oil industry stumbled as firms and their respective 
governments protested. Standard Oil of New Jersey and El Águila, for example, 
questioned the legality of the presidential decree and rejected the conditions of 
compensation payments. With respect to countries, Britain adopted a more radical 
posture than that of the United States by suspending diplomatic relations with Mexico. 
The government of Roosevelt, on the other hand, recognised the right of Mexico to 
nationalise the oil industry, but highlighted the need to compensate U.S. firms 
accordingly. The commercialisation of inputs was another concern. In addition to the 
inherent limited technical capabilities of the Mexican oil industry, what also made 
access to international markets problematical was that in retaliation the U.S. and Britain 
imposed restrictions. The outbreak of the Second World War in late 1939, however, 
benefitted Mexico in that respect since it became a supplier of crude oil to the Axis 
countries, although crude exports to Germany and Italy were marginal. By then, 
Mexico‟s output was not considerable and much of the production was in fact absorbed 
by a growing domestic market. But the most important consequence of the world 
conflict was that it also helped appease the pressure wielded by the U.S. government. 
National security concerns topped the priorities of the economic and political agenda of 
policy makers north of the border.  It soon became clear that the menace posed by the 
Axis countries would demand close co-ordination with Latin American countries - and 
this was an issue far more important than any legal suits presented by expropriated firms 
(Meyer 1985b).  All in all, the 1938 expropriation is seen as „the culmination of 
Mexican revolutionary nationalism‟ as it not only brought to an end the long standing 
control that foreign firms wielded over the most important natural resource of the 
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country, it also paved the way for the subsequent creation of Petróleos Mexicanos 
(PEMEX) (Meyer 1985b: 149).  
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The extent of foreign participation in key sectors of the Mexican economy at the 
beginning of the 20
th
 century was viewed with scepticism by factions within the 
political elite and the general public. The political order that emerged from the civil war 
and the subsequent enactment of the 1917 Constitution laid the groundwork for the state 
to participate more actively in the economic development of the country in the years 
ahead. To that end, the hydrocarbon industry, mostly in the hands of U.S. and British 
firms, was destined to be a key instrument. Post-revolutionary governments encouraged 
the dissemination of nationalistic values through the establishment of an array of labour 
and social organisations and this political scaffolding has persisted to the present day. 
The dispute between workers and foreign oil firms over wages erupted in the midst of a 
climate permeated by the rise of economic nationalism. For the Mexican government, 
the conflict not only represented the perfect opportunity to expropriate oil assets in 
1938. It also signalled the path of development that political elites were to embrace – 
one in which the state is the most important regulator and supporter of economic 
activities. To a significant extent, the context that led to the creation of Petróleos 
Mexicanos (PEMEX) helps us understand the rationale behind the industrial 
development strategy that the country followed in the subsequent decades – period in 
which the establishment and rise of the petrochemical industry took place.  
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5 
THE RISE OF THE PUBLIC PETROCHEMICAL 
INDUSTRY  
An overview of the national context in the post-World War II period 
 
    
INTRODUCTION 
In the decades following the end of World War II, many countries in the developing 
world embraced inward-looking strategies in pursuit of social and economic progress. 
Contrary to the outward-looking policies instigated in Asian countries, Mexico 
introduced a series of measures for expanding the national industrial base through the 
substitution of imports – a strategy that entailed imposing high barriers to trade. Even 
though this approach succeeded in accelerating economic growth for a period of over 
two decades, the model itself began to present certain flaws by the 1970s. In the light of 
the relative deterioration of the economic climate throughout the first half of that 
decade, policy makers wondered whether import-substitution strategies would enable 
Mexico to continue in the right direction. Nevertheless, there were no changes to 
economic policies in the second half of the 1970s. The oil boom experienced during this 
period fuelled the belief that hydrocarbon resources would contribute to an expansion of 
the domestic industrial apparatus – an approach that broadened and deepened the extent 
of prevailing policies. In this context, the government envisaged the processing of 
natural gas and crude into basic industrial inputs as pivotal. Since these basic inputs 
would encourage development of the privately-owned secondary petrochemical 
industry, while simultaneously stimulating production of a broader range of consumer 
goods, the government allocated substantial resources for the construction of PEMEX 
petrochemical facilities. The downside to such a strategy is that the magnitude of the 
required investments largely contributed to the widening of public financial imbalances, 
which along with the deterioration of the external economic environment sent the 
country into economic turmoil in 1982.  
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In the present chapter, even though the main focus of the discussion is on the 
establishment and rise of the petrochemical industry in the 1960s and 1970s, attention is 
also paid to political economy issues associated with this development. It is difficult to 
understand what drove the construction of petrochemical facilities in the Veracruz 
cluster and elsewhere without discussion of the wider economic context. The import-
substituting industrialisation (ISI) that Mexico followed from the 1950s is therefore 
discussed. Another development that deserves particular consideration is the oil boom 
the country experienced towards the end of the 1970s. Apart from encouraging 
industrial expansion, the growth of hydrocarbon reserves also played a role in 
worsening public imbalances. If one believes that the economic model at that time along 
with the oil boom help to explain the rapid expansion of the state-owned petrochemical 
company‟s installed capacity, the collapse of the economy in 1982 is equally of great 
weight with respect to understanding the development of the sector in subsequent 
decades. For instance, a brief yet concise discussion of what such economic turmoil 
entailed is also given.   
THE GOLDEN YEARS OF THE MEXICAN ECONOMY 
Although the genesis of import-substituting industrialisation (ISI) in Mexico is traced 
back to the administration of Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940), the president who 
nationalised the oil industry in 1938, it is not until after World War II that such a 
development strategy became a calculated policy tool (Ángeles Cornejo 2001, Baer 
1972). In the relevant literature it is widely acknowledged that the 1950s and 1960s 
represented the golden age of ISI – a phase during which the country‟s economy 
expanded at an average rate of more than 6 percent annually (Figure 5.1). Such 
prosperity was accompanied by other equally alluring economic indicators: inflation 
remained under control, prices rose at an annual rate below 5 percent from 1940 to 
1976, and industrial output expanded at an even faster pace towards the end of the 
period. From 1960 to 1972 the sector grew by more than 7 percent per annum. 
Furthermore, what also contributed to this economic strength was the fixed exchange 
rate for the peso against the dollar with the value of the national currency pegged at 12.5 
pesos to the U.S. dollar from 1954 to 1976 (Ramírez 1986). 
The political stability experienced by Mexico from the mid 1930s onwards played an 
important role in the country‟s outstanding performance. At the core of the country‟s 
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political system was the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), founded in 1929, 
which brought together the most important social, political and economic forces that 
survived the Mexican Revolution. Given the strict control the PRI eventually wielded 
over different spheres and the fact that other ideological groups held little power, post-
conflict Mexico emerged as a one-party democracy that assured both the transfer of 
command from one president to another in peaceful terms and the continuation of 
economic policies (Domínguez 1982).  
Mexico‟s favourable economic and political scenario under ISI was coupled with an 
expanding domestic market. In 1970 the Mexican population reached 50.7 million, up 
from 20.2 million in 1940 (Alba and Porter 1986), with annual growth of over 3 percent 
throughout the period. A social phenomenon that characterised the ISI model is that the 
population tended to migrate from rural to urban areas in search of jobs and better living 
conditions. The population living in urban centres of more than 2,500 inhabitants grew 
from 42.6 percent in 1950 to 58.7 percent in 1970 – a trend that accelerated the shift of 
employment from agriculture to the service and industrial sectors (Lustig 1981, 1998). 
This sizeable domestic demand, coupled with increasing income, is believed to have 
prompted policy makers to intensify the implementation of protective measures. 
Figure 5.1 Mexico’s main economic variables, 1950-1972 
  (Real average annual growth rates, 1960=100) 
  1950-55 1955-60 1960-66 1966-72 
GDP 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 
Population 3.1 3.2 3.4 3.4 
Per Capita Product 3.0 3.0 2.9 3 
Industrial Output 4.4 6.2 7.3 7.9 
Agricultural Output 5.7 3.0 4.3 2.4 
Price Index for Mexico City 7.5 3.9 1.8 3.5 
   
Source: Taken from Ramírez (1986). 
With regard to the prevailing policy framework in the 1950s and 1960s, both 
accelerated growth and industrial expansion were made possible thanks to the 
imposition of high trade barriers and other quantitative and qualitative restrictions on 
imports. Towards the end of the 1940s, the government had introduced an import permit 
system. As the aim was to protect domestic infant industries from foreign competition, 
import tariffs on consumer goods were fixed at 50 percent - a rather high rate to 
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discourage consumers from purchasing imported goods. On the other hand, policy 
makers were also interested in „establishing domestic production facilities to 
manufacture goods that were formerly imported‟ (Baer 1972: 95). The permit system 
taxed machinery and raw materials, which were regarded as vital inputs for industrial 
expansion, at 5 percent and 10-15 percent respectively – a much lower rate in 
comparison to consumer goods. In the years to come, under pressure from industrialists, 
Mexican authorities imposed quantitative restrictions on a larger number of goods 
(Reynolds 1970). In addition to tariffs, the government also contemplated licensing 
requirements for imports. Calva (2000), for example, notes that the value of imports 
subject to licensing requirements in the 1950s and 1960s averaged 57.2 percent, while a 
decade later the share had escalated to 74.1 percent. While Villarreal (1977) offers a 
similar judgment, he nonetheless estimates that 80 percent of imports required a license 
to enter the country by 1970.  
The role of the state went far beyond regulation as it was determined to be heavily 
involved in the expansion of the industrial base. To do so, it carried out a crusade to 
“Mexicanise” several productive sectors. „In 1961 the government decreed that foreign 
mining companies had to sell majority stakes to Mexican investors. In 1962 López 
Mateos, Mexico‟s president from 1958-64, moved to limit foreign ownership in the 
automobile parts industry to 40 percent.  In 1966 President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz (1964-
70) ordered that the banking industry had to be domestically owned. In 1967 he limited 
foreign ownership in the sulphur industry to 34 percent. Three years later, Díaz Ordaz 
declared his intention to “Mexicanise” the steel, cement, glass, fertiliser, paper, and 
aluminium industries‟41 (Haber et al. 2008: 47). There is no doubt that the intervention 
of the state was determinant in the rapid industrialisation experienced by Mexico during 
the 1950s and 1960s, with the setting up of the petrochemical industry in this period 
being a case in point. 
 
 
                                                 
41
 For a more detailed discussion of the role of the Mexican state in the organisation of the 
aforementioned industries see Bernstein (1964) and Izquierdo (1995). 
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THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PETROCHEMICAL INDUSTRY IN 
MEXICO  
In the 1950s Mexico embarked on a process of industrialisation through the 
implementation of import-substituting measures. In line with such an approach, the 
processing of hydrocarbon resources into a wide range of industrial raw materials, 
which at subsequent production stages are transformed into an even broader array of 
consumer goods, was deemed by policy makers to be a critical component in 
accelerating expansion of the domestic industrial apparatus – an objective central to the 
prevailing economic model. In other words, by turning crude and natural gas into 
industrial inputs, what the government contemplated was a strengthening of the vertical 
configuration of associated value chains. The establishment and later expansion of the 
petrochemical industry became one of the top priorities of policy makers.   
The government took the first steps towards setting up petrochemical facilities in 1951 
when PEMEX commenced operation of a plant for the production of sulphur, an input 
used in the production of fertilisers, at the Poza Rica refinery in the state of Veracruz. 
Later, in 1959, the government completed construction of facilities at the Mexico City 
refinery for the making of dodecylbenzene, an important raw material employed in the 
detergent industry. During this period development of the petrochemical industry in 
terms of output and installed capacity was constrained by a number of factors and 
PEMEX was unable to finance construction of the petrochemical plants contemplated 
by the government. A key element in the industrial policy institutionalised by the 
Mexican government during the ISI era was the commercialisation of products and 
services provided by state-owned firms at subsided prices. The goal was to encourage 
the development of associated private sectors. It is believed that industrial expansion 
occurred elsewhere
42
 and at the expense of the financial standing of PEMEX. To make 
matters worse, the existing regulatory framework of the oil industry did not clarify 
demarcation between basic and secondary petrochemical products and this lack of a 
clear definition led to a high degree of uncertainty among government officials with 
regard to the extent of the involvement of public and private actors in the industry. 
These factors prompted a heated debate in political circles in relation to determining the 
regulatory framework for the petrochemical industry (Snoeck 1986). As a result, on 29 
                                                 
42
 For a more detailed discussion of the growth of the secondary petrochemical industry in the 1960s, see 
a report by the Instituto Mexicano del Petróleo (1973). 
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November 1958 President Ruiz Cortinez (1952-58) decreed an amendment to the 
Petroleum Law of Article 27 of the Constitution, which included the legal precepts 
serving to regulate the oil industry in Mexico. The aim of the amendment was to hand 
PEMEX the exclusive right to produce basic petrochemicals, while allowing private 
firms to transform these basic inputs into intermediate and final products
43
. But the 
classification of inputs proved complex to interpret. On 25 August 1959 President 
López Mateos (1958-1964) decreed the Regulations of the Petroleum Law of Article 27 
of the Constitution with the aim of further defining basic and secondary petrochemical 
products
44
. These Regulations ensured the State‟s entitlement to produce basic industrial 
raw materials, which are derived from „petrochemical processes based on the first important 
chemical transformation of hydrocarbon resources and its by-products‟, while those 
„products derived from subsequent petrochemical processes (secondary petrochemical 
products) are subject to being indistinctly produced by either state-owned or private 
companies‟45. Since this set of regulations gave PEMEX the responsibility of supplying 
basic inputs to those industries the government was seeking to develop under ISI, the 
expansion of output and installed capacity was a matter of fundamental importance 
(Snoeck 1986). At the same time, President López Mateos (1958-64) sought to alleviate 
the financial situation of PEMEX by authorising a rise in the subsided price of oil-
derived products
46
. The latter course of action, along with the regulations of the sector 
that established which petrochemical inputs fell within the scope of government or 
private investors, allowed PEMEX to undertake more ambitious plans (Dovalí Jaime 
1971, Snoeck 1986). Throughout the presidency of López Mateos, the number of 
petrochemical inputs processed by PEMEX grew from 4 in 1960 to 13 in 1964. Output 
followed suit by swelling from 56,000 to 397,000 tonnes during the same period, as 
Figure 5.2 depicts.  
 
                                                 
43
 See the Official Gazette of the Federation (DOF) of November 29, 1958. 
44
 In the case of a product whose definition as basic or secondary is not clear, it is stated in Article 29 of 
the Regulations (DOF 1958) that the President would make a decision based on a report prepared by 
PEMEX, the Ministry of National Assets (SEPANAL) and the Ministry of Trade and Industry (SIC). 
45
 See the Official Gazette of the Federation (DOF) of August 25, 1959. In the case of conflicts derived 
from the interpretation of basic and secondary petrochemical inputs, the President would issue a final 
decision based on a report previously prepared by PEMEX. 
46
 It is important to remember that a component of industrial policy during this period was 
commercialisation of hydrocarbon-derived products at subsided prices, which tended to be lower than 
those in the U.S. 
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Figure 5.2 Evolution of PEMEX petrochemical output, 1960-1977 
  (Thousands of tonnes)  
 
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977
Alkila rilo 3 8 13 9 11 16 8 10 10 7 6 5 7 5 4 6 6 6
Sulphur 34 52 47 44 37 47 34 48 53 58 60 65 62 64 64 90 96 146
Do decylbenzene 10 20 27 21 26 36 42 48 46 45 49 48 53 49 60 72 63 62
Tetramers 9 19 27 10 25 35 41 47 49 43 35 37 41 35 37 41 50 38
Ammo nium s ulfide 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.02
Ammo nia 57 103 124 121 140 132 163 391 454 460 505 530 525 801 865 944
Carbo n dio xide 66 126 149 91 171 161 254 551 631 677 746 751 813 1,092 1,156 1,263
Heavy aro matics 0.7 6 17 26 53 49 38 42 44 52 58 42 34 42
Benzene 7 31 37 52 80 82 77 75 62 82 97 90 99 74
Heptane 0.3 3 3 2 3 3 5 4 4 5 6 7 5 5
Ortho xylene 0.6 5 10 14 15 14 14 14 14 14 17 15 19 14
Hexane 0.8 6 9 7 10 12 14 15 19 20 25 26 30 30
To luene 15 65 92 88 99 97 89 93 84 101 119 116 132 116
Ethylbenzene 3 7 8 11 13 15 25 28 30 38 27 34 32
Metaxylene  and 
paraxylene
19 34 41 49 44 42 44 40 49 57 52 66 62
P o lye thylene 6 16 23 27 26 36 65 87 89 99 94 95
Muria tic  ac id 1 16 19 42 46 40 40 11 9 13 13
Vinyl chlo ride 0.7 8 10 19 21 16 16 50 44 60 56
Dichlo ro e thano 3 20 23 39 42 38 40 98 90 104 98
Styrene 10 24 25 28 31 32 33 30 27 35 36
Ethylene 8 24 41 53 60 69 83 166 178 213 228 230
Ethane 15 41 65 84 106 112 159 247 271 324 352 416
P ro pylene 51 58 62 54 46 71 83 95 92 93 114 137
Aceta ldehyde 2 10 17 20 31 26 26 32 47 44
Cyclo hexane 0.7 2 0.4 1 5 28 42 35 43 38
Methano l 5 19 17 22 26 30 32 32 33
Is o pro pano l 3 9 7 8 12 8 4 4
Acrylo nitrile 11 17 19 22 20 22 19
Ammo nium 
s ulpha te
5 8 6 15 15 15 12
Hydro gen cyanide 2 3 3 4 3 4 3
Ethylene  o xide 5 13 23 27 25 27
P etro chemica l 
s pec ia lities
2 2 2 3 2
P araxylene 5 33 32 39 35
Hydro chlo ride  ac id 30 26 35 38
Aro mine 3 4 3
Butadiene 22 19 23
P erchlo ro e thylene 3
To ta l 56 99 237 313 397 484 725 838 1,157 1,721 1,934 2,097 2,323 2,647 2,978 3,633 3,947 4,199
 
  Source: PEMEX (1978). 
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With respect to the stipulations described lines above, it is appropriate to make a 
parenthesis to indicate that the manner in which petrochemical value-adding activities 
are currently organised in the Veracruz cluster are rooted in the context of state 
intervention at that point of time: PEMEX-Petrochemicals produce and supply raw 
materials that private firms use to yield intermediate (or final) inputs.  
Back to the discussion, in the second half of the 1960s the government continued 
subsidising the growth of associated industries by imposing price controls for PEMEX 
products. It is alleged that the price index of basic petrochemicals fell from 100 in 1960 
to 96.5 in 1966 and to 89.5 in 1972, whereas price indexes for other economic sectors 
such as agriculture and construction jumped from 120.9 and 130.7 in 1965 to 149.4 and 
175.5 in 1972, respectively (Gutiérrez 1975). In the specific case of agriculture, the 
government paid special attention to this sector. Figure 5.2 demonstrates that the 
production of ammonia, the main input for the making of fertilisers, substantially 
increased towards the end of the 1960s. Output skyrocketed from 57,000 tonnes in 1962 
to 454,000 tonnes in 1970. Overall, and in spite of the financial restrictions PEMEX 
endured in the 1960s, output firmly established an upward drift, jumping from 397,000 
tonnes in 1964 to 1,934,000 tonnes in 1970 – a figure 34.5 times larger than that in 1960 
and 4.9 times that of 1964. Concerning the number of products, the figure reached 26 by 
1970 – up from 4 in 1960 and 13 in 1964, the last year of the previous presidential term. 
These numbers illustrate both the extent of state intervention and, more importantly, the 
strategic significance of the sector with regard to import substitution. In this respect, 
PEMEX (1971) reported that import substitution during the 1964-70 presidential term 
was 5.6 times greater than during the 1958-1964 administration. In the ensuing years, 
indications were that despite deterioration of the economic climate prospects for the 
petrochemical sector looked promising.  
The 1970s – the waning of the economic model 
The involvement of the state, along with trade barriers and rising domestic demand, 
contributed greatly to the growth of gross domestic product at a rate of 6.4 percent from 
1966 to 1972. This upward trend was also mirrored by industrial output, which grew by 
almost 8 percent annually throughout the same period - more than three times the 
average growth of the agricultural sector (Figure 5.1). Up to that point, the Mexican 
economy had performed remarkably well, but the situation was about to take a less 
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fortunate turn as there was evidence indicating that macroeconomic stability was at risk. 
Protectionist measures created industrial sectors that grew larger under oligopolistic 
structures and that had no incentives to export since the domestic market yielded 
significant returns. In order to grow, this domestic industrial base relied strongly on 
imported raw materials and machinery for the manufacture of consumer goods. The 
combination of both these factors led to imports ballooning at a faster rate than exports, 
thereby widening the deficit of the balance of payments current account (Figure 5.3). 
While in 1950 Mexico‟s exports totalled $826 million47, the value of services and 
products marketed abroad had reached $6,305 million by 1975. An even more 
pronounced drift is observed with regard to imports, which in 1950 stood at $768 
million. By 1975 imports had skyrocketed to almost $10 billion, resulting in a trade 
deficit of $3.692 billion in the same year (Ramírez 1986). In many respects, it is thought 
that what also contributed to holding back the rise of exports was the fixed exchange 
rate for the peso. The value of the dollar was set at 12.5 pesos from 1954 to 1976 and 
this policy delivered mixed results, stabilising prices for capital goods demanded by 
industrialists but also eroding the competitiveness of Mexico‟s products in international 
markets (Haber et al. 2008). 
Figure 5.3 Mexico’s exports and imports, 1940-1975 
  1940 1950 1960 1970 1975 
  Millions of U.S. Dollars 
Exports of Goods and Services 213.9 826.7 1371.8 2933.1 6305.5  
Imports of Goods and Services 191.3 768.0 1672.3 3879.0 9998.4 
Balance on Current Account 22.6 58.7 -300.5 -945.9 -3692.9 
      
  Shares % 
Exports/GDP 6.3 9.7 6.1 4.3 4.3 
Imports/GDP 8.8 11.8 9.8 7.8 10.0 
      
  Growth Rates (Average annual rates, %) 
    1940-50 1950-60 1960-70 1970-75 
Exports of Goods and Services 
 
12.3 4.5 6.7 12.7 
Imports of Goods and Services 
 
8.2 6.0 8.7 15.9 
            
 
  Source: Adapted from Ramírez (1986). 
                                                 
47
 Figures in this thesis are expressed in US dollars.  
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Furthermore, during the first half of the 1970s the government conducted a more 
aggressive form of interventionism by further encouraging import substitution in the 
capital goods sector along with public spending (Solís 1982). There is reason to believe 
that this course of action was driven by the mild economic slowdown the country 
experienced, which was to some extent attributed to the oil crisis of 1973. Additionally, 
the administration of President Echeverría (1970-76) believed that greater state 
intervention was in the interests of economic, social, and political stability. Policy 
makers were certain that the government had to wield a sizeable deal of control over 
industrial ownership, investment, and price-setting mechanisms. According to this line 
of thinking, it was taken for granted that the country „would be more prosperous, 
equitable, and less vulnerable to the political pressures of the business sector at home 
and abroad‟ (Lustig 1998: 18).  
But the interventionist role of the state came at a high price with public finances being 
rapidly debilitated. Lustig (1998: 19), for example, explains that the „fiscal deficit rose 
from 2.5 percent of GDP in 1971 to 10 percent in 1975‟. To finance public spending, 
the government had to borrow heavily from international markets. „During the same 
period the foreign public debt rose from $6.7 billion to $15.7 billion‟, which according 
to Ramírez (1986) corresponded to 24.4 percent of the GDP in 1975. In addition, „the 
inflation rate, Mexico‟s pride in the previous two decades, reached chronic two-digit 
levels, rising from 3.4 percent in 1969 to an average of 17 percent in 1973-75‟48 (Lustig 
1998: 19). Another significant indication of the deterioration of public finances is the 
country‟s external financial solvency. In the 1960s debt service payments, as a 
percentage of the current value of exports of goods and services, represented 21.5 
percent. By 1975 the financial solvency of Mexico worsened to a further 26 percent 
(IDB 1982).  
In the face of these adverse economic events, the Mexican government had no option 
but to devalue the national currency for the first time in more than two decades. The 
exchange rate jumped from 12.5 to 19.7 pesos per dollar. Given the extent of the 
turbulence, the Mexican government commenced negotiations with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) in order to design a program that would alleviate financial 
imbalances. The IMF called for the implementation of austerity measures that entailed 
                                                 
48
 For a more extensive discussion of the deterioration of Mexico‟s public finances see Zedillo (1985, 
1986). 
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scaling back public sector employment, reducing the deficit, adjusting the exchange 
rate, and adjusting prices for goods and services produced by state-owned firms. In 
1978, however, the economic circumstances that compelled Mexico to implement this 
course of action were to take a dramatic turn in the near future. PEMEX announced the 
discovery of oil fields that converted Mexico into an energy powerhouse almost 
overnight (Ramírez 1986). 
The oil boom 
The austerity measures the IMF recommended for Mexico were put on hold. The 
country‟s economic perspectives changed as its oil and natural gas reserves climbed 
from 6,338 million barrels in 1975 to 40,194 million barrels three years later and then to 
72,008 million barrels in 1981 (Figure 5.4). In a scenario where world oil supply was 
not guaranteed, the new energy wealth of Mexico was praised in financial and political 
circles of the industrialised world, particularly in the United States, a country that had 
suffered the boycott of Arab oil-producing countries in the early 1970s.  
Figure 5.4  Proven reserves and production of oil and natural gas, 1970-1981 
Year Proven Reserves 
Annual 
Production Years of Reserves 
  (Million barrels)   
1970 5,567.50 310.6 18 
1971 5,428.40 306 18 
1972 5,387.80 326.9 16 
1973 5,431.70 335.6 16 
1974 5,773.40 402 14 
1975 6,338.40 464.8 14 
1976 11,160.90 500 22 
1977 16,001.70 545.6 29 
1978 40,194.00 672.2 60 
1979 45,803.40 803.6 57 
1980 60,126.40 1,039.10 58 
1981 72,008.40 1,228.80 57 
   
  Source: Taken from Ramírez (1986). 
Although it is not within the scope of this chapter to shed light on the strategic 
importance of Mexican oil in relation to the energy vulnerability of the United States, it 
is worth pointing out that Mexico was seen as a more reliable source of supply since it 
did not belong to the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) (Grayson 
1981) - a syndicate that exerted a great deal of control over world oil prices. The 
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possession of massive hydrocarbon holdings, as Grayson puts it (1979: 431), „lofts a 
country's standing within the community of nations, improves its position with the 
World Bank and other financial agencies... (and) also expands (its) leverage in 
negotiations with the United States‟. To a major extent, this quote clearly demonstrates 
Mexico‟s experience during this period.  
As these large hydrocarbon reserves needed to be developed, Mexico‟s demand for 
foreign borrowing increased and this occurred in the context of a favourable external 
environment. During this period the price of oil remained high as a result of market 
intervention by OPEC countries in the wake of the 1973 embargo (Smith 1992), 
yielding large returns for oil producers. A large proportion of such returns were 
deposited in the banks of oil-importing countries, which swelled the availability of 
capital throughout the international financial system. International banks therefore 
sought to channel these funds into profitable projects, and Mexico, in many respects, 
was regarded at the time as an attractive option (Haber et al. 2008). As oil output 
mushroomed from 672.2 million barrels in 1977 to 1,228.8 million barrels in 1981, 
Mexican authorities managed to obtain low interest rates from foreign lenders (Grayson 
1979, Meyer and Morales 1990).  
Figure 5.5 Mexico’s economic evolution, 1976-1981 
  1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Gross domestic product (annual 
percentage change) 
4.2 3.4 8.2 9.2 8.3 7.9 
Annual average inflation (annual 
percentage change, 1978=100) 
15.8 29.1 17.5 18.2 26.3 27.9 
Fiscal Deficit as % of GDP 9.9 6.7 6.7 7.6 7.5 14.1 
Total external debt (billions of U.S. 
dollars) 
27.5 30.9 34.6 40.3 50.7 74.9 
Total public debt (billions of U.S. 
dollars) 
20.8 22.9 26.3 29.8 33.8 53.0 
Oil exports as a % of total exports 15.4 22.3 30.7 45.1 67.3 72.5 
Current account balance (billions of 
U.S. dollars) 
-3.7 -1.6 -2.7 -4.9 -10.7 -16.2 
 
  Source: Adapted from Lustig (1998). 
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On the domestic front, despite the economic boom – Mexico‟s economy expanded at a 
rate of over 8 percent from 1978 to 1981 – there were some warning signs that 
government officials appeared to overlook (Figure 5.5). A rather alarming drift was the 
fact that the expansion of exports mostly came from larger oil output. While oil exports 
accounted for $3.9 billion in 1979, the amount had increased to $14.5 billion in 1981 – 
representing almost 75 percent of the total value of exports (Nacional Financiera 1984).  
Furthermore, a system of low taxation coupled with increasing levels of government 
spending greatly contributed to an increase in the public deficit. In 1981 the public 
deficit represented 14 percent of gross domestic product, up from 7.5 percent a year 
earlier. To ameliorate the problem, the government sought to increase the money supply 
in the economy, but this measure only led to higher rates of inflation. Consumer prices 
rose from 15.8 percent in 1976 to 27.9 percent in 1981. As can be noted, the financial 
concerns of the Mexican government were associated with an increasing public deficit -  
partially fuelled by PEMEX and the development of oil fields which absorbed 45 
percent of the country‟s borrowing from 1974 to 1981 (Haber et al. 2008). Even though 
oil output skyrocketed from 500 million barrels in 1976 to 1,228.8 million barrels in 
1981 (Figure 5.4) as a result, the country‟s public finances sharply worsened at the same 
time.  
THE RISE OF THE PETROCHEMICAL INDUSTRY IN MEXICO (1970-1982) 
At the beginning of the 1970s there was no doubt concerning the strategic nature of the 
petrochemical industry with regard to import substitution. While in the 1960s the aim 
was to industrialise hydrocarbon resources and encourage the development of associated 
value chains, in the 1970s the objective was to make Mexico self-sufficient in the 
production of basic inputs demanded by the secondary petrochemical industry and other 
sectors. As a result, the state-owned basic petrochemical industry tended to be more 
orientated towards meeting domestic needs – a situation that has continued to the 
present. For the rest of the 1970s, and the early years of the 1980s, even when output 
grew at a faster pace than that of the previous decade, PEMEX was unable to cope with 
increased demand. Whether the latter objective was achieved or not is beyond the scope 
of this analysis, however, it is necessary to address the fact that output in 1982 was five 
times greater than that of 1970 (Figure 5.6), according to official estimates (Snoeck 
1986). 
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It has been mentioned in preceding sections that the first half of the 1970-1982 period 
was marked by an erratic economic environment (1970-76) and that the second half 
(1977-82) was characterised by both the discovery of oil fields, rapid economic 
expansion, and serious public financial imbalances. To a great extent, the development 
of the state-owned petrochemical sector throughout this period is similarly phased.  
During the presidency of Luis Echeverría (1970-76), growth perspectives for the sector 
were constrained by a number of factors. Firstly, a central concern of the government 
was the establishment of a clearer set of guidelines for while previous administrations 
had attempted to demarcate the sphere of action for public and private interests, the 
definition of basic and secondary petrochemical products frequently led to conflicting 
interpretations – an ambiguity that made private firms hesitant concerning investment 
plans. President Echeverría tried to solve this problem by introducing legal definitions 
of what the petrochemical industry is and by further clarifying the scope of action of the 
government and the private sector
49
. Simultaneously, the government established the 
Mexican Petrochemical Commission - the regulatory body for the sector with 
responsibilities including technical enquiries and the interpretation of which products 
either PEMEX or private firms were allowed to produce. From that moment on, the 
intention of policy makers was for petrochemical projects to be undertaken in 
accordance with legal, technical, and economic criteria (DOF 9/2/1971, Rey Romay 
1996). 
                                                 
49
 Amendments to the Regulations of the Petroleum Law of Article 27 of the Constitution on February 9, 
1971, stipulate that the petrochemical industry consists of the performance of either chemical or physical 
processes for the making of compounds derived from oil natural hydrocarbons, or from hydrocarbons that 
are products or by-products of refining operations. Amendments also state that the Mexican government, 
through PEMEX or associated subsidiaries, is entitled to participate in the production of petrochemical 
compounds that can be used as basic industrial raw materials resulting from either the first important 
chemical transformation or the first important physical process of products or by-products derived from 
refining processes or oil natural hydrocarbons. The new legal precepts also granted exclusive production 
rights to PEMEX and other state-owned firms for those products that represent a fundamental economic 
and social interest. To do so, the newly-created Mexican Petrochemical Commission, along with the 
Ministry of National Assets, determines the strategic character of those inputs in question. In relation to 
petrochemical inputs resulting from subsequent processes, the amendments pointed out that these may be 
produced by either state-owned firms or by private firms. With regard to the participation of Mexican 
nationals in the social capital of private petrochemical firms, this must stand at 60 percent, which at the 
same time indicates that the participation of foreign investors in the secondary petrochemical sector 
cannot be higher than 40 percent (DOF 9/2/1971). 
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If the financial constraints of PEMEX
50
 weren‟t enough in themselves, what also cast a 
shadow over petrochemical prospects was the complex co-ordination entailed by 
backward and forward linkages. The construction of proposed state-owned 
petrochemical plants was not only determined by the availability of inputs (natural gas 
and naphthas), but also by the existence of firms demanding that specific group of 
products. Bottlenecks with regard to engineering and input supply estimates along with 
the cancellation of projects by private investors are similarly said to have contributed to 
slowing down the expansion of petrochemical output by PEMEX (Snoeck 1986).  
In addition to the above mentioned factors, it could be initially inferred that the 
relatively adverse economic climate of the first half of the 1970s may have also 
prevented the petrochemical industry from expanding. However, in general terms this 
was not the case. Output climbed from 1,934 thousand tonnes in 1970 to 2,978 thousand 
tonnes in 1974. All in all, what is critical to emphasise is that the growth rate under 
these circumstances was slower than that for ensuing years. The perspectives of the 
petrochemical industry began to change in the final two years of the Echeverría term. 
The 1973 oil embargo, the discovery of hydrocarbon fields in southern Mexico 
(Grayson 1979, Smith 1992), and an authorised increase in subsided prices for basic 
inputs allowed PEMEX to accelerate the construction of plants. By 1976 PEMEX had 
put into operation seventeen new plants (PEMEX 1983) that added 2,690 thousand 
tonnes to the overall installed capacity, which in that year reached 5,039 thousand 
tonnes. This additional capacity led to PEMEX output totalling 3,947 thousand tonnes 
in 1976 – 1.32 times larger than that of 1974 and more than twice the figure for 1970. 
During this entire period, the pace at which output grew stood at 12.7 percent annually 
(Figure 5.6).  
At this point it is pertinent to go back to the discussion of the industrial policy 
introduced by the government during this period. It is widely accepted that in addition 
to financial imbalances, ISI accentuated both the spatial concentration of economic 
activities and social inequality (Blanco 1981). In an attempt to alleviate these 
shortcomings, the Echeverría administration considered the creation of growth poles - 
peripheral regions embodying certain features that encourage industrial development 
(Snoeck 1986). The construction of state-owned petrochemical plants was central to this 
                                                 
50
 It is important to remember that PEMEX output was supplied to domestic user firms at subsided prices 
– a government decision that prevented PEMEX from expanding capacity in line with demand.  
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purpose as the availability of basic inputs in a particular locality would lead to a 
clustering of user firms. A case in point is the petrochemical cluster in southern 
Veracruz – a region that eventually became home to the largest agglomeration of 
industrial firms in southern Mexico. In this respect, NAFIN (1976), for example, 
estimated that the state of Veracruz accounted for 49.4 percent of total investment by 
the private secondary petrochemical sector in 1973. 
Within the period examined in the present section, the second phase of development of 
the petrochemical industry runs in parallel to the sexenio
51
 of López Portillo, Mexico‟s 
president from 1976 to 1982. As one can observe in Figure 5.6, PEMEX petrochemical 
output escalated from 3,974 thousand tonnes in 1976 to 10,590 thousand tonnes in 
1982, with this being primarily the result of putting into operation fifty seven plants 
(PEMEX 1983). The aggregated production capacity during this period reached 9,844 
thousand tonnes – 3.66 times greater than the figure reported for the previous 
presidential term. The explanation for such accelerated growth is the fact that the 
presidency of López Portillo was distinguished by a favourable economic setting. High 
rates of economic growth coupled with huge hydrocarbons reserves discovered off the 
Campeche coast in south-eastern Mexico and low interest rates abroad (Ramírez 1986) 
favoured the reaching of PEMEX targets. On the policy making front, what also 
contributed to this was that the government still considered the sector pivotal with 
regard to the industrialisation of crude and natural gas and the geographical organisation 
of production. In this way, the state-owned petrochemical industry, along with another 
eight economic activities was given priority by government officials in terms of public 
spending (De Oteyza 1977).  
As to PEMEX investment during the 1976-82 sexenio, it is worth considering the 
establishment of ammonia plants at the Cosoleacaque petrochemical complex and the 
construction of La Cangrejera petrochemical complex in Coatzacoalcos – projects that 
ballooned PEMEX output at the time. In the first case, what led PEMEX to expand the 
installed capacity for ammonia was the importance of this input for overhauling 
agricultural productivity, an issue of great concern for Mexico‟s government in terms of 
food self-sufficiency, and the increasing availability of natural gas
52
 in southern 
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 It refers to the six-year presidential period in Mexico. 
52
 Natural gas is the input used to produce ammonia, which at the same time is used in the making of 
fertilisers.  
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Veracruz where adequate infrastructure already existed. From 1977 to 1981 PEMEX 
brought 5 plants into operation with the capacity to yield 2,080 thousand tonnes of 
ammonia and 2,616 thousand tonnes of carbon dioxide. As a result, ammonia output 
rose from 864 thousand tonnes in 1976 to 2,469 thousand tonnes in 1982 – representing 
23.5 percent and 23.3 percent of PEMEX overall output for the same years, 
respectively. As for carbon dioxide, output jumped from 1,156 thousand tonnes in 1976 
to 3,552 thousand tonnes in 1982 - representing 29.2 percent and 33 percent of PEMEX 
output for each of the years mentioned. A more sound indication of the importance of 
these inputs is the fact that both accounted for 51.2 percent of PEMEX petrochemical 
output in 1976 and a further 57 percent in 1982 (PEMEX 1983, 1989). In this context it 
is necessary to highlight the fact that four of these plants, which represented 85 percent 
of the recently added ammonia and carbon dioxide production capacity, were situated at 
the Cosoleacaque petrochemical complex. This is to say that the southern region of the 
state of Veracruz, and in particular the city of Coatzacoalcos, was considered 
fundamental to the industrial decentralisation policy envisioned by the government 
(Snoeck 1986). 
Figure 5.6 PEMEX petrochemical output and installed capacity, 1970-1982 
  (Thousands of tonnes)  
  
Installed 
capacity 
Annual 
change (%) 
Output 
Annual 
change (%) 
Capacity 
utilisation 
(%) 
1970 2,349 - 1,934 - 82.33 
1971 2,494 6.17 2,097 8.43 84.08 
1972 2,990 19.89 2,323 10.78 77.69 
1973 3,299 10.33 2,647 13.95 80.24 
1974 4,059 23.04 2,978 12.50 73.37 
1975 4,409 8.62 3,633 21.99 82.40 
1976 5,039 14.29 3,947 8.64 78.33 
1977 6,384 26.69 4,199 6.38 65.77 
1978 7,659 19.97 5,788 37.84 75.57 
1979 7,840 2.36 6,345 9.62 80.93 
1980 8,886 13.34 7,224 13.85 81.30 
1981 11,676 31.40 9,160 26.80 78.45 
1982 14,883 27.47 10,590 15.61 71.16 
 
Source: PEMEX (1978, 1991), Snoeck (1986). 
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Parallel to the expansion of Cosoleacaque, PEMEX carried out an even more ambitious 
project in Coatzacoalcos. The aim was to establish twenty-two plants at La Cangrejera 
complex
53
. Although construction commenced in 1974, the adverse economic climate of 
the mid 1970s and early 1980s, along with the precarious financial standing of PEMEX, 
meant that La Cangrejera did not become fully operational until 1984 (Snoeck 1986). In 
spite of the financial and technical difficulties faced, which are beyond the scope of this 
thesis, it is necessary to address the fact that La Cangrejera further boosted the position 
of southern Veracruz in the national petrochemical spectrum. By 1982, the year in 
which twelve of the projected plants began producing, it is estimated that the state of 
Veracruz was home to 70 percent of PEMEX overall installed capacity, while the share 
in 1970 was 62 percent (PEMEX 1971, 1983). In absolute terms, the latter means that 
petrochemical installed capacity in Veracruz stood at 8,683 thousand tonnes in 1982 – 
of a total of 10,590 thousand tonnes nationwide. Furthermore, in the case of the 
secondary petrochemical industry, users of the basic inputs produced by PEMEX, 21.4 
percent of the country‟s installed capacity was reported to be located in the state of 
Veracruz (IEPES 1982). 
In view of the evidence, there is no doubt that the construction of petrochemical plants 
in southern Veracruz was at the core of the PEMEX strategy with respect to installed 
capacity expansion in the second half of the 1970s and early 1980s. Much of this 
remarkable development of the public petrochemical industry not only occurred in the 
midst of the oil boom (Figure 5.6), it also materialised in spite of a declining economic 
climate. The crisis that erupted in 1982 set the tone for the development of the sector in 
the decades ahead. 
THE 1982 DEBT CRISIS 
As demonstrated in the previous two sections, public finances were seriously weakened 
towards the end of the 1970s and more so in the early 1980s. Public external debt 
climbed from $23 billion in 1977 to $53 billion in 1981, and to a further $60 billion in 
1982 (Haber et al. 2008, Hamilton 1984, Lustig 2001). If the external debt of the private 
sector is added, the number soars from $30.9 in 1977 to $74.9 billion in 1981 (Figure 
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 The installed capacity of La Cangrejera was projected at 3,500 thousand tonnes a year. Ethylene, 
ethylene derivatives, and aromatics constitute the main production lines.   
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5.5). The government sought to finance its growing deficit through external borrowing, 
which was contracted on the assumption that interest rates would remain low and the 
price of oil per barrel would continue to be attractive. By 1981, and unfortunately for 
Mexico, the external panorama took a turn for the worse. The price of oil began a 
downward drift, interest rates soared, and external credit became increasingly meagre 
(Lustig 2001, Ramírez 1986). As it was imperative to counteract this emerging 
disadvantageous scenario, policy makers devised a series of questionable measures. To 
meet the galloping public financial needs, for example, the government turned to short-
term borrowing. By 1981 Mexico‟s short-term debt escalated to $10.8 billion, up from 
$1.5 billion a year earlier (Cárdenas 1996). This approach to alleviating public 
imbalances exacerbated the maturity of the external debt with, according to Lustig 
(1998), almost half of it requiring repayment or refinancing in 1982.  
Given this disadvantageous scenario, it was no longer reasonable to maintain the value 
of the peso through borrowing so the government decided to devalue the national 
currency in January 1982. The exchange rate jumped from 27 pesos to 47 pesos per U.S. 
dollar. It is believed that devaluation of the peso was intended to slow down the flight of 
capital and the value of imports with the aim of boosting the availability of dollars to the 
central bank. However, evidence suggests that this measure was counterproductive. It 
made the burden of public and private external financial obligations even greater as the 
dollar value of the debt remained unchanged (Lustig 1998). 
In addition to this, while the government took steps to prevent citizens from taking 
dollar-denominated savings out of the country, the long and porous border between 
Mexico and the United States aggravated the flight of capital. Powerless to prevent the 
drain of dollars, on August 20, 1982, the government had no alternative but to announce 
its inability to „repay $10 billion in short-term debt that would fall due a few days later‟ 
(Haber et al. 2008: 64). With that decision, Mexico, „the world‟s first and foremost 
debtor nation at that time, kicked off what would come to be called the debt crisis‟ 
(Adler Hellman 1997: 2). To make matters worse, President Jose López Portillo (1976-
1982), worried that the private sector would accelerate the flight of capital, decided to 
take full control of the financial sector to prevent that from occurring. On September 1, 
1982, López Portillo decreed the nationalisation of the banking system (Del Angel-
Mobarak et al. 2005).  
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In the face of these events, 1982 is widely marked in the relevant literature as a turning 
point in Mexico‟s development strategy. With public external debt of $60 billion, an 
inflation rate of 98.8 percent, devaluation of the national currency, a drop in GDP of 0.6 
percent, an employment rate that jumped to 8 percent, foreign dollar reserves equal to 
just one month of imports, financial turmoil, higher international interest rates, and a 
falling oil price, the Mexican economy started out on the bumpy road it would be forced 
to take over the coming years (Haber et al. 2008, Lustig 1998). Whether the fortunes of 
the Mexican economy over those years are attributed to adverse external circumstances 
or economic mismanagement is beyond the scope of this thesis, although it is worth 
pointing out that Mexico‟s external debt default, the nationalisation of the banking 
system, and the prevailing economic conditions seriously damaged the credibility of the 
government and political elites at home and abroad. Throughout the rest of the decade 
(and beyond) Mexico embarked on a process of economic liberalisation with far-
reaching implications. To a great extent this series of policies created a context that 
would hinder the development of PEMEX, its petrochemical division, the private firms 
situated in the Veracruz cluster, and value chains of petrochemical origin.  
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The establishment and subsequent growth of the petrochemical industry from the 1950s 
to the 1970s was not only accompanied by favourable economic circumstances, the 
approach to industrial development that dominated policy making at that time is also 
viewed as critical in that respect with the Mexican state acting in the national interest. 
By expanding output and the installed capacity of basic petrochemical inputs, the 
government managed to encourage the development of indigenous value chains. 
Measured in these terms, the intervention of the state delivered positive results with oil 
boom of the late 1970s also contributing to this perception.  
Nonetheless, as noted by Lustig (1998), it is equally important to draw attention to the 
fact that government officials instigated questionable policies, mainly with respect to 
financing public expenditure. The administration of López Portillo continued to borrow 
heavily upon the assumption that international interest rates would remain low and 
crude prices high. Unfortunately, the hydrocarbon wealth did little to prevent Mexico 
from economic unrest. The 1982 collapse not only brought economic growth to a halt, 
the government also abandoned import-substituting industrialisation. In the wake of this 
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context, the role of PEMEX and its petrochemical industry was set to change in the 
forthcoming years. 
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6 
MEXICO IN TIMES OF NEOLIBERALISM 
Understanding the complex scenario of the petrochemical industry 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
It has been widely documented that Mexico found itself on the verge of financial 
collapse in 1982 – the year government officials sent shockwaves through the 
international community by defaulting on external debt obligations. This decision, along 
with the gloomy economic imbalances persisting at the time, is widely regarded as 
having prompted the country to abandon the inward-looking strategies of economic 
development introduced since the administration of Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940). 
Given that it was imperative for the government to restore economic stability and 
growth all the indications were that Mexico had no alternative but to set its sights on 
market-friendly export-driven policies. In the years ahead, under the tutelage of 
multilateral organisations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank (WB), which proceeded in association with the country‟s creditors, the local 
political elite pushed Mexico towards a process of economic liberalisation. Under the 
new economic regime the tendency was for the market to replace state regulation, 
private ownership to displace public ownership, and competition to replace surrogate 
protectionism (Lustig 2001).  
At first, the dismantling of the state-owned productive apparatus and the opening of the 
economy to foreign trade and investment were the cornerstone of the program (Ramírez 
1995). Such development foundations, however, proved insufficient to reinstate 
economic stability in the way the government had hoped. After a decade of reforms, 
policy makers considered it necessary to take neoliberalism to the next level. To some 
extent, the inroads of the economic liberalisation program of the 1980s eased the 
institutionalisation of additional market-based policies in the years ahead. The most 
important of these was the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) – which 
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tied the economic structure of Mexico to that of the United States and Canada. NAFTA 
was the instrument through which Mexican political elites ensured that further 
instrumentation of neoliberalism „would survive the pendulum policy shifts of future 
sexenios‟ (Dresser 1998: 245).  
With respect to the analysis proposed in this thesis, it is argued that the development 
strategy adopted by Mexico in the 1980s contributed to the eventual creation of a multi-
dimensional setting that has hindered not only the development of PEMEX and its 
petrochemical division, but also that of the Veracruz cluster and associated value chains. 
With regard to public and private firms in the Veracruz cluster, the problem that arose 
concerns the nature of the complex context that has allegedly constrained industrial 
upgrading, collective efficiency, and the quality of vertical linkages in the locality. It is 
therefore fundamental to situate our case study within a broader empirical background, 
or rather within the political economy of Mexico. The discussion must follow a timeline 
that includes the strategy the government adopted to stabilise the economy in the wake 
of the 1982 debt crisis, the increasing U.S. dependence on imported oil and the role of 
the Mexican hydrocarbon industry in relation to this dependency. The chapter analyses 
how these national and supranational determinants (Figure 3.4) contributed to 
persuading government officials to minimise the scope of state intervention in the 
petrochemical industry on the one hand and determine the horizontal restructuring of 
PEMEX on the other - political decisions understood as a step towards the dismantling 
of the state-owned petrochemical sector. Last but not least, the chapter also discusses 
the post-NAFTA era context and the threat of privatisation for PEMEX-Petrochemicals 
resulting from the 1994 peso crisis.  
THE ROAD TO A FREE MARKET ECONOMY 
In the two presidential regimes that followed the 1982 economic crisis, the roots of 
which were briefly discussed in Chapter 5, Mexico underwent a process of profound 
change. During this period, given the failure of the former development model, there 
was widespread belief that the state must play a less important role in economic 
planning (Biersteker 1990). Mexican political elites, which were convinced that the 
prescriptions of the IMF and the WB would restore economic growth and stability, 
implemented a series of policies aimed at giving market forces a much greater influence 
in economic matters. Miguel De La Madrid (1982-1988) took office as Mexico‟s 
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president in December 1982 – months after López Portillo, the preceding president, 
declared a default on the country‟s external debt and decreed the nationalisation of the 
banking system (Haber et al. 2008, Del Angel-Mobarak et al. 2005). The new 
administration inherited an economy in tatters with an external debt of $92.4 billion, a 
public deficit of 16.9 percent of GDP, rampant inflation, and capital flight and these 
factors set the tone for the upheaval experienced throughout the 1980s (Lustig 1998). 
These circumstances indicated it was time for Mexico to distance itself from inward-
looking strategies.  
Mexico‟s vulnerable position prompted policy makers to seek the assistance of the IMF 
and the WB concerning debt restructuring. Needless to say, such assistance came at a 
price and Mexico was forced to introduce a structural adjustment program (SAP). For 
the first half of his term, President Miguel De La Madrid envisaged a stabilisation 
program entailing currency devaluations, restrictions on imports, and deep public 
spending cuts (Lustig 1998). In the short term, the strategy seemed to work. Non-oil 
exports rose from approximately $400 million during the first quarter of 1982 to over 
$600 million in the first quarter of 1983. Imports fell from roughly $2 billion per month 
in 1981 to less than $600 million during the first months of 1983 (Ten Kate 1992). As to 
public spending, government officials managed to reduce the deficit from 16.9 percent 
in 1982 to 8.6 percent of GDP in 1983. Nonetheless, all these measures proved 
insufficient to counterbalance both persistent financial imbalances and an adverse 
external environment as the national economy continued to perform poorly. While in 
1982 external debt stood at $92.4 billion, the amount jumped to $96.6 billion in 1985 - 
representing 54.2 percent and 52.4 percent of the country‟s GDP in each of the years 
indicated. The international price of oil consistently tumbled throughout the first half of 
De La Madrid‟s tenure – from $28.7 per barrel in 1982 to $25.3 in 1985. Furthermore, 
nominal interest rates in the U.S. remained high. The cost of capital averaged 12 percent 
from 1982 to 1985 - a rate that obliged Mexico to transfer 6.5 percent of its yearly GDP 
to international creditors during the same period (Lustig 1998).  
Figure 6.1 demonstrates that the De La Madrid administration failed to stabilise the 
economy. The approach of the IMF and the dogmatic viewpoint of Mexican policy 
makers overestimated the effectiveness of the measures introduced. The actual 
performance of inflation, public sector borrowing requirements (PSBR), and real GDP 
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growth was much worse than first anticipated. The IMF projected that inflation would 
shrink from 55 percent in 1983 to 18 percent in 1985. In point of fact, prices 
skyrocketed at a rate of 80.8 percent in 1983 and 63.7 percent in 1985. The PSBR as a 
percentage of GDP followed a similar pattern. IMF officials believed that the public 
deficit would fall from 8.5 percent in 1983 to 3.5 percent in 1985. Unfortunately, the 
PSBR jumped from 8.6 percent to 9.6 percent during the same period. With regard to 
GDP, the original IMF projection calculated that the economy would achieve no growth 
in 1983 and that the rate of expansion would stand at 6 percent in 1985. Instead, GDP 
collapsed by 4.2 percent in 1983 and attained a rather modest growth rate of 2.6 percent 
by 1985 (Lustig 1998). The determinants behind such failure are beyond the scope of 
this chapter, but what is important to note is that the Mexican government was 
compelled to step up the pace of economic reforms in the years ahead.  
Figure 6.1 Key economic variables, 1981-1990 
  1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
GDP (%) 8.8 -0.6 -4.2 3.6 2.6 -3.8 1.7 1.3 3.3 4.5 
Public sector borrowing 
requirement (as % of GDP) 
14.1 16.9 8.6 8.5 9.6 15.9 16 12.5 5.6 3.9 
Total external debt 
(billions of U.S. dollars) 
74.9 92.4 93.8 96.7 96.6 101.0 107.5 100.4 95.3 104.3 
Public sector external debt 
(billions of U.S. dollars) 
53.0 59.7 66.6 69.4 72.1 75.4 81.4 81.0 76.1 77.8 
U.S. nominal interest rate 
(%) 
18.9 14.9 10.8 12.0 9.9 8.3 8.2 9.3 10.9 10.0 
Interest payments (billions 
of U.S. dollars) 
9.5 12.2 10.1 11.7 10.2 8.3 8.1 8.6 9.3 9.0 
External debt as % of GDP 29.9 54.2 63.0 55.0 52.4 77.7 76.5 58.1 46.1 42.7 
Debt service as % of GDP 6.26 7.1 6.78 6.65 5.53 6.38 5.76 4.97 4.49 3.68 
Export oil price (U.S. 
dollars per barrel) 
33.2 28.7 26.3 26.8 25.3 11.9 16 12.2 15.6 19.2 
Oil exports as % of total 
exports 
72.5 77.6 71.8 68.6 68.2 39.3 41.8 32.6 22.4 24.8 
Inflation (annual average) 27.9 58.9 101.9 65.4 57.7 86.2 131.8 114.2 20 26.7 
Minimum wage (annual 
percent change) 
1.0 -0.1 -21.9 -9.0 -1.2 -10.5 -6.3 -12.7 -6.6 -9.1 
Net resource transfers to 
GDP (%) 
n.a. 6.3 7.6 6.8 6.9 4.2 2.9 6.8 1.2 0.4 
   
  Source: Taken from Lustig (1998). 
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Due to this state of affairs, the country once again faced a balance-of-payments crisis in 
mid-1985. One of the fundamental consequences of the latter was that as the country 
failed to meet fiscal targets, access to additional external financing was limited in that 
year and for much of 1986. Policy makers soon realised that fiscal and monetary 
policies were by no means sufficient to counterbalance public imbalances and that this 
time the search for economic stabilization needed to be bolstered by trade liberalisation 
and a less prominent role for the state in economic affairs (Lustig 1998).  
In keeping with this rationale the government unilaterally resolved to reduce the share 
of domestic production protected by import licensing from 92.2 percent in June 1985 to 
47.1 percent in December of the same year – a drop of over 45 percent in a span of six 
months (Figure 6.3). With respect to state intervention, the government sped up the 
privatisation of state-owned firms. The number of firms turned over to the private sector 
soared from 7 in the first two years of the sexenio to 32 in the year 1985 (Presidencia de 
la República 1982-2003). With this decision the government sought to persuade 
multilateral organisations and potential domestic and foreign investors of the 
government‟s determination to perform comprehensive structural reforms (Ten Kate 
1992, Rodrik 1989).  
On the international front, the economic situation in Mexico raised concerns throughout 
the financial system. Since U.S. commercial banks were largely exposed not only to 
Mexican debt but also to that of several other indebted developing countries. This 
situation jeopardised the stability of the U.S. banking system (Monteagudo 1994). 
James Baker, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury at that time, devised a plan aimed at 
assisting heavily indebted countries to meet debt obligations (Baker 1985). It is reported 
that the U.S. government conditioned his mediation between Mexico and creditors to 
both the implementation of substantial structural reforms and the reaching of a new 
agreement with the IMF (The Economist 1986). The economic policies proposed by the 
Baker Plan were thus incorporated by the WB and the IMF as conditions for the 
financial assistance provided to Mexico (Monteagudo 1994). In 1986, after commercial 
banks and multilateral institutions agreed on rescheduling the country‟s external debt, 
the government was coerced into furthering the structural adjustment program already 
initiated. The privatisation of state-owned firms (Ramírez 1995, Chong et al. 2005) and 
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the liberalisation of trade (Ten Kate 1992, Weiss 1992) gained momentum in the second 
half of the De La Madrid tenure.  
It is understood that the most sweeping expression of the structural adjustment program 
was the reduction of the role of the state in the economy (Ramírez 1995). The adverse 
circumstances of several developing economies in the 1980s coupled with an inefficient 
industry resulting from protectionist practices is what led to the emergence of an 
uncontested consensus among multilateral financial organisations, international banks, 
U.S. government officials, and scholarly circles that economic planning must shift from 
state intervention to a greater reliance on market forces (Biersteker 1990). In the case of 
Mexico, as previously noted, the financing of development was conditioned to either 
shutting down state-owned firms or turning them over to the private sector. Figure 6.2 
reveals that under the De La Madrid government, the number of public firms tumbled 
from 1,155 at the beginning of the term to 666 in 1988 (Chong et al. 2005).  
At present, the fact that expansion of the state-owned petrochemical industry - most of 
which is situated in southern Veracruz - is no longer a priority for policy makers must 
be understood in the light of the approach to development embraced during these years.  
Even though the De La Madrid administration did not contemplate privatisation of the 
petrochemical industry (as it did with other state-owned sectors), the nature of economic 
and industrial policies instigated under his leadership set up the foundations that 
eventually restrained the extent of state intervention in the sector and with that the 
development of the Veracruz cluster and the quality of local inter-firm linkages.  
Figure 6.2 Evolution of Mexico’s privatisation program, 1982-2003 
State-owned enterprises 1982-88 1989-93 1994-2003 
Total at the beginning of the period 1,155 666 258 
Creation 59 39 108 
Liquidations/shutdowns 294 193 58 
Mergers 72 17 16 
Transfers 25 11 26 
Privatisations 157 226 56 
In process  
  
37 
Total at the end of the period 666 258 210 
 
  Source: Taken from Chong and López-De-Silanes (2005). 
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Turning now to the issue of trade liberalisation, which primarily consisted of the 
elimination of import licenses (Figure 6.3), the aim was to increase competition for 
privatised sectors in the domestic market. Notwithstanding government reduction of 
domestic production protected by import licensing in 1985, the IMF and the WB 
remained sceptical in many respects. What contributed to weakening the credibility of 
the trade policy was that goods not contemplated under such scheme continued to 
represent almost half of the domestic production and the fact that the average import 
tariff was increased from 23.5 percent to 28.5 percent in order to compensate import 
liberalisation. The 20 percent devaluation of the peso in July 1985, which held back the 
rise of imports, also played a role (Ten Kate 1992). As this credibility was a critical 
ingredient in the allocation of IMF and WB funds for the financing of the structural 
adjustment program in Mexico, it was therefore imperative for the government to 
demonstrate the definitive character of trade reform (Rodrik 1989). Mexico‟s access to 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in August 1986 (Story 1986) was 
clearly a step in this direction. In addition, the subsequent reduction in the proportion of 
domestic production covered by import licensing, which plunged from 47.1 percent in 
December 1985 to 21.3 percent in 1988, is also interpreted as a move to shore up the 
confidence of creditors and potential investors in the government plan (Ten Kate 1992). 
Figure 6.3 Domestic production value protected by import licensing 
  June 1985 
December 
1985 
December 
1986 
December 
1987 
December 
1988 
December 
1989 
Oil and Gas 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Petroleum refining 94.3% 87.4% 87.2% 87.2% 87.2% 86.4% 
Transport 
equipment 
99.0% 77.0% 64.2% 58.0% 41.4% 41.0% 
Total 92.2% 47.1% 39.8% 25.4% 21.3% 19.8% 
 
  Source: Taken from Ten Kate (1992). 
While the rationale behind Mexico‟s rapid economic liberalisation in the 1980s is 
associated with the belief that it would increase efficiency for both the domestic 
industrial apparatus and the entire economy on the one hand (Ten Kate 1992, Baer 
1994), and that it would promote sustained economic growth on the other (Baker 1985), 
the evidence indicates that the speed at which such reforms were introduced was 
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fundamentally determined by the state‟s need for capital inflows to comply with debt 
servicing. This view is arguably sound if we bear in mind that throughout the second 
half of the sexenio (1986-88) net capital transfers to the industrialised world accounted 
for 4.6 percent of GDP (Gurría 1991) – a shocking figure given that economic growth 
over the same period of time averaged -0.26 percent (Figure 6.1). 
In view of IMF and WB prescriptions, government stabilisation measures such as 
currency devaluations and public spending cuts, and an adverse external economic 
environment, the economic performance of Mexico continued to languish as late as 
1987. The country was marked by a frail economic growth rate of 1.7 percent, public 
sector borrowing requirements that made up 16 percent of GDP, debt servicing that 
stood at 5.7 percent of GDP, an annual inflation rate of 131.8 percent, and inflation-
adjusted minimum wages that deteriorated at a negative rate of 6.3 percent (Figure 6.1). 
In a further attempt to ameliorate these impasses, De La Madrid orchestrated an 
arrangement in which the state, along with labour, agricultural, and business syndicates, 
teamed up to push for the convergence of policies. The Economic Solidarity Pact (PSE) 
was launched in the same year. Besides trade liberalisation and privatisation
54
, the PSE 
also relied on fiscal deficit cuts and a comprehensive price and wage control policy. The 
PSE started to produce moderate positive results in 1988 with the economy growing 1.3 
percent, inflation slowing down towards the end of the year, non-oil exports rising by 
15.2 percent, foreign reserves jumping from $13.7 to $16 billion, and real wages 
worsening at a rate lower than that of 1983 (Lustig 1991, 1998). In spite of the fragility 
of these variables, the subsequent administration was provided with somewhat more 
solid preconditions to broaden the scope of market-orientated policies.  
NEOLIBERALISM RELOADED 
The extent to which the array of sectoral, national, and supranational determinants 
have shaped both the development of the Veracruz petrochemical cluster and 
governance structures prevailing in transactional linkages between PEMEX-
Petrochemicals and local private firms is strongly associated with the deepening of trade 
liberalisation in the early 1990s. In that respect, it is broadly acknowledged that the 
                                                 
54
 The speeding up of privatisation was central to the PSE. The number of public firms turned over to the 
private sector rose from 22 in 1987 to 66 in 1988 (Presidencia de la República 1983-2003).  
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signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement is the pinnacle of that process and 
for that reason is essential to illustrate the political and economic circumstances leading 
to the inauguration of this agreement between Mexico, the United States, and Canada in 
1994.  
In the light of the rather harsh economic circumstances endured by Mexicans towards 
the end of the De La Madrid term, the Revolutionary Institutional Party (PRI), which 
had held power since 1928, was at risk of losing the 1988 presidential election. After a 
highly contested ballot vote, Carlos Salinas, the PRI candidate, managed to be sworn in 
as the country‟s president in the midst of widespread claims of fraud. The hostile 
economic conditions, pervasive social discontent, and the lack of confidence shown by 
domestic and foreign investors in the government urged the new administration to take 
the market reforms that De La Madrid had inaugurated to the next level (Haber et al. 
2008).  
By the time Salinas (1988-1994) took office in December 1988, inflation had begun to 
show signs of slowing. Official estimates indicate that prices increased 1.2 percent a 
month throughout the second half of the year. On the other hand, economic growth 
continued to be rather disappointing. It is argued that the enormous net capital transfers 
Mexico yielded as a result of the external debt burden is what really compromised 
economic recovery (Lustig 1998, Gurría 1991). It is important to note that what fuelled 
the extent of capital transfers was the private sector‟s lack of confidence in the 
government. Potential domestic and foreign investors remained of the credibility of 
economic reforms so it was therefore of critical importance to design policies to boost 
the confidence of private investors in order to increase capital inflows in the form of 
direct investment and capital repatriation (Lustig 1998). 
One of the first measures undertaken by Salinas and his U.S.-educated economic team 
(Babb 2005, Lindau 1993) was to launch the Pact for Economic Stability and Growth 
(PECE). The PECE sought to „underscore the government‟s commitment to growth 
without sacrificing price stability‟ (Lustig 1998: 55). Salinas therefore negotiated 
restructuring of the external debt with the U.S., the WB, and the IMF as part of the so-
called Brady Plan
55
. Even if servicing of the debt decreased by $1 billion a year (Orme 
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 Mexico signed the final Brady Plan agreement in February 1990.  
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1996), it is claimed that the most important feature of the restructuring was the implicit 
support given by the U.S. to the Mexican reform program. With respect to foreign 
investment, Salinas took steps towards the elimination of restrictions on the ownership 
of manufacturing firms and the purchase of shares in domestic firms (Haber et al. 2008, 
Clarkson 2002). Following the trend established by De La Madrid, Salinas also 
concentrated on the divestiture of public assets. The banking system, expropriated in 
1982, along with firms ranging from steel plants to airlines and Teléfonos de Mexico 
(TELMEX), the landline monopoly company, were sold to private investors (Pastor and 
Wise 2002). During the first three years of the Salinas term, for example, 193 state-
owned firms were privatised, while the number during the last three years of the 
previous sexenio stood at 118 (Presidencia de la República 1982-2003). Figure 6.2 also 
indicates the pace at which the state-owned productive apparatus was dismantled under 
Salinas. The number of public firms sank from 666 at the start of the sexenio to 258 by 
the end of it. Most of the resources these transactions yielded are reported to have 
contributed to moderate financial imbalances for the government (Pill 2002).  
Although debt restructuring did little to reduce the financial burden (Figure 6.1), the fact 
that negotiations with creditors were accompanied by both the privatisation of state-
owned firms and changes to the foreign investment law helped the economy respond 
favourably and re-established government credibility. Public sector borrowing 
requirements, for example, dropped from 12.5 percent in 1988 to 3.9 percent in 1990. 
The economy expanded at a rate of 1.3 and 4.5 percent over the same period and 
inflation was brought down to 20 and 26.7 percent in 1989 and 1990 – a sizeable plunge 
since prices soared 114.2 percent in 1988. The government also experienced a certain 
degree of success with respect to net transfer resources, the ratio of which to GDP 
plunged sharply from 6.8 percent in 1988 to 0.4 percent in 1990. To a significant extent, 
such a fall in capital transfers is associated with the rise of capital inflows that occurred 
soon after the government announced the reprivatisation of banks in May 1990. 
Nevertheless, much of the capital inflows corresponded to portfolio investment, which 
in 1991 was reported to have increased fivefold in comparison to 1990 (Lustig 1998). 
The most significant shortcoming of the Salinas administration, at least for the first 
three years, was that, in spite of the policies introduced, foreign direct investment did 
not significantly vary with respect to the final three years of the De La Madrid term. 
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What is more, as late as 1993, the fifth year of the sexenio, the ratio of fixed capital 
formation to GDP continued to stand at its 1988 level. The much expected upsurge in 
FDI inflows proved harder to materialise and after almost a decade of reforms, it 
appeared that the Mexican economy was still haunted by the ghosts of state intervention 
and economic nationalism – factors that helped create the perception among investors 
that Salinas‟s structural reforms could be reversed by future administrations and turn the 
country back to protectionism and nationalisation practices. As economic growth in the 
short- and medium-term was believed to rely to a significant extent on FDI, it was 
therefore crucial to eliminate the uncertainty associated with government policies 
(Haber et al. 2008, Dresser 1998, Orme 1996).   
The Mexican government soon understood that a free trade agreement with Canada and 
the United States, the country‟s largest source of investment and trading partner, would 
greatly help in ameliorating the lack of confidence in the economic liberalisation 
program. The Bush administration and the Canadian government responded favourably 
to Salinas‟s proposal and kicked off negotiations in August-November 1991. It is worth 
mentioning that by that time tariff barriers between Mexico and the United States were 
already low (Krugman 2008, Maxfield and Shapiro 1998). The trade liberalisation 
initiated by De La Madrid (Figure 6.3) was extended by Salinas and immediately prior 
to NAFTA coming into effect, it is reported that just 11 percent of domestic production 
was still protected by import licensing and that the average import tariff stood at 13 
percent. In the case of the United States, import tariffs applied to Mexican goods 
averaged 3.5 percent. With these figures in mind, it would therefore be imprecise to 
contend that NAFTA primarily addressed free trade between members since the most 
significant feature of the deal was that it included a series of non-trade issues intended 
to establish a framework that would help protect the interests of investors (Haber et al. 
2008). In the end, NAFTA is interpreted as the instrument used by the government to 
more firmly establish market-orientated policies and accelerate social and economic 
integration with the rest of North America (Dresser 1998). From the U.S. perspective it 
is certain that NAFTA allowed for the introduction of mechanisms to protect 
investment, but what is of particular significance is the fact that NAFTA also 
represented the ideal channel for demanding further liberalisation of the Mexican oil 
industry - a matter that had long been a main concern in U.S. policy circles. In a 
scenario where U.S. dependency on oil from volatile regions continued to grow, access 
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to Mexico‟s sizeable hydrocarbon reserves was considered an issue of paramount 
importance for the U.S. energy security strategy (Fagen 1979). In this respect, the 
vertical integration of PEMEX, to which the petrochemical complexes situated in the 
state of Veracruz are central, may be interpreted as representing a danger to both the 
long-term availability of crude intended to feed the industrial apparatus of the U.S. and 
the prospects of U.S. oil firms to capture a larger share of the Mexican petrochemical 
market. The dismantling of the Mexican state-owned petrochemical industry (and 
development of the Veracruz cluster) must therefore also be understood in this context.  
U.S. OIL DEPENDENCY AND PEMEX 
Before focusing on what economic liberalisation in the 1980s and 1990s entailed for the 
petrochemical industry, it is of utmost importance to determine how supranational 
determinants such as the United States oil dependency may be associated with the 
current standing of PEMEX
56
 and that of the Veracruz cluster
57
.  
International organisations (WB 1995) and scholars (Smith 1992) have long argued that 
the state-owned nature of PEMEX is a factor limiting the development of the oil 
industry in Mexico. The inefficiencies of the company were therefore exacerbated as a 
means to push for greater deregulation of the sector. Nonetheless, it is worth pointing 
out that such rhetoric emerges at a time when the U.S. was struggling to reduce its 
dependency on oil from OPEC countries (Figure 6.4) – a determinant that forced the 
world‟s largest energy consumer to develop alternative sources of supply. It can 
therefore be asserted that the 1973 Arab oil embargo had long-term repercussions with 
respect to the U.S. energy policy-making process and that reducing dependency on 
OPEC oil has been central to such policies since that time. In this context, the issue to 
address is where Mexico‟s oil industry would be suitable.    
The Arab oil embargo of 1973 and the subsequent manipulation of oil prices and supply 
by OPEC countries demonstrated the extent of U.S. energy vulnerability as well as that 
of other industrialised economies that relied heavily on imported oil. In response, the 
U.S., along with the member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD), created the International Energy Agency (IEA) with a 
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 The standing of PEMEX is discussed further in Chapter 7.  
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 Chapters 7 and 8 analyse the contemporary standing of the Veracruz petrochemical cluster.  
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mandate to counterbalance OPEC influence over the world oil market. It is contended 
that „one of the fundamental policies of the IEA was to stimulate the production and 
exports of oil‟ of non-OPEC suppliers such as Mexico, for which financing to develop 
fields was made available (Ángeles Cornejo 2001: 76).  
Figure 6.4 U.S. oil dependency and oil prices, 1960-2009 
 
  Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (2010). 
Ironically, in the years that followed the boycott U.S. dependency grew steadily. The 
Energy Information Administration (2010) estimates that the share of oil imports in 
overall consumption surged from 34.8 percent in 1973 to 46.5 percent in 1977. Imports 
from OPEC countries jumped from 19.5 percent to 33.6 percent in the same period 
(Figure 6.4). These worrying figures raised concerns in U.S. policy circles and provoked 
a heated debate that not only focused on what needed to be done to reduce this 
dependency, but also underlined the different possible scenarios if demand continued to 
expand and output became stretched (Fagen 1979). Since the possibility of another 
energy crisis persisted, pundits wondered what the repercussions would be for the U.S. 
and the wider international community and in fact predicted possible scenarios. In this 
sense, Yergin (1978: 32), an influential expert on energy matters, anticipated that oil 
prices „will double or triple, in real terms, within a short time. The standard of living of 
every American will nosedive. The international monetary system will shudder and 
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shake. Industrial nations will be pitted against each other in a bruising scramble for oil. 
The Western alliance could be shattered. In a number of countries, democracy itself 
might not be able to survive‟. Even though this gloomy picture did not materialise, these 
words did reflect to a significant degree the character of policy dialogue in the U.S. in 
the aftermath of the oil embargo.  
At the same time as this debate was taking place in the U.S., a development of 
significant proportions unfolded south of the border. In the second half of the 1970s 
PEMEX discovered major oil fields that served to swell hydrocarbon
58
 reserves from 
11,160 million barrels in 1976 to 40,194 million barrels in 1978 and to a staggering 
72,008 million barrels in 1981 (Figure 5.4). The prospects of the holdings were so 
enormous that government officials speculated that possible reserves could be as high as 
200 billion barrels (Petróleos Mexicanos 1979). This enthusiasm resonated throughout 
the media
59
 and political
60
 circles in the U.S. (Fagen 1979, Grayson 1979) with the lead 
editorial of The New Republic (19 August 1978), for example, reporting that Mexico‟s 
oil output, by some estimates, was believed to be as high as 10 million barrels by the 
mid 1980s – an amount that would have been fundamental in weakening U.S. 
dependency on OPEC and Arab oil (Fagen 1979: 39).  
In retrospect, there is no doubt that possible reserves and output predictions were greatly 
overstated. But the point is that the strategic importance of Mexico‟s oil and the country 
itself, where crude output soared from 803 Mbd in 1976 to 2,748 Mbd in 1981 (PEMEX 
1989), grew in status on the international scene. The dimension of the latter is summed 
up by Fagen (1979: 46), who argued that „a barrel of Mexican crude oil is not just 
another barrel on the world market. It is a barrel that softens upward price pressures; it 
is a barrel (if there are enough of them) that weakens OPEC; it is a barrel that might be 
available when other barrels are in short supply for either political or economic reasons. 
It is, in sum, a barrel with a very high political value added. Note that this added 
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 It refers to crude oil, condensates, gas liquids, and natural gas.   
59
 Fagen (1979) indicates that U.S. perception of the Mexican oil boom was invigorated by the 
speculative figures influential magazines and academic journals helped disseminate. Fortune (10 April 
1978) published that „optimists on Mexican oil say that the potential reserves come to perhaps 120 billion 
barrels.‟ Business Week (15 January 1979) similarly echoed the oil boom in Mexico. The author also 
reported that a Mexican journalist is believed to have said that „PEMEX thinks it has 700 billion barrels‟ 
(quote found in Metz, W. (1978) Mexico: the premier oil discovery in the western hemisphere. Science, 
Vol. 202, 1261-65).  
60
 In March 1978 the U.S. Geological Survey informed Senator Edward. M. Kennedy, at that time 
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Energy of the Joint Economic Committee, that Mexico‟s oil holdings 
may be as high as 340 billion barrels (Grayson 1979).  
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political value of Mexican oil is not necessarily diminished even if the United States is 
highly successful in limiting energy use – and thus imports. Nor is it diminished even if 
Mexican oil comprises a relatively modest percentage of U.S. imports during the 1980s. 
Since the Mexican barrel is thought to be potentially more secure, it is correspondingly 
– and somewhat ironically – more crucial. When much else may be in doubt, so the 
logic goes, the United States can surely count on Mexico.‟  
Another example that illustrates the growing interest of the U.S. in Mexican oil is to be 
found in the words of President Jimmy Carter, who is quoted (Fagen 1979: 46) as 
saying during a broadcast address on energy problems (April 17, 1977) that „now we 
have a choice. But if we wait, we will constantly live in fear of embargoes. We could 
endanger our freedom as a sovereign nation to act in foreign affairs. In ten years we 
would not be able to import enough oil – from any country at any acceptable price‟. 
These two viewpoints clearly signal the position that the Mexican oil industry would 
come to occupy in the decades that followed the oil boom.  
In the decade of the 1980s a combination of domestic factors contributed to eventually 
articulate the development of PEMEX with both the energy security agenda and the 
economic interests of the United States. As noted in previous sections, Mexico‟s 
economic climate markedly worsened during that time. In order to deal with the 
enormous burden of external debt and the public deficit (Figure 6.1), the government 
needed to generate much-needed capital inflows urgently. Given the magnitude of 
public financial requirements and the limited export capacity of the domestic industrial 
apparatus, policy makers had no alternative but to urge PEMEX to increase output and 
therefore exports. Despite the harsh economic conditions, output grew significantly. It 
jumped from 575 Mbd in 1974, the year after the oil embargo, to 1,936 Mbd in 1980. 
By 1984 PEMEX production had reached 2,806 Mbd and averaged 2,565 Mbd for the 
rest of the decade. As a consequence, exports also grew at a fast pace. PEMEX sales 
abroad rose from the meagre figure of 15 Mbd in 1974 to 827 Mbd in 1980 and to a 
further 1,537 Mbd in 1983. For the rest of the 1980s exports remained consistently 
above the mark of 1,300 Mbd. Of all these exports, an average of over 50 percent went 
to the U.S., whose imports of Mexican oil climbed from 533 Mbd in 1981 to 720 Mbd 
in 1990 (Figure 6.5).  
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Figure 6.5  PEMEX output and oil exports to the U.S., 1974-2009 
  (Thousands of barrels per day) 
 
  Source: PEMEX (1989, 1990, 2000, 2010a).  
With regard to U.S. dependency on OPEC oil, it must be noted that this began to sink at 
the same time Mexico‟s output increased (Figure 6.5). Whereas 33.6 percent of U.S. 
consumption came from OPEC countries in 1977, by 1985 that share had plummeted to 
11.6 percent. Nonetheless, from that year onwards U.S. dependency rebounded. The 
overall ratio of U.S. oil imports to domestic consumption rose from 27.3 percent in 
1985 to 33.4 percent in 1986 and to a staggering 42.2 percent in 1990. The share of 
imported oil supplied by OPEC countries grew from 11.6 percent in 1985 to 17.4 
percent in 1986 and to 25.2 percent in 1990 (Figure 6.4). What appears to have driven 
U.S. oil dependency in the mid-1980s is the fact that domestic consumption, which 
surged from 15.726 Mbd in 1985 to almost 17 Mbd in 1990, grew at a time when 
proven reserves and output were dropping slightly but consistently. Proven reserves fell 
from 36.4 billion barrels in 1985 to 33.8 billion barrels in 1990 (BP 2010). Domestic 
production, on the other hand, shrank from 10,580 Mbd to 8,914 Mbd over the same 
period – a drop of 16 percent (Figure 6.6). Furthermore, this conjuncture is embedded in 
a context of lower international oil prices – at least in comparison with the 1977-1985 
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period. While the extent to which price levels led to fluctuations in U.S. energy 
dependency is open to debate, the evidence suggests that it exercises a certain degree of 
influence. From 1977 to 1985 U.S. oil dependency declined in the midst of relatively 
high international prices, which averaged $27.91 per barrel. From 1986 to 1990, on the 
other hand, U.S. oil imports as a percentage of consumption soared while international 
prices averaged $17.95 per barrel – a drop of 35.7 percent with respect to the previous 
quote (Figure 6.4) 
Figure 6.6 U.S. consumption and production of oil, 1973-2009 
  (Thousands of barrels) 
 
  Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration (2010). 
Bearing in mind this scenario, in the years preceding the launching of NAFTA 
negotiations (August-November 1991) the U.S. found itself immersed in a situation 
where energy dependency continued to grow and showed no signs of slowing down in 
the near future. So, did energy dependency persuade the U.S. to consider signing a 
comprehensive agreement with Mexico? Arguably yes. Mexico‟s hydrocarbon reserves, 
which stood at 51 billion barrels and represented 1.58 times those of the U.S. in 1991 
(BP 2010), appeared on the radar of U.S. policy makers. Apart from the trade and non-
trade issues covered by NAFTA, while the Salinas administration regarded the deal as 
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2008), the U.S. weighed it up as the mechanism that would eventually facilitate greater 
access to Mexico‟s hydrocarbon wealth.  
The articulation of PEMEX with the U.S. energy security strategy became clearer when 
NAFTA came into effect. Figure 6.5 demonstrates how PEMEX output and exports to 
the U.S. began an upsurge in 1994. Of the total exports from 1994 to 2000, which 
accounted for 53.1 percent of overall PEMEX output throughout the period, exports to 
the world‟s largest energy consumer averaged 76.64 percent – an explosive jump in 
comparison to the 1980-93 period when the share of exports to the U.S. averaged 54.41 
percent, according to official estimates. On the domestic front, what were the most 
paradoxical consequences of all this? After NAFTA came into effect, the amount of 
Mexican crude processed at U.S. refineries was frequently larger than that refined by 
Mexico itself. From 1988 to 1993 exports to the U.S. accounted for 59 percent of the 
crude processed by PEMEX. From 1994 to 2000 the proportion soared to 92 percent. 
These figures further demonstrate the articulation of PEMEX with the U.S. energy 
security strategy (PEMEX 1989, 1990, 2000, 2010a).  
Figure 6.7 PEMEX petrochemical output, 1979-1994 
  (000‟ tonnes) 
 
  Source: PEMEX (1990, 2001).  
Within this equation, it is important to point out that notwithstanding the economic 
unrest Mexico endured in the 1980s, PEMEX managed to bring into operation 
petrochemical plants that led to a considerable increase in output. The wave of external 
borrowing in the late 1970s and early 1980s, which PEMEX channelled towards the 
industrialisation of hydrocarbon reserves, is what to a certain extent fuelled the 
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expansion of the state-owned petrochemical industry in the pre-NAFTA era. Figure 5.6 
in the previous chapter and Figure 6.7 demonstrate that PEMEX petrochemical output 
skyrocketed from 1,934 thousand tonnes in 1970 to 6,345 thousand tonnes in 1979 and 
to a further 16,882 thousand tonnes in 1989.  
Such remarkable development, however, appears to have provoked concerns elsewhere. 
Ocampo Torrea (2006: 124) for example, argues that specialised magazines such as 
Hydrocarbon Processing
61
 (1981) revealed that the U.S. National Petrochemical and 
Refiners Association
62
 (NPRA) discussed the growing importance of Mexico as a maker 
of petrochemicals. In that respect, the author also claims that some even labelled 
PEMEX a dangerous competitor. To contend that such a view of PEMEX was 
widespread in the U.S. may arguably be certain. Since the U.S. dependency on imported 
oil grew larger, a mounting petrochemical output demanding greater amounts of 
feedstocks in Mexico was viewed as jeopardising both the availability of hydrocarbon 
inputs to feed the industrial apparatus of the U.S. and, more importantly, the 
international expansion and vertical integration of U.S. oil firms. The vulnerability of 
Mexico as a result of the external debt problem represented the perfect means for the 
U.S. to urge liberalisation of the sector allegedly through conditions attached to WB and 
IMF financial aid and NAFTA stipulations.  
An ongoing economic liberalisation program in Mexico that entailed a much weaker 
role of the state, coupled with a growing energy dependency north of the border, proved 
to be of major importance for the public petrochemical industry and the relationships of 
this with buyer firms in the Veracruz cluster. The following section demonstrates the 
approach adopted by neoliberal government officials with respect to development of the 
sector. 
DISMANTLING THE PUBLIC PETROCHEMICAL INDUSTRY 
How has output at state-owned petrochemical plants plummeted over the last decade 
and a half? What has driven the upward drift of imports? What lies behind the 
disarticulation of value chains of petrochemical origin? These questions to a great extent 
                                                 
61
 A monthly magazine offering industry news and technical content for the refining, gas processing, 
petrochemical/chemical manufacturing and engineer/construction industries. Information obtained from 
http://www.hydrocarbonprocessing.com/AboutUs.html (Accessed on 12 March 2011).  
62
 The NPRA comprises „virtually all U.S. refiners and petrochemical manufacturers‟, according to the 
organisation‟s official website (22 December 2010). 
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reflect both the contemporary challenges faced by state-owned and private 
petrochemical firms situated in the Veracruz cluster and the drawbacks characterising 
the entire industry in the context of the political economy of Mexico. In order to 
understand the current status of the Veracruz cluster, it is therefore of critical 
importance to examine the implementation of sectoral determinants such as the 
reclassification of basic petrochemical inputs and the horizontal restructuring of 
PEMEX in the wake of the political, economic, and institutional environment of the 
1980s and 1990s.  
During these decades public petrochemical assets in particular were not off the radar of 
neoliberal policy makers. In tune with the process of economic liberalisation and given 
the financial hardship endured by the state
63
, Mexican authorities intended to open up 
the sector to private capital. The different reclassifications of petrochemical inputs, the 
horizontal restructuring of PEMEX, and changes to the pricing policy of inputs were, 
among others, the avenues to achieve this. Contrary to what government officials 
predicted, such guidelines in the end largely contributed to delineating the complex 
context in which the Veracruz cluster is currently embedded.  
The reclassification of basic inputs 
First of all, it is necessary to briefly shed light on the legal precepts that regulate the 
state-owned petrochemical industry. The Regulations of the Petroleum Law of Article 
27 of the Mexican Constitution of 1959 and subsequent amendments in 1971 stipulated 
that the making of hydrocarbon by-products that either „serve as basic industrial raw 
materials or embody a fundamental socioeconomic interest for the country‟ is reserved 
exclusively to the state. The private sector, on the other hand, is permitted to „produce 
those industrial inputs that result from subsequent processes‟ - provided that foreign 
investors participate with up to 40 percent of the social capital (DOF 25/08/1959, 
09/02/1971). In a more specific manner, private firms are allowed to transform basic 
industrial raw materials into secondary petrochemical products. Despite the confusion 
such demarcation provoked, the intention of the government was to differentiate the 
scope of action reserved for public interest and that reserved for the private sector. Two 
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 It is estimated that Mexico‟s interest payments amounted to 9.4 percent of GDP in 1990 (Haber et al. 
2008). 
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and a half decades after setting up this regulatory regime, the extent of public concern in 
the sector was no longer regarded as being in line with the prevailing economic 
approach.  
With respect to the structural adjustment reforms of the 1980s, a fundamental clause 
worth underlining is that of the reduction of resources allocated to state-owned firms. 
By doing this, firms belonging to strategic sectors would eventually find themselves in a 
position to be the subject of additional deregulating measures. PEMEX, the largest 
source of public revenues, is a case in point. The government consistently downsized 
the financial resources allocated to PEMEX throughout the sexenio. In 1988, for 
example, the firm‟s budget comprised around 50% of that in 1983 – a financial 
constraint that had wider repercussions within the company structure. It is estimated that 
PEMEX was therefore unable to produce certain basic petrochemicals demanded by 
domestic user firms. In August 1986 government officials had no alternative but to 
authorise private companies to import those basic inputs that were not being supplied by 
PEMEX. In retrospect, such a course of action may be interpreted as the policy that led 
to further deregulation of the sector (Ángeles Cornejo 1996). 
A couple of months later, in October 1986, President Miguel De La Madrid took the 
first step towards dismantling the public petrochemical industry. De La Madrid decreed 
a cut in the list of basic petrochemical products from seventy to thirty four – an arbitrary 
decision with which the Mexican government handed over the manufacturing of thirty 
six basic petrochemical inputs to the private sector. The government claimed that this 
reclassification was intended to help increase productive investments in this industrial 
branch, expand the production of basic and secondary petrochemical products that the 
national industry requested, foster the integration of value chains, and encourage the rise 
of non-oil exports with high added value (DOF 13/10/1986, Ángeles Cornejo 1996).  
In an attempt to present such arguments in a more convincing manner, the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industrial Promotion (SECOFI) published the Integral Program for the 
Promotion of the Petrochemical Industry (PIDIP) in the same issue of the DOF. The 
objective of the PIDIP was to establish the policy mechanisms through which the 
government would force the sector to maintain an output growth rate higher than that of 
the manufacturing industry, increase the participation of national production in the total 
supply of petrochemical products, reduce the trade balance deficit, and strengthen the 
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vertical integration of the basic and secondary petrochemical industry, among others 
(DOF 13/10/1986). But as we will see in subsequent chapters, these targets proved hard 
to meet. 
The vertical dissolution of PEMEX continued under the administration of Carlos 
Salinas (1988-1994) as a second reclassification was announced less than a year after he 
took office. This time the reclassification consisted of listing sixteen basic 
petrochemical products as secondary products and narrowing down to twenty the 
number of basic inputs PEMEX was entitled to produce, according to the DOF 
(15/08/1989). It is contended that what determined such reclassification were the 
conditions attached to restructuring of the external debt under the Brady Plan in 1989. 
The Salinas administration pledged to introduce a program aimed at limiting the 
participation of PEMEX in the sector while encouraging the involvement of private 
capital (Ángeles Cornejo 1996, Saxe Fernández 2002). The 1989 decree, however, went 
beyond reclassification. With respect to secondary petrochemical products, it reduced to 
sixty six the number of industrial inputs requiring production permits – a requisite 
stipulated in the regulations of the DOF in 1959 and 1971. It also eliminated 
bureaucratic requisites for the production of 540 tertiary petrochemical products and 
permitted foreign ownership in the production of more than 700 products (Ángeles 
Cornejo 1996, Maxfield and Shapiro 1998).  
In spite of the extensive deregulation already inflicted, Salinas conceived a third 
reclassification (DOF 17/08/1992) parallel to NAFTA negotiations in 1992. Despite 
Mexico‟s intention to protect its petrochemical industry, the United States pushed for 
further deregulation. The Mexican negotiation team agreed to make „limited‟ 
concessions. Fourteen primary petrochemical products were declassified and three more 
were added to the list. The final list of basic petrochemicals hence encompassed just 
eight products (Maxfield and Shapiro 1998).  
With respect to secondary inputs requiring permits, only 12 remained on that list, as 
stipulated in the DOF (17/08/1992). As to the remaining non-basic inputs, „including 
the sixty six secondary petrochemicals, the NAFTA negotiations concluded that these 
would be open to one hundred percent foreign ownership within a period of three years‟ 
(Maxfield and Shapiro 1998: 98). This provision eliminated the previous ceiling of 40 
percent concerning foreign ownership.  
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Figure 6.8 Reclassification of basic inputs
64
 
  09 April 1960 13 October 1986 15 August 1989 17 August 1992 13 Nov 1996 
1 Ammonia Acetaldehyde Ammonia Butanes Butanes 
2 Benzene Acetonitrile Benzene Ethane Ethane 
3 Butadiene Acrylonitrile Butadiene Heptanes Heptanes 
4 Cumene Alpha olefins Dodecylbenzene Hexane Hexane 
5 
Ethylene 
Dichloride 
Ammonia Ethane Carbon black Carbon black 
6 Ethyl chloride Benzene Ethylene Naphthas Methane 
7 Dodecylbenzene Butadiene Heptanes Pentanes Naphthas 
8 Styrene Cyclohexane Hexane Propane Pentanes 
9 Ethylene Vinyl chloride Carbon black 
 
Propane 
10 Isopropanol Cumene Methanol 
  
11 Methanol Dichloroethane Methyl tert-butyl ether 
 
12 HD polyethylene Dodecylbenzene N-paraffins 
  
13 LD polyethylene Styrene Ortho-xylene 
  
14 Propylene Ethane Para-xylene 
  
15 Polypropylene Ethyl benzene Pentanes 
  
16 Toluene Ethylene Propylene 
  
17 Xylenes Heptanes 
Propylene 
Tetrameter   
18 
 
Hexane Methyl ter-amyl-ether 
 
19 
 
Isopropanol Toluene 
  
20 
 
Carbon black Xylenes 
  
21 
 
Methanol 
   
22 
 
Methyl tert-butyl ether 
  
23 
 
N-paraffins 
   
24 
 
Internal olefins 
   
25 
 
Ortho-xylene 
   
26 
 
Para-xylene 
   
27 
 
Pentanes 
   
28 
 
HD polyethylene 
   
29 
 
LD polyethylene 
   
30 
 
Propylene 
   
31 
 
Propylene 
Tetrameter    
32 
 
Toluene 
   
33   Xylenes       
TOTAL 17 33 20 8 9 
 
  Source: Chow Pangtay (2003). 
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 Apart from the reclassification shown in Figure 6.8, the government decreed to take methyl tert-butyl 
ether off the list of basic petrochemicals on June 7, 1991 and add methane to the list on November 13, 
1996 (DOF 7/06/1991 and DOF 13/11/1996).  
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In reviewing how the petrochemical industry has been regulated over time, it is possible 
to distinguish fundamental features that demonstrate its evolution. During the import-
substituting industrialisation era, for example, differences arising from the 
categorisation of basic and secondary petrochemical inputs were settled by means of 
recommendations from a working group formed by several government agencies and 
PEMEX that were presented to the president (Snoeck 1986). More to the point, it has 
been suggested that in the Petroleum Law of Article 27 of the Constitution of 1958 and 
the subsequent amendments in 1959, which represented early attempts to delineate the 
scope of public interest with respect to petrochemicals, the participation of the 
legislative branch was determinant. In the context of economic liberalisation, the 
resolution to reclassify basic inputs was in the hands of the president and a small group 
of technocrats, leaving political and economic factions traditionally consulted in the 
state decision-making process out of the debate (Pérez Fernández 1996).  
Such an autocratic approach was intended not only to cast doubt over the law-abiding 
nature of the resolution. Scholars, pundits, and Member of Congress alike (Pérez 
Fernández 1996, Saxe Fernández 1996, 2002, Ángeles Cornejo 1996, Suárez Guevara 
1996, 2008, Ortiz Muñiz 1996, Ocampo Torrea 2006, Nahle García 2008) have pointed 
out that the reclassification of inputs not only represented the capitulation of the state‟s 
role in the petrochemical industry, but that it was in fact unconstitutional.  
As Salinas (1988-94) was aware of how contentious would be to reform the 
Constitution, and given that this was a necessary step if changes to state participation in 
the oil industry were to be considered, his administration was determined to amend the 
Regulations of the Petroleum Law of Article 27 of 1996. Amendments to this secondary 
law not only made it possible to circumvent the mandate expressed in the Constitution, 
but also to avoid irritating the opposition in Congress and the nationalist wing of his 
party. By arbitrarily listing basic inputs as secondary Salinas completed what De La 
Madrid had begun – the handing over of downstream oil activities to private capital at 
the expense of the vertical integration of PEMEX and the associated industrial base of 
the country (Suárez Guevara 1996, Ortiz Muñiz 1996, Saxe Fernández 1996). 
Furthermore, the technical character of what the government considered basic inputs is 
rather questionable. The nine compounds that Figure 6.8 lists in the 1996 classification 
are allegedly not even basic petrochemicals, but rather hydrocarbon feedstocks used for 
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the making of base petrochemicals. A comprehensive interpretation of the Regulations 
of the Petroleum Law of Article 27, which claims that basic inputs are derived from the 
first important chemical transformation of hydrocarbon resources, leads to the argument 
that these reclassifications neither respect the stipulations of the Constitution nor the 
parameters of chemical nomenclature. All in all, one may conclude that the position of 
PEMEX within the petrochemical industry has been downgraded and its function was 
simply to supply inputs naturally found in crude oil and natural gas fields (Cruz Malpica 
1996, Manzo 1996, Ocampo Torrea 2006). 
The rationale behind these reclassifications, or rather sectoral determinants, was that the 
participation of the private sector would increase investment flows and facilitate 
articulation of the different actors - basic and secondary input producers as well as user 
firms manufacturing final goods - across the broad range of petrochemical value chains. 
Mexican policy makers also expected to promote both national and foreign investment 
flows (DOF 13/10/1986, 15/08/1989, 17/08/1992). The dogmatic interpretation of 
neoliberalism in government circles seemed to be shared by some scholars. Maxfield 
and Shapiro (1998: 98-99), for example, speculated that deregulation of the 
petrochemical sector „was the only way Mexico could hope to reverse drastic 
underinvestment and poor capacity use‟. However, it is worth mentioning that 
underinvestment in the state-owned petrochemical firms was one of the prescriptions of 
the WB and the IMF in the face of the structural adjustment program instigated in the 
1980s and 1990s (Ángeles Cornejo 1996). As the state ceased its investment in the 
sector so did the private sector. Regardless of what government officials initially 
claimed, reclassification of basic petrochemical inputs and deregulation of the sector did 
not generate the expected capital inflows (Ortiz Muñiz 1996, Torres 1999, Morales 
2005) – a policy failure that was finally recognised by the government in the 2001-2006 
energy sector program (Presidencia de la República 2001). With regard to poor capacity 
use, Maxfield and Shapiro (1998) similarly misjudged PEMEX performance. The 
company reports that petrochemical complexes operated at an average rate of 98.68 
percent of installed capacity in the four years prior to NAFTA (PEMEX 2000). Taking 
into consideration the levels of production and capacity use PEMEX attained over those 
years, it is rather contradictory to argue that the state must withdraw from the sector. 
Figure 6.7 demonstrates that output at state-owned petrochemical facilities grew 
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steadily throughout the 1980s and even accomplished record levels by the time 
reclassifications commenced (PEMEX 1990, 2003).  
Another point that challenges government arguments for deregulation is the sector‟s 
changing business environment. It is widely acknowledged that under ISI private capital 
was attracted by the high rates of return on investment that regulatory barriers to entry, 
subsidised input prices, and import protection yielded. Given that the government also 
struggled to attract greater investment, anticipating that greater investment would be 
drawn into the secondary petrochemical industry by a regime that favoured free trade, 
competition, and the elimination of subsidies on petrochemical inputs produced by 
PEMEX is at best naive (Kessel and Chong-Sup 1993).  
Ultimately, the reclassification of petrochemical inputs not only entailed a judgment that 
observed the directives of market-orientated policies and the liberalisation of almost 90 
percent of the state-owned petrochemical industry (Palacios Solano 2008), it also 
compromised the articulation of value chains of petrochemical origin in the long run – 
as in the case of the Veracruz cluster.  
The horizontal restructuring of PEMEX and the international context 
In April 1992, Guadalajara, the capital city of the western state of Jalisco, suffered one 
of the most devastating industrial accidents in Mexican industry. Natural gas that had 
leaked from a PEMEX pipeline into the sewer system of the city caused a blast that 
reportedly killed more than 200 people. The Salinas administration (1988-1994) used 
the tragedy to highlight the lack of accountability for PEMEX activities and address the 
need to restructure the company (Merrill and Miro 1996, Ángeles Cornejo 2001). Three 
months after the explosion, on July 16 of the same year, Congress enacted the Organic 
Law of PEMEX and Subsidiary Bodies – a new regulatory regime that abrogated the 
1971 Organic Law of PEMEX and reorganised the company into a central holding and 
four subsidiaries, that is, PEMEX-Exploration and Production, PEMEX-Refining, 
PEMEX-Gas and Basic Petrochemicals, and PEMEX-Petrochemicals (DOF 
16/07/1992).   
One of the fundamental amendments was that each subsidiary became a more 
autonomous entity. Article 4 of the new PEMEX Law stated that „Petróleos Mexicanos 
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and its decentralised subsidiaries, according to their own objectives, are allowed to enter 
into any sort of act, agreement, and contract with individuals and corporations, and 
subscribe negotiable instruments
65‟. In other words, PEMEX-Petrochemicals, most of 
the assets of which are situated in the Veracruz cluster, was not only entitled to act 
independently from the rest of the subsidiaries, it was also granted the right to issue 
debt. Even if the petrochemical division of PEMEX did not exercise such rights, these 
changes in the regulatory framework represented the avenue that could lead to further 
deregulation of the sector in the future (Suárez Guevara 1996, Ángeles Cornejo 2001).  
Nonetheless, the most staggering repercussion of the 1992 PEMEX Law was the 
introduction of the transfer pricing scheme, which indicated that transactions between 
subsidiaries were no longer determined by production costs, but rather by arm‟s length 
prices. This principle established that input transactions between associated entities, as 
in the case of PEMEX subsidiaries, were subject to determination by market-based 
prices (OECD 2009). This approach was to a significant extent in line with the price 
liberalisation policy that the Salinas administration (1988-1994) undertook as part of the 
Pact for Economic Stabilisation and Growth (PECE), in the wake of NAFTA 
negotiations in 1991 (Lustig 1998) and as a consequence of the country‟s joining the 
OECD in 1994.  
But what do market-based prices entail for PEMEX inputs? The concept of opportunity 
cost has helped government officials address this problem. Rigoberto A. Yepez (2006), 
former deputy director of economic planning at PEMEX, explains that opportunity cost 
is understood as „the amount the provider would receive in the market if the product is 
sold to the next best alternative. If the provider can obtain a greater amount from the 
next best alternative‟, that alternative ought to determine the market price of that 
particular product. The next best alternative for the commercialisation of PEMEX inputs 
is the relevant international market which, given the economic integration of the country 
with the U.S., is situated on the northern coast of the Gulf of Mexico. The prices of 
ethane and other precursors of petrochemical value chains pertaining to the Veracruz 
cluster are therefore linked to those prevailing in Texas and other southern states of the 
                                                 
65
 Negotiable instruments are documents by which companies/individuals acquire/recognise debt 
obligations, according to Mexico‟s General Law of Negotiable Instruments and Credit Operations (DOF 
27/08/1932). 
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U.S. and allegedly reflect the opportunity cost with respect to those markets (Yepez 
2006, fieldwork interviews).   
While the government argues that the pricing transfer scheme helps „maximise the value 
of the company as a whole, reflects the value created in each division, identifies 
inefficiencies and opportunities for improvement, and complies with international trade 
regulations and taxation‟ (Comisión de Energía de la Cámara de Diputados 2009: 4), 
others (Ocampo Torrea 2006) contend that such a mechanism simply reflects 
transactions  between U.S. based firms and takes away the comparative advantages of 
PEMEX.  
The argument is that while PEMEX remained vertically organised, the company set 
input prices according to a policy that both favoured the industrialisation of its own 
hydrocarbon reserves and took into account production costs. Contrary to this approach, 
horizontal restructuring introduced by the 1992 PEMEX Law articulated the country‟s 
hydrocarbon resources with the energy needs of the United States and paved the way, 
along with the reclassifications previously discussed, for disincorporation of the 
petrochemical division (Suárez Guevara 1996, Ángeles Cornejo 2001).  
If the path that the output of petrochemical complexes has followed in recent times 
(Figure 7.7) is studied, the effectiveness of the transfer pricing mechanism can be 
questioned. This is just one perspective from which the horizontal structure of PEMEX 
may be placed under scrutiny. Almost in parallel to the reclassifications and the 1992 
PEMEX law, a wave of mergers and acquisitions in the U.S. oil industry were observed 
(Figure 6.9). In 1984, for example, the Standard Oil Corporation of California (currently 
Chevron) acquired the Gulf Oil Company – a transaction dubbed at that time as the 
largest in U.S. history. Similarly, Occidental Petroleum (currently Oxy), a California-
based firm, purchased a series of energy-related companies throughout the 1980s 
(Bazan Navarrete and Peña Guevara 2007, Chevron company profile, Oxy corporate 
history).  
Despite the number of mergers occurring in the 1980s and early 1990s and what these 
represented, Mexican policy makers were reluctant to anticipate that the trend in the 
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world oil industry was in the direction of vertical operational integration
66
. This is the 
strategy that in fact determined the expansion of oil firms in the years to come, as 
Shields has put it (2005). Figures 6.9 and Figure 6.10 thus demonstrate that while 
Mexican policy makers were engaged in orchestrating the deregulation of downstream 
PEMEX activities, the world‟s largest players sought to strength their international 
standing by placing more emphasis on the development of their refining capacities.  
Figure 6.9 Mergers and acquisitions of oil firms in the United States 
1980s 
 Chevron - Gulf Oil 
Occidental Petroleum - Cities Service 
Texaco - Getty Oil 
Occidental Petroleum - Union Pacific 
1990s 
BP – Amoco 
BP - Amoco – Arco 
Exxon – Mobil 
El Paso Energy – Coastal 
1999 
Phillips – Tosco 
Anadarko Petroleum - Union Pacific Resources Group 
Devon Energy - Santa Fe Snyder 
Occidental Petroleum acquires Altura Energy and Arco Long Beach 
El Paso – Coastal 
Chevron – Texaco 
 
  Source: Taken from Bonilla Sánchez and Suárez Guevara (2008). 
While it is beyond the concerns of the present thesis to cast light on the vertical 
integration of multinational oil firms, this evidence does reinforce the argument that in 
the context of economic liberalisation the role of PEMEX was conceived as that of a 
simple supplier of crude oil – a strategy that eventually transformed Mexico into a net 
importer of refined and petrochemical products. In that respect, it is useful to consider 
Figure 6.5 once again since it serves to underline how the proportion of crude exports to 
the U.S. in relation to the domestic refining of crude by PEMEX grew after the 
introduction of NAFTA.  
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 It is argued that the driver behind the mergers depicted in Figures 6.9 and 6.10 was the need for firms to 
further enhance their competitive position (Antill and Arnott 2002).   
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Figure 6.10  Mergers of major oil firms 
Bidder  Firm acquired or merged Year Corporate name 
BP AMOCO + ARCO 1998/2000 BP (British Petroleum) 
Exxon Mobil 1999 ExxonMobil 
Phillips Petroleum Tosco + Conoco 2001/2002 Conoco Phillips 
Chevron Texaco 2001 Chevron-Texaco 
Valero Energy USD 2001 Valero Energy 
Shell Motiva/Equilon 2001 Shell 
Total PetroFinal/Elf 1999/2000 Total Final Elf 
 
  Source: Bazan Navarrete and Peña Guevara (2007). 
Returning to the discussion of PEMEX-Petrochemicals, the issue to be taken into 
consideration is that up to 1994, the year NAFTA came into effect, the performance of 
the subsidiary seemed to overlook the regulatory framework put into practice. In that 
year output continued to be as sound as at the beginning of the decade. Nonetheless, the 
1994 peso crisis was about to make things take a turn for the worse.  
Divestiture attempts in the wake of economic turmoil 
Under the administration of Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000) the petrochemical division of 
PEMEX is reported to have endured its sharpest output fall. While in 1995 overall 
output stood at 13,447 thousand tonnes, by the end of the period it had plunged to 6,835 
thousand tonnes (PEMEX 2010a). Consideration of these output figures makes it clear 
how much the Zedillo administration further weakened the petrochemical division of 
PEMEX, effectively increasing momentum in comparison with previous presidential 
periods. The question here concerns the determinant factors that accentuated that drift 
and the answer arguably lies in the repercussions of the peso crisis that occurred in 
December 1994, which is seen as an external determinant that has contributed to 
shaping both the development of the Veracruz cluster and governance structures of 
local inter-firm linkages.      
In late 1994, Mexico found itself once again in the midst of economic turmoil. A chain 
of economic, social, and political developments occurring that year culminated in the 
collapse of the peso in December – a few weeks into the presidential tenure of Ernesto 
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Zedillo (1994-2000). It is worth mentioning that 1994 is a distinctive year in the 
country‟s history. In the international sphere, it marked both the beginning of NAFTA 
and the country‟s accession to the OECD – events that signalled the willingness of 
political elites to forge an economy more integrated with the world
67
.  On the domestic 
front, the uprising of the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN), a leftist 
revolutionary group that declared war on the Mexican state and seized a number of 
cities in the southern state of Chiapas on the day
68
 NAFTA came into effect, the 
assassination of both Luis Donaldo Colosio, the presidential candidate of the ruling 
party (PRI), on March 23 and Jose Francisco Ruiz Massieu on September 28, who was 
touted to become leader of the PRI in the lower house of the Mexican Congress during 
Zedillo‟s term, served to cast a shadow over the optimistic scenario trumpeted by 
Salinas. While the guerrilla uprising emphasised social discontent concerning the 
market-orientated policies of Salinas, the political assassinations, on the other hand, 
were seen to jeopardise the country‟s long-standing political stability. Financial markets 
reacted anxiously to these incidents with the peso coming under attack from currency 
speculators almost at the same time as the assassinations occurred. Foreign reserves 
plunged from $30 billion in March 1994 to approximately $17 billion in early 
November. While many argued the currency was overvalued, Salinas allegedly rejected 
the possibility of devaluation since it would have undermined both the probabilities of 
the PRI winning the presidential election in August and his stature as a statesman - and 
with that the possibility of his becoming the head of the World Trade Organisation once 
his presidential term ended. Another fundamental factor in the lead up to the crisis was 
that the country‟s debt obligation loomed large on the immediate horizon – and this 
worried investors since foreign reserves had shrivelled to almost $11 billion by 
December 19 (Springer and Molina 1995). 
In response to these circumstances, the recently inaugurated Zedillo administration 
allowed the peso to fluctuate 15 percent above the pre-established ceiling on December 
20. The downside of this policy was that investors did not perceive the new value of the 
currency as credible and a sizeable capital flight followed. In an attempt to ameliorate 
this problem, the government resolved to institute a floating exchange rate a couple of 
days later – a decision that implied a greater devaluation of the peso. Faced with the fact 
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 A year earlier, in 1993, Mexico joined the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation Forum (Ministry of 
Economy) 
68
 January 1, 1994. 
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that foreign reserves had fallen to $6 billion by late December and that short-term debt 
obligations maturing in 1995 were estimated at $50.5 billion, Mexico was on the verge 
of default. This deteriorating situation raised concerns north of the border and in 
response President Bill Clinton proposed granting Mexico a loan of $40 billion despite 
the fact his request provoked intense opposition in Congress (Lustig 1998). A loophole 
that allowed Clinton to draw funds from the Exchange Stabilisation Fund (ESF), „a pot 
of money set aside for emergency intervention in foreign exchange‟ (Krugman 2008: 
51), along with resources from the International Monetary Fund, the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS), commercial bank loans, and Latin American and 
Canadian credit facilities, allowed Mexico to raise $53 billion to help stabilise the peso 
(Springer and Molina 1995).  
Despite the fact that the most controversial aspect of the financial rescue package was 
the Mexican government agreeing to deposit PEMEX oil export sales as collateral in the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York (Springer and Molina 1995, Suárez Guevara 1996, 
Lustig 1998), it soon became clear that the Zedillo administration had also agreed to 
encourage the eventual participation of the private sector in certain economic activities 
still under state control. In fact, La Jornada, a Mexico City newspaper, reported on 
November 2, 1995 that the U.S. Department of Commerce had informed U.S. investors 
of the business opportunities appearing in Mexico. The government contemplated the 
privatisation of 61 petrochemical plants along with 22 ports, 58 airports, and 26,000 km 
of railroads (cited in Bonilla Sánchez 1996: 69). Such a wave of apparent privatisations, 
at least in the case of the petrochemical division of PEMEX, was revealed to be part of 
the commitments made by the Mexican government as a result of the 1995 bailout (La 
venta de petroquímicas, a cambio del apoyo de EU, 1996, January 19). Throughout his 
term in office, Zedillo stepped up government efforts to divest itself of the 
petrochemical complexes situated in the Veracruz cluster.  
After years of policies that contributed to the deterioration of the status of PEMEX, the 
regulatory underpinnings to privatise the state-owned petrochemical complexes, which 
had been accentuated by the economic crisis of 1994, were already in place. On 
November 14, 1995 the government made public the beginning of the bidding process 
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to disincorporate the assets
69
 of the Cosoleacaque petrochemical complex – once 
dubbed one of the world‟s largest ammonia producers (PEMEX Petroquímica 1995). 
Even though the public tender failed to attract bidders, it did provoke a stir in cities such 
as Coatzacoalcos and Minatitlán in the state of Veracruz where most of the public 
petrochemical infrastructure is situated. It is estimated that over 40,000 people 
demonstrated against privatisation of the Cosoleacaque petrochemical complex in 
Minatitlán in late October 1995 (Shields 1995: 40, Bonilla Sánchez 1996). Despite 
public opposition the government all but desisted in its plan. During an official visit to 
Europe in January-February 1996, it is understood that Zedillo affirmed before the 
Italian banking community that his government was committed to establishing an 
appropriate set of rules to facilitate privatisation of PEMEX secondary petrochemical 
plants (Saxe Fernández 1996: 7-8). There is no doubt this rationale initiated the process 
leading to disincorporation of the Morelos petrochemical complex situated in 
Coatzacoalcos in September 1998. While the tender drew the interest of two bidders, 
financial constraints eventually led to their withdrawal. In the end, the Ministry of 
Energy was forced to declare the tender null and void (Ocampo Torrea 2006).  
Divestiture attempts not only contemplated public tenders, the government also resorted 
to certain mechanisms to make petrochemical complexes reach a point at which 
privatisation became more plausible. Zedillo was determined to asphyxiate the sector 
through the limited allocation of resources – a practice initiated in previous sexenios. In 
the years following the peso debacle, the petrochemical division of PEMEX suffered 
deep cuts. It is reported that investment expenditure in 1995 represented just 51.9 
percent of that of a year earlier. In other words, it fell from $119.4 million dollars in 
1994 to $61.84 in 1995. In 1996 the amount plunged even further to $50.27 million 
dollars. If these figures are considered in relative terms, and in comparison with those 
from Salinas‟ tenure, the picture is even gloomier. While investment in the 
petrochemical division as a proportion of the overall expenditure of PEMEX averaged 
5.17 percent in the 1991-94 period, the figure plummeted to 2.5 percent and 1.53 
percent in 1995 and 1996 (PEMEX 2001)
70
. In such a context, it also important to 
mention that the foregoing administration institutionalised cuts just after PEMEX was 
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 The most important assets included 5 ammonia plants, 1 hydrogen plant, and 1 paraxylene plant 
(Suárez Guevara 1996: 92-93).   
70
 PEMEX shows figures in Mexican pesos. The dollar-denominated investment expenditure is computed 
with the yearly average value of the dollar as made public by Mexico‟s central bank.   
142 
  
restructured into subsidiaries. In that sense, Suárez Guevara (1996: 92) claims that 
„PEMEX-Petrochemicals was the only division not contemplated in the strategic 
investment projects of the conglomerate‟. Unsurprisingly, the budget allocated to 
petrochemical complexes dropped from $206.2 million dollars in 1992 to $84.74 in 
1993 and bounced back slightly to $119.4 million dollars in 1994. Now, returning to the 
discussion of budget cuts under Zedillo, it is alleged that the Mexican government 
agreed with the WB to substantially and abruptly moderate the provision of taxpayers‟ 
money to PEMEX-Petrochemicals. It is estimated that $33.99 million dollars were 
conveyed to petrochemical complexes in 1996. As noted, this figure differs from the 
$50.27 million dollars reported by PEMEX for the same year, but the reality is that both 
reflect the extent of the cuts. All in all, the controversial issue to highlight here is that 
„such resources were channelled towards - and were barely apt for - the maintenance of 
plants and pipelines‟, downgrading the long-established approach to expanding output 
and installed capacity (Saxe Fernández 1996: 12).  
Notwithstanding the questionable results of preceding waves of privatisation, Zedillo 
insisted that handing over petrochemical assets to the private sector would be 
advantageous – at least this is what a government-conducted assessment on 
petrochemical plants concluded (Gilmer and Williams 1999: 2). In justifying such a 
course of action, policy makers continuously addressed not only the benefits of 
privatisation, but also the alleged shortcomings of the sector. It was then argued that the 
petrochemical division of PEMEX operated with obsolete technology and that 
„upgrading is only achievable through the technical resources provided by privatisation‟ 
(Rey Romay 1996: 54). In that respect, PEMEX staff contended that a certain degree of 
obsolescence may be attributed to the lack of investment over the preceding decade, but 
that most petrochemical processes were competitive with respect to industry standards. 
Another argument referred to the frail financial capacity of the government that 
purportedly „holds back the modernisation of existing plants and the construction of 
new ones required by a growing national demand‟ (Rey Romay 1996: 54-55). In that 
sense, it is important to bear in mind that PEMEX revenues are confiscated by the state 
through a tax regime that hinders the company‟s organic growth. Government officials 
also declared that PEMEX-Petrochemicals efficiency „is lower than those international 
average standards and that the privatisation will enhance it‟ (Rey Romay 1996: 55). 
This is precisely the argument that persuaded policy makers to privatise state-owned 
143 
  
fertiliser plants (Fertimex) in 1991 and 1992. It was argued at the time that by allowing 
the participation of private capital, the sector would be able to increase output, 
employment and exports. In a span of a few years Mexico became a net importer of 
fertilisers and shut down most of its plants. The privatisation of petrochemical plants 
was proposed using the same underlying principle (Rey Romay 1996: 56). 
In the end, the government failed to disincorporate the petrochemical division of 
PEMEX. It is unclear to what extent social and political opposition as well as flaws in 
the regulatory framework were responsible for driving off bidders and bringing the plan 
to a halt. Nevertheless, what is critical to point out is that the state made sure it had laid 
the groundwork for the complex setting in which the petrochemical industry currently 
finds itself. This statement not only refers to the outcomes of policies such as the 
reclassification of inputs and the horizontal restructuring of PEMEX, but also to the 
implications that the poor performance of PEMEX-Petrochemicals since the second half 
of the 1990s – a period during which output shrank from 13,066 thousand tonnes in 
1994 to 6,836 thousand tonnes in 2000 (PEMEX 2001) - may have over both the quality 
of transactional linkages in the Veracruz cluster and the development of value chains of 
petrochemical origin. Given the set of rules introduced in the 1990s, it would be strange 
to anticipate that these constraints on both PEMEX and its petrochemical division were 
short-term. The following chapter is set to discuss this issue in greater depth.  
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In clear contrast to what ISI policies stipulated (Chapter 5), the road to development 
embraced by Mexico after the 1982 collapse pushed for a diminished role of the state in 
economic matters. The establishment of market-orientated foundations also implied the 
emergence of a regulatory framework intended to encourage greater participation by 
private actors. The policies to which government officials resorted were economic and 
trade liberalisation. With respect to the latter, the North American Free Trade 
Agreement is the most significant example. Mexico viewed NAFTA as the instrument 
that would reinforce the character of the economic liberalisation program (Haber et al. 
2008). The United States, on the other hand, considered it a mechanism that could be 
used to push for further deregulation in strategic sectors, eventually facilitating access to 
Mexico‟s hydrocarbon wealth. Among the repercussions of this situation, articulation of 
PEMEX to the energy strategy of the U.S. and the sectoral regulations institutionalised 
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stand out. This context marked the development of the oil and petrochemical industry in 
the final two decades of the 20
th
 century and beyond.  
Additionally, what also contributed to the deterioration of the standing of PEMEX-
Petrochemicals, particularly throughout the second half of the 1990s, was the policy 
setting that followed the 1994 peso crisis. As the Zedillo administration (1994-2000) 
failed to privatise the petrochemical complexes of Cosoleacaque and Morelos, it seems 
that his economic team resolved to suffocate the sector instead. Output sharply 
plummeted towards the end of his term.  
As to the Veracruz petrochemical cluster, there is no doubt that the complex multi-
dimensional environment described above helps us understand many of the 
shortcomings that the locality embodies. It not only has hindered the role of PEMEX-
Petrochemicals as a reliable supplier of basic inputs, but also has shaped the type of 
governance structure that characterises transactional linkages between state-owned 
petrochemical complexes and local buyer firms.  
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7 
OUTSIZED BUT UNDERMINED 
PEMEX and its petrochemical division in the wider economic spectrum 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
What were the consequences of the political, economic, and institutional drivers 
contextualised in Chapter 6 on the development of PEMEX and its petrochemical 
subsidiary in recent times? What does the present standing of PEMEX and the 
petrochemical industry entail for the wider economic spectrum? In order to concentrate 
on both queries is first necessary to discuss certain external determinants that are 
believed to stimulate in a more positive manner discussion in this chapter, that is, the 
tax burden of PEMEX and the composition of the energy matrix of the country.  
The second section of the chapter will illustrate the extent to which the aggregate 
context, which basically refers to sectoral, national, and supranational determinants 
like the institutionalisation of regulatory policies, the implications of trade liberalisation 
and the peso crisis, as well as the weak tax collection of the government and the 
increasing use of natural gas for electricity generation, has shaped the development of 
the petrochemical division of PEMEX in terms of output.  
It is worth mentioning that the analysis does not consider private petrochemical firms 
situated in the Veracruz cluster. Given the weight of the public petrochemical 
complexes and the strong ties with the private sector in the locality, the evidence and 
insights exposed here reflect, to a major extent, the conditions faced by the entire 
cluster. In this respect, Chapter 8 offers a more detailed discussion of private 
petrochemical firms.  
The third section of the chapter offers an account of the extent to which overlapping 
external determinants have exerted a major influence on a much wider economic 
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spectrum, that is, the worrying increasing of imports of refined and petrochemical 
products, and on the standing of PEMEX in comparison with international oil firms, 
which serves to illustrate that the capacity of oil firms to generate substantial revenue 
rest on downstream value-adding activities. 
REVIEW OF A TROUBLED SECTOR 
Despite the fact that Mexico has been a major producer of hydrocarbons since the late 
1970s, the development of associated industries is an issue that has raised concerns in 
recent times. PEMEX, the only supplier of crude and refined products
71
 to the domestic 
market, faces a rather complex scenario as a result, in part, of an unfair tax regime that 
confiscates a large share of the firm‟s revenues. It is widely acknowledged that the 
implications of this problematic are not only inherent to PEMEX, but also to other areas 
of the national economy. As to the former, which is the focus of the present section, the 
petrochemical industry is a case in point. Output and installed capacity at PEMEX-
Petrochemicals have, at best, stagnated over the last decade and a half. It is therefore of 
paramount importance to shed light on key variables that indicate the road PEMEX and 
its petrochemical subsidiary have followed throughout this period.  
PEMEX and its tax burden 
Over the last three decades, hydrocarbon resources have represented a consistently 
important source of revenue for the Mexican government. Since the 1980s, when 
PEMEX output climbed as a result of oil discoveries at the end of the preceding decade, 
a large share of government expenditure has been financed through PEMEX royalties. 
At the end of the 1970s, for example, the contribution of PEMEX to the state treasury is 
estimated to have averaged 25 percent. This dependency became more acute as output 
and exports rose in the 1980s and by that time it is estimated that the tax burden of 
PEMEX accounted for 39 percent of state revenue. The economic liberalisation the 
country underwent during this period did little to slow down the “petrolisation” of 
government finances. During the following decade this figure dropped to 30 percent. 
However, three decades after the discovery of Cantarell, the offshore oil field that 
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 Refined products refer to gasoline, diesel, jet fuel, liquid fuel, liquefied petroleum gas and other 
petroleum oils (PEMEX 2009).  
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yielded more than half of Mexico‟s output for much of the past decade, the petrolisation 
of the economy remains a serious concern for policy makers (Figure 7.1).  
During this period, PEMEX earnings were drained since the low level of tax collection 
is considered one of the most significant shortcomings of the Mexican state. The United 
Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL) (2008) 
estimates that Mexico‟s tax collection stands at approximately 9.4 percent of gross 
domestic product
72
. In the face of such an inadequate tax collection regime, PEMEX 
royalties came to play a significant role in keeping the state machinery running. As late 
as 2008, the contributions of PEMEX in the form of taxes were reported to account for 
37 percent of state revenue (Figure 7.1).  
Figure 7.1 Oil-related and non-oil income as % of government revenues  
 
  Source: Banco de México (n.d). 
These circumstances demonstrate one of the most critical features of PEMEX. This 
heavy tax burden prevents Mexico‟s largest company from reinvesting in key areas such 
as exploration and refining. With respect to the latter, it must be noted that PEMEX has 
not been able to expand capacity at the pace one may expect from a major crude 
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 Overall, average tax collection in Latin America, calculated as a proportion of GDP, stood at 18.4 
percent in 2008. In Brazil the figure was 35.5 percent and in Argentina 30.6 percent for the same year. 
According to a report by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
cited in El Mañana, a Mexican newspaper. 31/05/2010. México, último lugar de LA en recaudación 
tributaria: CEPAL.  
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producer. The atmospheric distillation capacity, which refers to the process of turning 
crude into refined products, rose from 1,270 thousand barrels per day in 1980 to 1,540 
thousand barrels per day in 2009. In a period of thirty years PEMEX managed to expand 
refining capacity by just 21.26 percent (PEMEX 1990, 2010a).  
Another development that merits discussion is the increasing deterioration of the 
PEMEX balance sheet. Despite the fact that income generated by the company through 
exports of crude and the domestic sale of refined products is regarded as the second 
highest in Latin America, the tax burden has put the financial standing of the company 
to the test. It is becoming standard practice for PEMEX to issue debt on international 
markets in order to comply with its obligations (Figure 7.2). Such obligations stretch 
from meeting the financial needs of the state and servicing its own debt to upgrading 
existing facilities and exploratory projects.  
Figure 7.2 Draining PEMEX revenues      
  ($ millions)   
 
  Source: PEMEX (2003, 2010a). 
As shown in Figure 7.2, PEMEX net income has been consistently negative since 1998 
and the trend has been sharp decline, with the 5-year period beginning in 2003 
deserving particular attention. Earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) have hit record 
levels as a result of both an upward trend in the price of oil and an output of over 3 
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million barrels per day – up to 2007 when production began to decline. However, the 
same applies to the parameters at the other end of the spectrum, namely, the tax burden 
and net loss year after year. By 2005, as the price per barrel rose to $42.71, EBIT 
climbed to $46.5 billion but a tax burden of $53.5 billion led to a net loss for PEMEX of 
$6.8 billion. Figures seriously worsened in 2008 when despite a surge in EBIT to 
$59.12 billion, the tax burden led to a net loss of $10.1 billion. In that year alone 
PEMEX transferred $69.2 billion to treasury coffers.  
The way PEMEX is managed is clear. A fiscal-driven approach has dictated the fate of 
the most important Mexican firm over the last three decades: the more PEMEX earns 
the more resources it pays to the government in the form of taxes. It has therefore 
become apparent that such a line of reasoning is what has guided the judgment of policy 
makers since the 1970s oil boom. As a result, PEMEX has found itself in the rather 
paradoxical situation of having to issue debt through international markets in order to 
comply with an inequitable tax regime at home.  
Figure 7.3  Assets vs. liabilities        
  ($ millions) 
   Source: PEMEX (2003, 2010a). 
The deterioration of the financial standing of PEMEX is also reflected in its assets-to-
liabilities ratio (Figure 7.3). In 1992, liabilities represented only 26.8 percent of assets. 
More specifically, the assets of PEMEX in that year were reported to be $50.1 billion, 
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whereas liabilities were calculated at $13.4 billion. The assets to liabilities ratio 
therefore stood at 3.7. By 1995, in the midst of the peso crisis, conditions worsened 
rapidly with liabilities accounting for 49 percent of assets and the ratio falling to 2.046. 
The figures were to weaken even further a decade later. In 2005, liabilities were greater 
than assets and the ratio plunged to .975 – a figure indicating that PEMEX debts were 
greater than the value of its assets. In the subsequent years things did not greatly 
improve as the assets-to-liabilities ratio averaged 1.032 for the three years to 2008 
before plunging to 0.95 in 2009. Once again the sum of liabilities was greater than the 
value of assets. It is worth noting that during the period of analysis, assets and liabilities 
peaked at $121 and $117 billion respectively in 2007, figures that roughly correspond to 
10 percent of the country‟s GDP for the year.   
It is obvious that these numbers paint a very gloomy picture, but at the same time they 
lead to a fundamental question: What lies behind all this? Even though the answer is 
rather complex, in the light of the evidence one is able to draw certain conclusions. 
PEMEX is managed using an approach that seeks to compensate for taxes the 
government does not collect from other sectors of the economy. The draining of 
PEMEX royalties has been privileged over, among other factors, the upgrading of its 
petrochemical complexes. 
Input supply at risk: a shrinking crude output meets high international prices 
It is widely acknowledged that the dominant role of PEMEX petrochemical complexes 
represents a serious concern for the upgrading of the entire cluster. Private firms face a 
scenario riddled with uncertainty concerning key features of their relationship with 
state-owned firms. In a similar fashion, state-owned petrochemical firms have a sour 
relationship with PEMEX, their parent company. One component of this spectrum is a 
limited stock of inputs since natural gas and crude are in short supply. If one is to trace 
the drivers of stretched public petrochemical firm output, it is necessary to consider 
other dynamics within PEMEX. Mexico‟s largest company has embraced a set of 
policies that imposes restrictions on expanding the production of petrochemical inputs. 
A number of features are at the core of this debate.  
The downward trend for crude output over the last five years is a matter that deserves 
particular consideration. Since 2004, the year when output peaked at 3.38 mbpd, overall 
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crude production has consistently deteriorated. It is therefore important to mention the 
role of Cantarell, a field off the Campeche coast discovered in 1976 and whose output in 
the same year peaked at 2.136 mbpd, accounting for 63.15 percent of Mexico‟s overall 
crude production. Output at Cantarell, however, has rapidly declined. The field yielded 
just 684 thousand barrels per day in 2009 – a figure that represents 26.3 percent of 
PEMEX production and a staggering fall of 1,452 thousand barrels per day vis-a-vis 
2004. All in all, PEMEX output plunged to 2.6 mbpd in 2009 - a sudden drop of 23 
percent over a period of five years (Figure 7.4).  This figure makes Mexico the world‟s 
sixth largest crude producer (PEMEX 2010a). In the future the lack of investment in 
exploration and the technical restrictions of PEMEX with regard to deepwater drilling 
may accentuate this drop (Shields 2008), although it must be pointed out that the firm 
managed to stabilise production at 2.576 mbpd in 2010 (PEMEX 2010b). 
Figure 7.4 PEMEX overall output and crude processed at petrochemical  
  facilities 
 
  Source: PEMEX (2003, 2010a). PEMEX, indicadores petroleros (2010b). 
In addition to declining output, a skyrocketing international price for crude is another 
factor requiring analysis. Evidence suggests that the age of low-cost oil has come to an 
end given that prices have more than tripled since 2003. The average price of the 
Mexican crude basket stood at $24.78 per barrel in 2003 but since then prices have 
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percent. In a context where falling crude output (Figure 7.4) is coupled with high 
international prices (Figure 7.5) and weak tax collection by the government, policy 
makers have been required to establish priorities that are open to discussion. Crude 
exports are a case in point. For fiscal purposes, crude exports to the U.S. and other 
countries appear to be more profitable in the short term than any of the other activities 
of PEMEX. As far as the petrochemical division of PEMEX is concerned, it is 
important to address the fact that the latter has occurred at the expense of the supply to 
petrochemical complexes, which process less crude (Figure 7.4) and therefore yield less 
petrochemical inputs year after year (Figure 7.7).  
Figure 7.5 Exports and average price of the Mexican crude basket 
 
  Source: PEMEX (2003, 2010a). PEMEX, indicadores petroleros (2010b). 
In the first half of the 1990s, when output at petrochemical complexes hit record levels, 
the amount of oil destined for the processing of petrochemical inputs stood at 209 
thousand barrels per day, or 7.9 percent of overall crude production. In the second half 
of the 1990s petrochemical plants handled 170 thousand barrels of crude per day (bpd), 
which accounted for 5.7 percent of PEMEX crude output. For much of the past decade 
the decline was even sharper. In the context of a high international price, particularly 
from 2003 onwards, the figures indicate a pronounced downhill trend. Crude processed 
at petrochemical facilities averaged only 4.1 percent (or 132 thousand bpd) as a 
proportion of the overall crude output for the 2003-2008 period (Figure 7.4). Such a 
share is not quite half of that attained during the first half of the 1990s. Nonetheless, the 
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most worrying slump was yet to come. While in 2008 the share of crude processed by 
petrochemical complexes represented 4.7 percent, the figure stood at just 3.7 percent by 
2009. All in all, what these numbers demonstrate is that the crude supply to PEMEX-
Petrochemicals has steadily contracted over the last two decades – a factor that in part 
explains the stretched availability of basic inputs in the Veracruz cluster. 
Input supply at risk: the growing use of natural gas for electricity generation 
Crude is not the only input demanded by the petrochemical industry. Natural gas, or 
more specifically dry gas, is also important and is the main feedstock, for example, in 
the making of ammonia at Cosoleacaque. In reviewing PEMEX estimates, it is evident 
that the company does not disclose data over the amount of gas it processes at its 
petrochemical complexes, although it does report how much gas it transfers to other 
sectors of the economy. In that respect, the generation of electricity is an issue that 
merits particular consideration. The use of natural gas to generate electricity in Mexico 
has rapidly increased over the last ten years (Figure 7.6). Regardless of the fact that the 
government has authorised the participation of private investors in the natural gas 
market
73
 and the generation of electricity, it is understood that environmental concerns, 
along with a growing domestic consumption, are the forces behind the upsurge. In order 
to situate the latter in a broader context, it is indispensible to consider how much gas 
PEMEX assigns to the power sector. When NAFTA came into effect, the proportion of 
gas PEMEX sent for the generation of electricity in terms of its overall output rose from 
18.96 percent in 1994 to 31.21 percent in 2000. This upward trend became even more 
pronounced in the following years, rising from 36.02 percent in 2001 to 50.42 percent in 
2009 (PEMEX 2001, 2010a).  To a great extent, the weight of natural gas, or rather the 
use of combined cycle power plants, in the generation of energy has mirrored the trend 
described above. Over the last decade and a half, as illustrated in Figure 7.6, it is 
reported that the generation of electricity in Mexico grew 60 percent. A large percentage 
of this additional output is attributed to the generation capacity of combined cycle plants 
which use natural gas as feedstock. In 1996, for example, while 55.8 percent of the 
                                                 
73 A year after NAFTA came into effect, the government embarked on a process to deregulate the natural 
gas market. In 1995, the Zedillo administration amended the petroleum law and allowed the participation 
of private capital in the transportation, storage, and distribution of natural gas as well as in the 
construction and operation of pipelines. Private investors were also permitted to freely import and export 
natural gas. Prior to these amendments, PEMEX held the exclusive right to perform the whole spectrum 
of natural gas related activities (Torres-Baron 2009).  
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energy generated came from conventional thermoelectric plants, only 6.94 percent came 
from combined cycle plants. This share grew at modest yet consistent rates towards the 
end of the decade. From 2000 onwards, however, the use of natural gas as an input for 
power generation grew rapidly and it is estimated that combined cycle plants accounted 
for 12.79 percent of the country‟s electricity output in 2001. The proportion rose 
slightly above 50 percent in 2009. Since the Energy Ministry estimates that domestic 
electricity consumption is expected to grow at an average of 4.3 percent in the fifteen 
years to 2025, it is clear that the share of natural gas in the composition of the country‟s 
energy matrix will continue to burgeon (Secretaría de Energía 2007, 2010).   
Figure 7.6 Mexico’s electricity outlook   
  (GWh)
 
  Source: Secretaría de Energía (2007, 2010).  
  * It includes both hydrocarbon (conventional thermoelectric, internal combustion, gas 
  turbine) and alternative sources (hydraulic, nuclear, coal, wind-electric and geothermal-
  electric). 
Even though it is unclear to what extent the increasing use of natural gas for energy 
generation limits the input available to feed industrial processes at state-owned 
petrochemical complexes, this situation undoubtedly places further pressure on 
PEMEX-Petrochemicals. In this sense, and as noted in the present section and the 
previous chapter, the determinants serving to elucidate the complex scenario of the 
Veracruz cluster are varied. The limited availability of inputs coupled with high 
international prices and deregulation of the sector have contributed to a deterioration of 
the petrochemical division of PEMEX. A brief overview of the petrochemical 
production at state-owned firms will therefore help reveal more.  
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THE PETROCHEMICAL ARM OF PEMEX 
The Cosoleacaque, La Cangrejera, Morelos and Pajaritos complexes situated in southern 
Veracruz are of great importance for the petrochemical division of PEMEX. They 
account for an installed capacity of 12,037 thousand tonnes, which represented 92 
percent of the overall installed petrochemical capacity of PEMEX
74
 as of 2009. In 
relation to output, the four complexes yielded 7,576 thousand tonnes of petrochemical 
raw materials, which is equivalent to 99.8 percent of overall PEMEX-Petrochemicals
75
 
production for the same year. A review of these variables for the previous two decades 
shows the figures are similar.  
It is well known that the fortunes of the Veracruz cluster are closely linked to the 
petrochemical division of PEMEX. This is mostly attributed to the fact that the 
complexes of Cosoleacaque, La Cangrejera, Morelos and Pajaritos supply industrial raw 
materials that the other firms in the Veracruz cluster process into intermediate inputs. 
Over the last fifteen years this role has been threatened as output from state-owned 
facilities has contracted. Figure 7.7 clearly shows how output at the four PEMEX 
petrochemical complexes has dropped since the 1990s. It is stated in official reports that 
output reached its peak in 1992 with the production of 11,948 thousand tonnes of 
petrochemical products – a figure that represented 87.6 percent of the subsidiary‟s 
overall production that year. Production was to a great extent solid during the first half 
of the 1990s, but began to decline in the second half as a result of government efforts to 
privatise the sector (Chapter 6).  
The downward trend for output commenced in 1996 when Mexico was on the road to 
recovery from the financial crisis that had hit two years earlier. It was during the Zedillo 
administration, Mexico‟s president from 1994 to 2000, that the PEMEX petrochemical 
complexes in Veracruz suffered their sharpest fall in output. By the end of Zedillo‟s 
tenure output had plummeted to 6,234 thousand tonnes, down from 11,855 thousand 
tonnes in 1995. The most dramatic drop, however, occurred in 2002 when production 
collapsed to 5,515 thousand tonnes. This figure represented 46 percent of the 11,948 
thousand tonnes recorded in 1992 – the year when output achieved record levels for the 
                                                 
74
 PEMEX-Petrochemicals installed capacity stood at 13,061 thousand tonnes as of 2009 (PEMEX 
2010a).  
75 
PEMEX-Petrochemicals reported production of 7,841 thousand tonnes in 2009 (PEMEX 2010a).  
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decade. For the 1990-1999 period, the output of Cosoleacaque, La Cangrejera, Pajaritos 
and Morelos represented 88 percent of the entire PEMEX petrochemical division. 
One of the conclusions drawn from analysis of the four complexes over the final eight 
years of the period shown in Figure 7.7 is that output stagnated. However, if the 
numbers achieved in the 1990s are taken into account, the picture is more devastating. 
While output averaged 10,618 thousand tonnes annually for the 1990-1999 period, from 
2000 to 2009 average output plummeted to 6,431 thousand tonnes per year – a reduction 
of 40 percent. As for 2009, the last year reported by PEMEX, output stood at 7,576 
thousand tonnes, just 63.4 percent of the output recorded in 1992. Nevertheless, the 
weight of the four petrochemical complexes within PEMEX-Petrochemicals in terms of 
output surged to 96.4 percent for the 2000-2009 period - mostly as a result of the 
shutting down of other state-owned plants throughout the country.  
Figure 7.7 Installed capacity and output at PEMEX petrochemical complexes* 
  („000 tonnes) 
 
  Source: PEMEX (2001, 2003, 2010a).  
  * It refers to PEMEX-Petrochemicals complexes in the Veracruz cluster. 
While there is no doubt that the aggregate performance of the four public petrochemical 
firms is overwhelmingly negative, it is necessary to point out that complexes differ in 
terms of installed capacity and output. In order to understand the weight each 
petrochemical complex carries within PEMEX-Petrochemicals a brief, yet more 
specific, account is needed.  
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The Cosoleacaque petrochemical complex 
In terms of installed capacity, the Cosoleacaque complex is the largest, accounting for 
38 percent of the entire PEMEX petrochemical division in 2009. In terms of output, 
Cosoleacaque is second to La Cangrejera, yielding 1,871 thousand tonnes of raw 
materials in 2009 – 24.7 percent of overall production for that year. The core production 
line of Cosoleacaque is ammonia – a natural gas by-product. Towards the end of the 
1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s the firm was touted as the world‟s largest 
ammonia producer. Of the overall installed capacity of almost 5,000 thousand tonnes, 
ammonia output accounted for more than half of the complex‟s production during this 
period. For the 1990-95 period, overall output at Cosoleacaque averaged 4,993 thousand 
tonnes, peaking at 5,546 thousand tonnes in 1991. Nevertheless, conditions deteriorated 
sharply in the following years (Figure 7.8).  
Figure 7.8 Installed capacity and output at Cosoleacaque petrochemical  
  complex (000‟ tonnes) 
 
  Source: PEMEX (2001, 2003, 2010a). 
Output began to wane in 1997 with Cosoleacaque producing just 4,165 thousand tonnes 
of ammonia and other inputs such as carbonic anhydride. Although this figure is high, it 
represented only 75 percent of the amount produced in 1991. In the light of the Zedillo 
administration‟s privatisation attempts (Chapter 6), output continued to tumble for the 
rest of the term and by 2000 output had fallen to 1,900 thousand tonnes. But the most 
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worrying scenario was yet to come as output plummeted to 1,160 thousand tonnes in 
2005 – a figure that represents just 21.5 percent of 1991 production levels. In 2009, the 
most recent year reported by PEMEX, the production of inputs at Cosoleacaque stood at 
1,871 thousand tonnes – 33.7 percent of the 1991 output level. As can be seen, output 
remained particularly low throughout the first half of the past decade and there is reason 
to believe this is mainly the result of high prices for natural gas on the southern coast of 
the U.S., as some interviewees pointed out during fieldwork. It is therefore important to 
remember that the price of inputs yielded at state-owned complexes in the Veracruz 
cluster are tied to those in the U.S., and that domestic production of ammonia is hit hard 
when natural gas prices north of the border fluctuate. On the other hand, it is also 
possible to identify a slight recovery in output during the final years of the period 
analysed. It is recognised by interviewees familiar with the situation that this 
corresponds to a rise in fertilizer prices – a situation that leads to more robust demand 
for ammonia. 
In relation to capacity utilisation, the figures shown above demonstrate an average of 
100 percent for the 1990-95 period, although this steadily dropped over subsequent 
years in line with the privatisation efforts of Zedillo. In the second half of the 1990s the 
number stood at 74 percent, mirroring the adverse conditions the industry endured at 
that time. From 2001 to 2009 production capacity at Cosoleacaque was used at an 
average rate of a disappointing 31 percent.  
Throughout this period, the contraction of ammonia production helps explain the sharp 
fall in overall petrochemical output so a brief account of this compound output drop is 
therefore required. While 2,500 thousand tonnes of ammonia were yielded at the 
Cosoleacaque complex in 1996, output plummeted to 923 thousand tonnes in 2000. Not 
only the limited availability of inputs previously described contributed to this, it is also 
alleged that one of the policies that helps to explain this drop during the second half of 
the 1990s is the pricing of natural gas, as briefly mentioned above. Natural gas is the 
raw material required for the production of ammonia, an essential compound in the 
production of urea and other fertilizers. In order to comply with the conventions of a 
free market economy, the Mexican government tied the price of domestic natural gas to 
that of the southern coast of the United States, where production costs are allegedly 
higher than in Mexico and elsewhere. This policy was adopted as the Mexican treasury 
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considered that a domestic price lower than that on the Texas coast would be considered 
unfair competition by U.S. based firms. As a result, the domestic price of ammonia and 
urea skyrocketed as it was no longer set by taking into consideration production costs. 
Instead, it followed natural gas price trends on the northern coast of the Gulf of Mexico. 
To mitigate the consequences of this problem for the agricultural sector, the target 
market of the value chain, the government eliminated import duties for urea. In this way 
farmers could buy fertilizers at more competitive prices. The grouping of these two 
policies proved devastating for the Cosoleacaque petrochemical complex and other 
firms along the value chain as PEMEX ammonia and fertilizer plants in the Veracruz 
cluster and throughout the country closed down. Mexico became a net importer of 
fertilizers
76
. In the name of free market policies, government officials played a major 
role in the dismantling of the natural gas-fertilizer value chain. Similar repercussions 
occurred throughout the PEMEX petrochemical spectrum.  
The La Cangrejera petrochemical complex 
The La Cangrejera complex is the second largest in terms of installed capacity, 
accounting for 3,280 thousand tonnes in 2009 or 25.11 percent of the entire capacity of 
PEMEX-Petrochemicals. This firm is in fact the largest if output is taken into account, 
yielding 42.07 percent of overall production. Of the 7,587 thousand tonnes of raw 
materials PEMEX produced in 2009, La Cangrejera generated 3,192 thousand tonnes. 
Similar to the experience of Cosoleacaque in the 1990s, output at La Cangrejera began 
to drop towards the end of the decade. In the first half of the decade output remained 
stable and in 1996 the firm registered record levels with output reaching 4,078 thousand 
tonnes. The following year production began to wane as the petrochemical complex 
registered a drop of 20 percent. By 2000 output had fallen to 1.985 thousand tonnes, a 
figure that represented just 48.67 percent of that recorded in 1996 (Figure 7.9).  
Things took a turn for the worse in 2001 when La Cangrejera produced 1,936 thousand 
tonnes - the sharpest drop recorded – with this contraction reflecting what occurred 
throughout the rest of the sector. However, output recovered in the following years, 
bouncing back to 2,800 thousand tonnes in 2005 - a rise of 44.6 percent in relation to 
                                                 
76
 According to fieldwork findings, the price for fertilizers has surged in recent years, prompting a rise in 
the production of ammonia and the re-opening of one fertilizer plant at a local firm, which is allegedly the 
only plant operating in the Veracruz cluster and in Mexico as of 2008.  
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2001. During this period PEMEX expanded the production of ethylene-derived products 
- a compound that feeds industrial processes of several buyer firms in the Veracruz 
cluster. Output continued to grow and La Cangrejera generated 3,192 thousand tonnes 
in 2009 – close to 80 percent of the amount registered in 1996. With regard to capacity 
utilisation, the early years of the 1990s represented a prolific phase for La Cangrejera 
and from 1997 to 2000 it is reported that capacity was exploited at a rate of 82 percent - 
a figure that does not reflect the tough times the Cosoleacaque complex was 
experiencing. Figures were also positive for the following decade with the average rate 
of installed capacity usage standing at 89 percent from 2001 to 2009. Of particular 
importance was the period 2007-2009 when the average was 98 percent. The lowest 
entry level was in 2000 when output represented just 69 percent of installed capacity 
usage (Figure 7.9). 
Figure 7.9 Installed capacity and output at La Cangrejera petrochemical  
  complex (000‟ tonnes) 
 
  Source: PEMEX (2001, 2003, 2010a). 
The evidence suggests that La Cangrejera managed to weather the storm experienced by 
the entire industry over the last decade and a half. To a great extent, this can be 
attributed to the fact that ethylene represents the most important production line for the 
PEMEX petrochemical division. Even though overall output remained steady during the 
period covered by Figure 7.9, this was coupled with skyrocketing imports. Domestic 
demand for ethylene-derived products and products of ethylene origin dwarfed output. 
The fact that domestic requirements (at subsequent stages of the associated value 
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chains) are met through imports is a matter of great concern and a chief component of 
the sector‟s problems. An overview of the import of petrochemical products in a later 
subsection will elaborate further on this.  
The Morelos petrochemical complex 
The importance of Morelos is overshadowed by that of Cosoleacaque and La Cangrejera 
as its share of installed capacity and aggregate output make it the third largest firm of 
the PEMEX petrochemical division. With regard to installed capacity, it represented 
19.4 percent of the overall figure in 2009. Morelos was capable of producing 2,535 
thousand tonnes – a jump of 12 percent in comparison to a year earlier. In terms of 
output, Morelos registered record levels in 2009 when it generated 1,833 thousand 
tonnes of raw materials. In relative terms this amount accounted for 24.15 percent of 
total PEMEX production for that year, which also means that plants at Morelos were 
working at 72 percent of capacity (Figure 7.10).  
Figure 7.10 Installed capacity and output at Morelos petrochemical complex      
  (000‟ tonnes)          
 
  Source: PEMEX (2001, 2003, 2010a). 
Although these numbers do not initially paint a negative picture, in particular because 
Morelos registered lower figures throughout the previous decade, they do mirror the 
trend throughout the entire sector. As for the 1990s, the firm had a mixed performance 
since in the 1990-93 period output averaged 1,500 thousand tonnes, representing 91% 
use of installed capacity. During the following phase, 1994 to 2000, output surged to 
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1,640 thousand tonnes, mainly due to greater installed capacity. The (process) 
upgrading of the Morelos complex expanded capacity from 1,700 thousand tonnes in 
1993 to 2,060 thousand tonnes in 1994 – a figure that remained stable until the end of 
the decade.  
During the same period the Morelos petrochemical plants operated at an average rate of 
80 percent. However, 1999 and 2000 offered a glimpse of what was to come as output 
shrank to 1,380 and 1,470 thousand tonnes and the complex worked at 68 percent and 
72 percent of its overall capacity respectively. Up to 2007 output remained steady as 
was the case in 2001, with Morelos producing 1,470 thousand tonnes of inputs. In 2007 
production stood at 1,482 thousand tonnes. Even though the average operation rate for 
Morelos during the 2001-2007 period plummeted to 67 percent, in 2008 capacity 
utilization rose to 81 percent - up from 66 percent a year earlier. In that year, Morelos 
yielded 1,824 thousand tonnes and a similar level of production was reported for 2009. 
Nonetheless, as Morelos underwent upgrading of its installed capacity, the rate at which 
this was utilised plunged to 72 percent.  
The Pajaritos petrochemical complex 
Last but not least, the Pajaritos complex in the city of Coatzacoalcos is the smallest in 
terms of installed capacity and output. In many respects, both indicators witnessed 
pronounced shifts over the course of the last two decades. In 1990 capacity utilisation 
stood at 97 percent, while a year later the number had sunk to 60 percent. Apart from 
1991, the firm in fact registered respectable numbers during the first half of the decade 
with output averaging 1,098 thousand tonnes a year, corresponding to an average 
capacity utilisation of 83 percent from 1990 to 1995. At the same time, installed 
capacity reached 1,470 thousand tonnes in 1995, up from 1,130 thousand tonnes in 
1990. For the rest of the decade, and in keeping with the sector trend, Pajaritos entered a 
less productive period with both output and installed capacity contracting. By 2000 the 
production of inputs shrank to 857 thousand tonnes at plants capable of yielding up to 
1,060 thousand tonnes. Capacity utilisation stood at 80 percent, but with an installed 
capacity 28 percent smaller than that in 1995. From 1996 to 2000 the rate of capacity 
use averaged 70 percent (Figure 7.11).  
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Over the course of the following decade the production capacity of Pajaritos remained 
steady, although output did suffer a different fate. The downward trend accelerated until 
2004 when only 222 thousand tonnes were yielded. In that year the rate at which the 
firm‟s plants were operating was 22 percent - the lowest level for the entire period. 
Nonetheless, conditions improved in the following years. Output bounced back to 966 
thousand in 2007, coupled with a capacity utilisation of 95 percent. 2008 merits special 
mention since the upgrading of installed capacity was accompanied by a sharp drop in 
output of 28 percent (697 thousand tonnes) while installed capacity grew 21 percent 
(from 1,021 thousand tonnes in 2007 to 1,240 thousand tonnes in 2008). Capacity 
utilisation sank to 56 percent - a number outperformed by the previous year. By 2009 
things had not improved for Pajaritos.  
Figure 7.11 Installed capacity and output at Pajaritos petrochemical complex 
  (000‟ tonnes) 
 
  Source: PEMEX (2001, 2003, 2010a). 
Despite the fact that the importance of Pajaritos in the fall of overall output is dwarfed 
by that of Cosoleacaque, its erratic operations over the course of the last two decades 
helps to highlight the deterioration experienced by the public petrochemical industry in 
the Veracruz cluster. Although not every firm has performed poorly, aggregate figures 
tell a story of shortcomings where output is a chief variable. As argued at earlier points 
of this chapter, to a certain extent the heavy tax burden and falling crude output help us 
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understand this downward trend. A look at the facts may lead us to wonder about the 
broader repercussions of this situation and the following section seeks to do just this. 
THE OUTCOMES OF DEREGULATION  
As indicated in Chapter 6, the administrations of Miguel De La Madrid (1982-1988), 
Carlos Salinas (1988-1994), and Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000) introduced a series of 
policies designed to encourage the participation of private actors in the petrochemical 
industry
77
, ensure compliance of the hydrocarbon industry with the stipulations of a free 
market economy
78
, and increase the efficiency of PEMEX through horizontal 
restructuring
79
. At this point it is worth remembering that such policies were not the 
only course of action pursued by the state and were accompanied by the confiscation of 
PEMEX revenues as described earlier. The stagnation of installed capacity and its 
inability to transform hydrocarbon inputs into refined and petrochemical products is a 
case in point and leads to a consideration of the crossroads where PEMEX currently 
finds itself.  
Did the arguments used by policy makers serve to validate the horizontal organisation 
of PEMEX and did the reclassification of basic petrochemicals lead to the anticipated 
outcomes? What are the repercussions of the abovementioned policies and the heavy 
PEMEX tax burden with respect to trade in crude and processed hydrocarbon by-
products on the one hand and the growth of the company in terms of revenues on the 
other? I will attempt to answer these questions by analysing the paradoxical juncture at 
which Mexico finds itself – the world‟s sixth largest crude producer80 whose imports of 
refined and petrochemical inputs are growing rapidly – as well as briefly comparing the 
implications of the horizontal structure of PEMEX with the vertical integration of major 
international energy firms.  
The paradoxical scenario of the Mexican hydrocarbon industry 
When studying the figures provided in the previous section, it becomes clear that the 
falling output at state-owned petrochemical complexes in the Veracruz cluster restricts 
                                                 
77
 This is the reclassification of basic inputs as secondary inputs.  
78
 To link prices of PEMEX inputs (petrochemicals and natural gas included) to those on the southern 
coast of the United States.  
79
 It entailed the organisation of PEMEX into four subsidiaries. 
80
 In the year 2009 (PEMEX 2010a).  
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the availability of industrial inputs domestically. This situation is exacerbated by the 
fact that PEMEX-Petrochemicals is, despite liberalisation of the sector in recent 
decades, the sole producer of a number of petrochemical precursors
81
, with this being 
one of the most detrimental repercussions of the regulatory framework institutionalised 
in the 1990s. As a result of the uncertainty arising from this context, the development of 
petrochemical value chains, which are constituted by both user firms in the locality and 
those associated with the transformation of secondary petrochemicals into final goods, 
has been hindered. To cope with the problem these companies hold the option of 
meeting their requirements through imports. The growth in imports of petrochemical 
inputs is undoubtedly one of the most detrimental consequences of the adverse scenario 
faced by PEMEX and its petrochemical subsidiary.  
To put things into a broader perspective, not only the value of imports and exports of 
petrochemical products
82
 require analysis but also that of products of petrochemical 
origin
83
 over the last two decades. Products of petrochemical origin include textiles, 
plastics and other chemicals that Mexican-based firms can produce by processing the 
intermediate petrochemical products yielded by those firms located in the Veracruz 
cluster. Since indigenous production has been outpaced by demand, imports of these 
products have increased and during the period 1993-2010 these imports significantly 
outnumbered exports. In relation to petrochemical products, the national office of 
statistics (INEGI) reports that exports accounted for $0.492 billion in 1993 while the 
figure stood at $0.601 billion in 2009 – a disappointing increase of 22 percent over a 
period of sixteen years. In reviewing the figures at the beginning of the period it can be 
concluded that since Mexico was not an important exporter of petrochemicals, a 
substantial share of PEMEX output, which achieved record levels during this period, 
was consumed locally. On the other hand, this indicates why imports were not 
particularly significant. However, things changed over the same period with respect to 
imports as Mexico imported $0.826 billion in petrochemical inputs in 1993 and this led 
to a trade deficit of $0.334 billion. As late as 2009, the value of imports swelled to 
$6.160 billion – a rise of 745 percent in relation to 1993. The deficit then widened to 
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 This issue is discussed further in Chapter 8.  
82
 The universe of secondary petrochemical products is extensive. The import figure computed by the 
National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) includes ammonia, polyvinyl chloride, ethylene, 
polyethylene, polypropylene, and others.  
83
 In addition to the „petrochemical products‟ classification, the INEGI gathers data on the trading of 
products of petrochemical origin (plastics, textiles and other chemicals).  
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$5.56 billion, which represents 16.6 times that of 1993. It is worth pointing out that the 
panorama was even darker in 2008 when imports peaked at $8.77 billion. With exports 
reaching $0.79 billion in the same year, the deficit hit record levels of $7.99 billion – 24 
times that of 1993.  
The trade figures calculated by the INEGI for January to November 2010 deserve 
special mention since the national statistics office estimates that exports of 
petrochemical products totalled $0.764 billion, while imports stood at $8.3 billion. The 
resulting trade deficit in relation to the first eleven months of the year was $7.54 billion.  
The same logic of analysis is used for the value of trade in products of petrochemical 
origin such as plastics, textiles and other chemicals during the same period. The INEGI 
indicated that exports of such products accounted for $0.98 billion in 1993 and $3.5 
billion in 2009 – a figure that grew 357 percent during the period. It therefore comes as 
no surprise that imports grew even more, standing at $1.6 billion at the beginning of the 
period while the country spent $7.1 billion on products of petrochemical origin from 
abroad in 2009 – 443 percent more than in 1993. The deficit therefore grew from $0.62 
billion in 1993 to $3.6 billion in 2009 – a rise of 580 percent. Once again, these figures 
were at record levels in 2008 since exports accounted for $4.4 billion whereas imports 
represented $9.12 billion, leading to a deficit of $4.72 billion – 73 times that of 1993. 
The latest available trade figures with respect to products of petrochemical origin cover 
the period January-November 2010 during which the INEGI estimates that the country‟s 
exports totalled $4.1 billion and imports $7.98 billion leading to a deficit of $3.87 
billion.  
Using a single number for the value of imports in both product categories, it is possible 
to establish a clearer account of the extent of the problem. In so doing, the value of 
crude exports serve as the comparable variable. In 1993, for example, imports of 
petrochemical products and products of petrochemical origin totalled $2.43 billion, 
representing 38 percent of the value of crude exports for that year. By 2009 aggregated 
imports swelled to $13.26 billion - 51 percent of crude exports. These numbers not only 
reflect the worsening of the import-to-export ratio, they also demonstrate that Mexico is 
increasingly becoming a supplier of crude and a buyer of refined products.  
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Using the same line of reasoning, the 2004-2009 period deserves particular attention 
since it is a period when imports grew rapidly. Imports of the products group averaged 
$13.8 billion annually with the figure being particularly high in 2008 when imports 
skyrocketed to $17.9 billion (Figure 7.12). With exports of crude oil standing at $43.32 
billion for the same year, the overall scene may not appear disturbing - but it is. In 2009, 
Mexico‟s oil exports stood at $25.66 billion, a year-on-year contraction of 41 percent. In 
a similar trend, imports plunged to $13.27 billion, 25.9 percent less than the previous 
year. As can be noted, the drop in imports of refined and petrochemical products was 
less pronounced than that of crude exports (Figure 7.12). In the short term things may 
change swiftly. As Mexico and the rest of the world recovers from the 2009 economic 
slowdown, imports of petrochemical input, textiles, plastics and other chemicals are 
predicted to gain pace again, whereas PEMEX oil output (Figure 7.4) is likely to remain 
at best stagnant in the foreseeable future.  
Figure 7.12 Petrochemical imports vs. crude exports           
  ($ millions) 
 
  Source: Economic databases of the external sector, INEGI, (2010). PEMEX (2003, 
  2010a).   * Data from January to November 2010 in the case of petrochemical products 
  and products of petrochemical origin.  
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Regardless of the fact that imports have recently surged, the value of crude exports has 
also risen and Figure 7.12 demonstrates the balance of these two variables. The trade 
surplus has widened since 2001 as a result of a combination of factors. Overall crude 
output rose from 3.127 mbpd in that year to 3.38 mbpd in 2003. From that point 
onwards output began to fall while the surplus continued to grow, boosted by higher 
international prices (Figure 7.5). As a result the positive balance jumped from $5.06 
billion in 2001 to $25.4 in 2008 before dropping to $12.4 billion the following year. 
While these figures may lead to a questioning of whether the petrochemical industry is 
in fact operating in the red, it is simply a matter of bearing in mind that imports of 
petrochemical products and products of petrochemical origin represent 51 percent of the 
value of crude exports in 2009 - a controversial figure for a major world oil producer.  
Given this scenario, the point is that the ability of PEMEX to capture larger sums of 
revenue to both finance public expenditure and offset petrochemical product imports 
will become more reliant on higher international prices – a factor that is beyond the 
control of policy makers as hinted at by Figure 7.12. As may be noted, crude export 
revenues rose from $25.6 billion in 2009 to $35.9 billion in 2010 with this occurring 
despite PEMEX crude output not varying from one year to another. Such a jump in 
revenues is therefore mostly attributed to higher prices for the Mexican crude basket - 
from $57.44 to $72.33 dollars per barrel in each of the years indicated - and to a lesser 
extent to a modest increase in exports – from 1.225 Mbd in 2009 to 1.361 Mbd in 2010 
(Figure 7.5). Imports of petrochemical products and products of petrochemical origin, 
on the other hand, also surged although at a slower rate – from $13.27 billion in 2009 to 
$16.26 billion in the period January-November 2010. Nevertheless, and although the 
figures for December need to be included, imports of these products accounted for 45 
percent of crude exports – down from 51 percent a year earlier.  
The situation worsens if statistics for refined products are included in the analysis. 
While it is not in the scope of this chapter to shed light on other areas of PEMEX, the 
refining of hydrocarbon resources is another issue of increasing concern. As the heavy 
tax burden prevents PEMEX from expanding its refining capacity, the company has not 
been able to meet growing domestic demand for refined products such as fuel oil, diesel, 
jet fuel, liquid fuel, liquefied petroleum gas and other petroleum oils. An even more 
disturbing scenario can therefore be observed (Figure 7.13) since imports of these 
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products have escalated rapidly. As recently as 2004 imports of refined products stood 
at $4.26 billion and it took four years for their value to climb to $13.8 billion. In 2008 
the figure was 3.24 times greater than that reported in 2004. That figure is particularly 
worrying as imports from 1993 to 2000 totalled just $17.43 and averaged $2.18 billion 
per annum according to the INEGI database on external trade.  
A more precise picture of the vertical disintegration of the Mexican economy therefore 
becomes clear when imports of petrochemical products, products of petrochemical 
origin and refined products are grouped together (Figure 7.13). In order to conduct this 
brief analysis, the timeline show in Figure 7.12 will be divided into three phases. The 
first of these is from 1993 to 2000 – when crude exports averaged $9.36 billion and 
imports of petrochemical and refined products averaged $6.63 billion a year. These 
figures represent an exports-to-imports ratio of 1.41.  
Figure 7.13  Imports of petrochemical and refined products vs. crude exports               
  ($ millions) 
 
  Source: Economic databases of the external sector, INEGI (2010). PEMEX (2003, 
  2010a).   * Data from January to November 2010 in the case of petrochemical products 
  and of petrochemical origin.  
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The next phase runs from 2001 to 2005. The reason for establishing this period is that 
the balance began an upward trend as a result of a crude output of over 3 mbpd annually 
and higher international prices between 2004 and 2005. During this period imports 
averaged $13.66 billion per year and crude exports $18.32. The exports-to-imports ratio 
slightly worsened to 1.34.  
Conditions markedly deteriorated in the 2006-2009 period. In annual average terms, 
crude exports amounted to $35.4 billion while imports came in at $31.1 billion – driving 
the ratio down to 1.14. Exports were just 14 percent higher than imports. The standout 
year during this period was 2008 when imports achieved a record $41.5 billion and 
crude exports totalled $43.3 billion - a surplus of $1.8 billion. In 2009, as a result of 
lower international crude prices (Figure 7.5), overall imports outstripped crude exports 
by $0.7 billion. The country spent $26.4 billion on imports of refined and petrochemical 
products and sent crude worth $25.7 billion abroad. Things changed in 2010, as noted 
earlier, when crude export revenues rose to $35.9 billion – up from $25.7 billion a year 
earlier. This change is mostly attributed to a considerable jump in the price per barrel. 
Imports of petrochemical and refined products increased as the economy bounced back 
from the previous year‟s economic slowdown84. The INEGI reported that imports from 
January to November 2010 amounted to $33.45 billion – an increase of almost 27 
percent with respect to 2009.  
Having put these figures into perspective, the reality is that imports of refined and 
petrochemical products not only threaten PEMEX crude profits, but also place at risk 
the country‟s energy security and self-sufficiency (Shields 2008). Should it therefore be 
considered paradoxical that Mexico exports crude oil before importing it in the form of 
refined products and other hydrocarbon inputs?  
With respect to this scenario, it should be remembered that in the wake of privatisation 
attempts by the Zedillo administration (1994-2000) in the mid 1990s, scholars such as 
Ortiz Muñiz (1996: 22) warned that the country was on the route to becoming a mere 
supplier of crude and a net importer of value-added hydrocarbon by-products and 
manufactured goods. Figure 7.13 corroborates this view.  
                                                 
84
 The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean estimates that Mexico‟s GDP 
plunged by 6.5% in 2009 (CEPAL 2010). For 2010, the INEGI reported that GDP recorded growth of 
5.5% (Economía de México crece 5.5% en 2010, 2011, February 21). 
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Although the latter account represents one of the dimensions used to scrutinise the 
paradoxical nature of the Mexican hydrocarbon industry, PEMEX should also be 
compared with major international energy firms in terms of income.  
PEMEX in the international energy scene 
The problems faced by PEMEX are not only demonstrated by the trade energy balance 
indicated lines above. If the structure of international energy firms is taken into 
consideration it is also possible to offer further insights. The Valero Energy Corporation 
(VEC) is a San Antonio-based firm that owns 14 refineries throughout the U.S.A., 
Canada and the Caribbean. Unlike PEMEX, VEC pays no attention to upstream 
activities. The company does not yield a single barrel of crude. It focuses instead on the 
production of refined and petrochemical products. In 2007, for example, it was reported 
that VEC imported $6 billion of Mexican crude, which it transformed into refined and 
petrochemical products worth $15 billion (Bazan Navarrete and Peña Guevara 2007). 
This is not to say that these products were marketed in Mexico, but this activity clearly 
serves to demonstrate the role of PEMEX as a supplier of crude to feed the industrial 
machinery of the U.S. 
Figure 7.14 PEMEX vis-a-vis VEC 
  ($ millions) 
 
  PEMEX VEC PEMEX VEC 
  2008 2009 
Assets 111,129 35,629 102,004 32,417 
Operating 
revenues 
51,314 68,144 32,796 113,136 
 
  Source: PEMEX (2010a) and Valero Energy Corporation (2009).  
Furthermore, the different approaches to operational integration pursued by both VEC 
and PEMEX can be identified when considering variables such as assets, operating 
revenues (Figure 7.14), and refining capacity. In 2009, for example, VEC reported 
assets of $34.4 billion and operating revenues of $113.13 billion, while those of 
PEMEX stood at $102 billion and $31.7 billion, respectively. The question raised here 
is: how effective are both companies at putting assets to work in order to generate 
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income? Every dollar of VEC assets produces $3.28 in operating revenues while each 
dollar of PEMEX assets generates 31 cents. Both examples refer to 2009 estimates. In 
terms of refining capacity, on the other hand, VEC dwarfs PEMEX. The U.S. firm 
operates a network of refineries with a capacity to process 2.6 mbpd whereas PEMEX is 
only capable of processing up to 1.54 mbpd at 6 refineries (PEMEX 2010a, Valero 
Energy Corporation 2009, Valero Energy Corporation website 10 January 2011).  
Further evidence to this effect, presented by David Shields (2005), a leading 
commentator on the Mexican hydrocarbon industry, shows that in the case of major 
international oil firms the largest proportion of revenue is generated by the production 
and commercialisation of value-added products. In this respect, PEMEX is situated at 
the other extreme of the spectrum. ExxonMobil, for example, owns 42 refineries and 
39,000 service stations. Royal Dutch Shell is the owner of 55 refineries and markets 
output through a system of 55,000 service stations. PEMEX, on the other hand, owns 7 
refineries and markets output through a franchised network of 6,000 service stations. 
Another major distinction that needs to be highlighted is the proportion of refined 
products sales with respect to crude production. Once again, private firms rank higher. 
In 2003, ExxonMobil yielded 2.516 mbpd but marketed 7.957 mbpd of value-added 
hydrocarbon products with a refined product sales-to-crude output ratio of 3.18. 
Similarly, Royal Dutch Shell produced 2.334 mbpd of crude and sold 7.445 mbpd of 
refined products – figures that result in a ratio of 3.18. In the case of PEMEX, however, 
the numbers are rather disturbing since Mexico‟s largest firm yielded 3.371 mbpd of 
crude but managed to market just 1.706 mbpd of refined products. With these figures, 
the PEMEX ratio was 0.51. As can be seen, both ExxonMobil and Royal Dutch Shell 
place a great deal more emphasis on downstream activities than PEMEX whose core 
business, one may argue, is the exporting of crude. This latter scenario, as described by 
the author, is reflected in the abilities of the firms to generate revenue. On average, the 
revenues of BP, ExxonMobil, and Royal Dutch Shell were almost four times greater 
than those of PEMEX in 2003 (Shields 2005: 25-26).  
By 2010, as Figure 7.15 demonstrates, the revenue asymmetry between PEMEX and 
international oil companies narrowed. However, while PEMEX managed to increase 
revenues at a slightly higher rate than Royal Dutch Shell and ExxonMobil between 
2003 and 2010, the revenues of the world‟s second and third largest corporations, 
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according to Fortune 2010, accounted for three and a half times that of the largest 
Mexican company.   
Figure 7.15 Revenues of major oil firms  
  ($ millions) 
 
  2003 2010 
Royal Dutch Shell 205,212 285,129 
ExxonMobil 222,654 284,650 
BP 235,889 246,138 
Sinopec 53,533 187,518 
China National 
Petroleum 
N.A. 165,496 
Chevron 114,666 163,204 
Total 119,250 155,887 
ConocoPhillips 91,329 139,515 
ENI 60,556 117,235 
Petrobras N.A. 91,869 
PDVSA 45,000 91,182 
PEMEX 55,929 80,722 
   
  Source: Fortune (2010, July 26).  Shields (2005), citing 2003 data from Fortune 500.  
When these figures are taken into account, it becomes clear that the government strategy 
concerning PEMEX has not delivered the anticipated results. There is no doubt that the 
division of PEMEX into four subsidiaries and the lack of investment in exploration and 
upgrading refining capacity are factors that have damaged the firm‟s ability to generate 
revenue. Nonetheless, the decisive factor in this matter is the tax regime. As mentioned 
earlier, a large share of PEMEX royalties is devoted to financing public spending rather 
than the development of critical areas of the company. The petrochemical arm of 
PEMEX is a case in point.  
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The context of development for the Veracruz cluster is both complex and multi-
dimensional, with factors that initially appear to be unconnected turning out to be 
relevant. This chapter has also explained the role of high international crude prices and 
described the country‟s energy matrix in relation to the petrochemical industry. It is not 
clear to what extent these determinants constrain the availability of crude (naphthas) and 
natural gas to be processed by PEMEX-Petrochemicals, and therefore output of basic 
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inputs in the locality, but the evidence presented suggests a certain degree of influence 
in that respect.  
By and large, the facts presented in this chapter suggest that the weakening of PEMEX 
and PEMEX-Petrochemicals has hampered the position of Mexico, a leading world oil 
producer, as a maker of value-added inputs. This has implications for the wider 
economic spectrum. The rapid pace at which imports of petrochemical products and 
products of petrochemical origin have grown is a case in point. This context serves to 
hinder vertical integration of the Mexican economy. It is therefore paradoxical to see 
PEMEX pursuing horizontal organisation while the trend for its international 
counterparts is towards vertical integration. The difference in revenues clearly indicates 
that regulatory measures previously instigated have delivered rather questionable 
results. All in all, the question that arises is as to what has driven policy makers to turn 
Mexico into a mere supplier of crude and a net importer of value-added products. In 
part, the answer may lie in the context of low levels of tax collection, which is mainly 
attributed to the lack of consensus among political actors. To ameliorate the problem, it 
appears that the easiest option for the government is to drain the revenues generated by 
Petróleos Mexicanos.  
Bearing in mind the factors exposed, the issue to highlight is that this chapter further 
demonstrates the significance of analysing the political economy of Mexico in order to 
understand the development of the Veracruz cluster. The aggregate context, which 
refers to the sectoral, national, and supranational determinants schematised in Chapter 3, 
has greatly contributed to deteriorating the capabilities of PEMEX-Petrochemicals as a 
reliable supplier of inputs. This is to say that the prevailing governance structure 
characterising inter-firm transactions and the trajectory of local petrochemical 
companies is to a significant extent outlined by external determinants. The following 
chapter puts these subjects into context.  
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8 
VERTICAL LINKAGES IN THE VERACRUZ 
PETROCHEMICAL CLUSTER     
Contextualising governance, transactional dependence, and firm 
trajectories 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
There is no doubt that the scenario portrayed in the previous chapters has imposed 
significant restrictions on the national economy, PEMEX, and PEMEX-Petrochemicals. 
This chapter seeks to shed light on the repercussions of this aggregate setting for the 
transactional dynamics of the Veracruz cluster. To that end, it is important to point out 
that private petrochemical firms have been particularly affected. The shutting down of 
firms and the plummeting of output are not the only factors illustrating these 
repercussions. Another central shortcoming that has been less explored is related to the 
mechanisms, rules and practices that regulate vertical transactions of petrochemical 
inputs between PEMEX-Petrochemicals and local buyer firms. Contextualisation of the 
governance structure through which inter-firm transactional linkages are co-ordinated is 
necessary to demonstrate another facet of the limitations that private firms in the 
Veracruz cluster experience, as discussed in previous chapters. It is therefore necessary 
to reflect on the captive nature of inter-firm linkages and analyse the extent to which the 
performance of local buyers has been hampered.  
Most of the insights offered here are, to a great extent, the result of findings from 
fieldwork activities in the locality and this chapter discusses in greater detail the 
circumstances that helped shape the relationships local private firms have established 
with PEMEX-Petrochemicals. To do so, the discussion will focus on the trajectory of 
firms, their standing within the production scheme of the Veracruz cluster, and the 
determinants associated with the extent of transactional dependence.  
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The cases presented below reflect the quality of inter-firm linkages in the Veracruz 
cluster. The first section, which deals with the ethylene oxide chain, is a clear example 
of how the limited availability of inputs at state-owned complexes hampers the 
upgrading prospects of user firms, particularly with regards to Industrias Derivadas del 
Etileno (IDESA), a local buyer firm. The second section discusses the degree to which 
changing regulatory policies have affected fertiliser firms and serves as an illustrative 
case that draws a distinction between the implications of the contemporary context of 
development and that of import-substituting industrialisation policies in the 1960s and 
1970s (Chapter 5). The third section not only contextualises the vertical integration of 
firms in the locality, it also identifies the strategies used by firms to counteract the 
shutting down of production lines at PEMEX-Petrochemicals. The fourth section, 
through analysis of a local firm that supplies a particular input to PEMEX-
Petrochemicals, shows how state-owned complexes continue to control the transaction 
of inputs even if located at the buyer end. 
By and large, the common denominator is the fact that private petrochemical firms 
(which are linked to PEMEX-Petrochemicals) are transactionally dependent on 
suppliers and that the outlook for firms operating in the cluster is hindered by the 
mechanisms used by PEMEX-Petrochemical to co-ordinate input transactions. With 
reference to firms affected by the closing down of production lines at state-owned firms, 
the evidence provided here also indicates the extent to which transactional dependence 
is experienced by these buyer firms and the extent to which their performance is 
influenced.  
THE ETHYLENE OXYDE CHAIN 
Ethylene is a natural gas by-product processed at the Morelos and La Cangrejera 
petrochemical complexes situated in the municipality of Coatzacoalcos. It is considered 
the most important PEMEX production line since it is the precursor of several value 
chains in which firms in the Veracruz cluster take part at later stages: high/low density 
polyethylene, vinyl chloride and ethylene oxide. These three intermediate inputs are 
also produced by PEMEX-Petrochemicals and in a similar way to other chains the 
operations of several private firms depend on this supply. Particular attention must be 
paid to ethylene oxide since four private firms in the cluster are linked to it: 
Petroquímica Beta, Industrias Derivadas del Etileno (IDESA), Oxiteno, and Clariant 
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process ethylene oxide into a broad range of petrochemical raw materials. Of these, the 
first two companies serve to illustrate the extent to which PEMEX-Petrochemicals 
wields a great deal of authority over the transaction of raw materials and how its 
dominant role and the hazardous nature of the input contribute to locking buyer firms 
into captive relationships.  
Petroquímica Beta 
The origins of the company date back to 1990 with the setting up of COIN, the initial 
name of Petroquímica Beta. It was established as the result of an initiative undertaken 
by a construction company named La Nacional. At that time, of all hydrocarbon by-
products processed in the region, light gasoline
85
, a compound rich in pentanes, drew 
the interest of La Nacional which realised it could use this petrochemical current to 
produce a high-grade mixture of pentanes
86
. A group of retired PEMEX workers was 
approached by the construction firm to join the project in order to take advantage of 
their technical expertise in petrochemical processes. In 1990, when COIN began 
operations in the municipality of Coatzacoalcos, it not only became the only firm in 
Latin America dedicated to the making of high-grade compounds such as n-pentane and 
isopentane (Figure 8.1), it was also the only petrochemical firm in the locality formed 
with the involvement of local workers as shareholders. Initially, the main supplier of 
COIN was the petrochemical complex of La Cangrejera, located less than 7 km from the 
plant.  
For much of the 1990s COIN remained under the ownership of the original 
shareholders. However, with the deterioration of the business climate in the wake of the 
1994 economic downturn, by 1998 the Southampton Refining Company (SRC), a 
Texas-based firm and competitor of COIN in the North American market, acquired the 
assets of its Mexican counterpart. From that time on it is reported that COIN operated at 
full capacity
87
, marketing its entire output in the United States. However, things 
changed once again in 2000 as inputs mirrored the upward trend of crude prices and the 
price of inputs supplied by PEMEX-Petrochemicals was reported to be higher than the 
                                                 
85
 The term light gasoline refers to a group of compounds (n-pentane, isopentane and neopentane) that 
embody a given quality. Petroquímica Beta transforms such products into high-grade pentanes.   
86
 Pentanes are used in the making of polystyrene (foams, expanded, moulded), which has a broad range 
of applications: disposable coffee cups, packing materials, buoys, boat bumpers, moulded automobile and 
refrigerator parts, CD cases, rigid panels, and so on (Burdick and Leffler 1990). 
87
 20,000 tonnes per annum.  
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price of COIN intermediate products. As a result, production languished during the 
following three years. In this context, it is important to underline the fact that 
transactional relationships between private firms are regulated by yearly contracts for 
which prices are often fixed. COIN was therefore unable to adjust the price of pentanes 
in line with increases for inputs and its financial obligations mounted, eventually 
leading to its assets being seized by creditors. A group of Mexican engineers, which 
already owned a plant that processed ethylene oxide derived products, acquired the firm 
in 2005, changing its name to Petroquímica Beta. The acquisition coincided with the 
launch of a polyethylene plant at the neighbouring petrochemical complex of Morelos. 
In 2005 the new shareholders diversified the product portfolio of Petroquímica Beta. 
The production of triethanolamine (used in the cosmetic and construction industry), 
nonylphenol (employed in the detergent industry), and polyethylene glycol (used in a 
wide range of industries such as agriculture, metallurgy, home care, cosmetics, paints, 
and textiles) allowed the firm to move into more sophisticated product lines. 
Nonetheless, the inputs required by these intermediate raw materials are ethylene oxide 
and ammonia, with the only suppliers and producers in Mexico being the La Cangrejera, 
Morelos and Cosoleacaque complexes. Despite product upgrading, Petroquímica Beta 
became even more transactionally dependent on PEMEX, as can be seen in Figure 8.1.  
In 2009 product portfolio expansion continued (product upgrading). It is acknowledged 
that the production of hydroxyethyl cellulose, an input that has specific applications in 
the cosmetic and home care industry, commenced in August 2009
88
. This made Beta the 
only firm in Latin America processing the compound. The raw material, cellulose, is 
imported from the United States, whereas ethylene oxide is provided by PEMEX-
Petrochemicals.  
Despite recent expansion, n-pentane and isopentane continue to be the most important 
Beta production lines. Contrary to what happened in the late 1990s, output is chiefly 
commercialised in the domestic market - only twenty percent is exported. PEMEX-
Petrochemicals is arguably the largest buyer since it needs isopentane to run the high 
and low density polyethylene plants at the Morelos complex. As can be observed, Beta 
is locked into captive forward and backward linkages with PEMEX-Petrochemicals and 
                                                 
88
 Data obtained from the company‟s website http://www.gpb.com.mx/main.html (March 12, 2010). 
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this represents a certain degree of risk for firm‟s operations. The fact that Beta relies on 
a single supplier (ethylene oxide) can be considered a disadvantage since PEMEX 
schedules temporary shutdowns of its plants for maintenance purposes, warning clients 
it will be unable to supply inputs for a given period of time. Problems arise when the 
maintenance periods are longer than estimated - a situation widely seen among user 
firms as recurrent - since this means Beta is unable to supply its own clients and this can 
lead to legal action.  
Figure 8.1 Backward and forward linkages of Petroquímica Beta  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Based on the author‟s database and the company website: 
http://www.gpb.com.mx/main.html (March 12, 2010). 
But not only maintenance tasks force PEMEX-Petrochemicals to interrupt supply. It is 
understood that the firm also suffers shortages of its own raw materials, resulting in 
limited availability of certain compounds. It is estimated, for example, that the level of 
production of ethylene oxide is unable to match domestic demand. Therefore, output 
expansion prospects for intermediate inputs at Beta and elsewhere are compromised.  
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To make matters worse, it is argued that the price at which PEMEX markets its 
hydrocarbon by-products is adjusted on a monthly basis. If the international price of 
natural gas or crude fluctuates, so does the price of inputs. For Beta, and any other 
private firm, this is a concern as it complicates earnings estimates, activity planning, 
product pricing, and other financial and operational parameters. Even though the 
transactional relationships between PEMEX-Petrochemicals and private firms are 
formalised through contracts, it is understood that the observance of these contracts is 
weak on the side of PEMEX-Petrochemicals. Furthermore, when a private firm turns 
out to be a PEMEX supplier, it is recognised that contracts also favour the state-owned 
entity. PEMEX-Petrochemicals allegedly demands from local private firms a flat price 
for the term of the contract. Clearly, this is a practice that both dramatically deteriorates 
the quality of inter-firm linkages in the locality and demonstrates that PEMEX-
Petrochemicals governs input transactions.  
Similarly, the role of Beta as supplier demonstrates an even more acute problem. As 
noticed lines above, it is a recurrent practice for PEMEX to carry out maintenance 
works on its plants and the H/L D polyethylene production line is no exception. When 
PEMEX announces that a plant, which partially runs on isopentane, is to cease 
production, Beta must also halt production. The firm is not in a position to continue 
operations as it lacks infrastructure for storage of its own output. If Beta wants its plant 
to keep running, the supply of isopentane to the Morelos complex must flow 
continuously. The captive nature of Beta as supplier is further emphasised by the status 
of PEMEX-Petrochemicals as the only producer of polyethylene in the country, 
meaning that the capabilities of Beta also contribute to strengthening the type of 
governance structure that characterises transactional linkages with PEMEX-
Petrochemicals. 
Industrias Derivadas del Etileno (IDESA) 
Grupo IDESA is a Mexican petrochemical company with production facilities in the 
states of Puebla and Tlaxcala, on the country‟s central plateau, and in the Veracruz 
cluster. The plants situated in the industrial corridor of the Morelos petrochemical 
complex are the most recent, where the production of glycols and amines commenced in 
1997 (Figure 8.2).  Like many of the other firms in the Veracruz cluster, it was critical 
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for IDESA to locate its plants in Coatzacoalcos for a number of reasons. In that respect 
the plant manager, Gilberto Godoy, stresses that: 
 ethylene oxide, the input needed for the manufacture of glycols, is produced 
 locally by PEMEX-Petrochemicals, and it is a compound extremely flammable 
 and explosive. Its transport entails a series of specifications that firms must 
 comply with. If IDESA were located elsewhere in Mexico, transport costs 
 would significantly increase the price of by-products and seriously hamper the 
 firm‟s competitiveness. As ethylene oxide is supplied through pipelines, we have 
 a great logistic advantage.   
Drawing on the plant manager comments, it is necessary to mention that the aim to 
supply ethylene oxide from the Morelos complex to IDESA through a pipeline was to 
reduce the risks the handling of ethylene oxide implies for the company and 
neighbouring urban centres. Other ethylene oxide buyers, such as Clariant and Oxiteno, 
are understood to have established facilities in the Veracruz cluster for the same 
reasons.   
With respect to the firm‟s production lines, the most important one is glycols, 
compounds used as industrial raw materials in the manufacture of a wide range of 
products
89
. The installed capacity of the plant is 200,000 tonnes per annum, although 
capacity utilisation is usually around 50 percent
90
, as discovered during fieldwork. The 
largest client of the firm in the locality is DAK Americas, the maker of polyethylene 
terephthalate in the city of Cosoleacaque. In fact, spatial proximity with respect to the 
buyer is considered to be another fundamental factor that prompted the setting up of 
IDESA back in 1997 – just a year after DAK Americas commenced operations. 
Returning to the discussion of IDESA production lines, the second most important 
production line is amines. Similar to glycols, amines are precursor compounds that have 
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 IDESA mainly produces three types of glycols. Monoethylene glycol is the main ingredient in 
automotive antifreeze and cooling systems. It is also used in the making of polyethylene terephthalate 
(PET), which is used in fibre, film, plastics and blow-moulded bottles (Burdick and Leffler 1990). It 
represents 90 percent of glycol output. The second most important glycol is diethylene glycol, which is 
mainly used in the making of unsaturated polyester resin. It accounts for 9 percent of output. Triethylene 
glycol is employed in the making of thermal, hydraulic and brake fluids (http://www.grupoidesa.com) 
Accessed on October 10, 2009.  
90
 As of April 2008.  
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a large number of applications
91
. The installed capacity of the plant is reported to stand 
at 45,000 tonnes per annum and the plant normally operates at 100 percent of capacity. 
Ammonia, the essential input, is processed at the Cosoleacaque petrochemical complex 
situated 30 km away in the neighbouring city of Minatitlán. In this particular case, 
inputs are transported in tankers from Cosoleacaque. This is to say that IDESA‟s degree 
of transactional dependence is illustrated by the fact that PEMEX-Petrochemicals is the 
sole supplier (and domestic producer) of ethylene oxide and ammonia. Figure 8.2 
exhibits that the captive character of IDESA as buyer is no different from that of many 
other private firms in the Veracruz cluster since IDESA relies heavily on input supply 
from PEMEX to maintain its plants working.  
Figure 8.2 IDESA linkages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
   
  Source: Based on the author‟s database.  
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 IDESA processes three types of amines. According to the company‟s website, monoethanolamine „is 
used in the manufacture of cosmetic intermediaries, lubricant additives, perforation additives, in the 
production of taurine, wood treatment, amongst other‟; diethanolamine „is used in the manufacture of 
insecticides and herbicides, surfactant agents, in the purification of natural gas as pH leveller‟; and 
triethanolamine „is used in construction as an additive, in the manufacture of cosmetic intermediaries, 
textile additive, surfactant agents, amongst other‟ ( http://www.grupoidesa.com). Access on October 10, 
2009.  
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At the other end of the spectrum, although IDESA‟s output tends to be primarily 
commercialised among private users, the firm also supplies PEMEX-Petrochemicals. 
But contrary to what Petroquímica BETA confronts in its relationship with PEMEX-
Petrochemicals, IDESA appears to have a „healthier‟ association with the state-owned 
company. The marketing of monoethanolamine, a compound that PEMEX uses in its 
natural gas plants, is far from being representative of IDESA‟s main line of business.  
Predictably, the problem arises when PEMEX is the supplier. Since IDESA began 
operations in Coatzacoalcos, output at Morelos has remained stagnant. In 1998 ethylene 
oxide output amounted to 324,000 tonnes, while a decade later the figure stood at 
344,000 tonnes (PEMEX 2009) - a rise of just 6 percent. During this period PEMEX 
upgraded its production capacity from 328,000 tonnes in 2004 to 400,000 tonnes per 
annum in 2006 (ANIQ 2008), but this has proved inadequate to cope with private sector 
demands. The IDESA glycol plant is a case in point as the only reason why this plant 
operates at 50 percent of installed capacity is the inability of the Morelos petrochemical 
complex to supply IDESA with sufficient ethylene oxide. In this context, a major 
concern for the firm is the consumption of energy, which is proportionate to the 
installed capacity of the plant. The cost of transforming ethylene oxide into glycols 
increases as capacity utilisation drops, thereby reducing IDESA‟s chances for 
expansion. While it may be assumed that importing this input could represent a solution, 
as mentioned earlier the handling of the compound is hazardous. Imports would imply 
sophisticated logistics for transporting the compound in specialised carriers, paying high 
rates of insurance, obtaining government permits, and arranging storage of the input, all 
of which make the international trade of ethylene oxide restrictive
92
. In the case of 
ethylene oxide, the captive nature of IDESA as buyer (and that of other buyers such as 
Beta, Oxiteno, and Clariant) is in some measure attributed to the hazardous nature of the 
input.  
The constraints PEMEX-Petrochemicals places on IDESA also include maintenance 
works conducted at the Morelos petrochemical complex which during such periods is 
unable to supply ethylene oxide. When this happens, IDESA is forced to shut down its 
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 U.S. imports and exports of ethylene oxide averaged less that $4 million and $8.5 million per annum 
from 2005 to 2009, respectively.  In the case of Mexico, the figure for imports stood at less than $1 
million per annum for the same period, whereas exports were practically non-existent, as reported by the 
United Nations Trade Commodity Statistics Database. This is an indication of the hazardous nature of the 
input.  
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glycols plant to carry out maintenance in line with PEMEX. Nonetheless, PEMEX 
frequently fails to complete works within the proposed schedule which reduces the 
supply of ethylene oxide for much longer periods and consequently affects IDESA‟s 
obligations with its clients. The plant manager puts it this way:  
The role of PEMEX as supplier is very complex [...]. When they shut down their 
own plants supply of ethylene oxide tends to be interrupted and that forces us to 
shut down plants as well. In theory we plan to shut down our plants every year 
for a period no longer than thirty days, but on some occasions we have had to do 
so for up to three months. [...] we always intend to adjust our operations to 
theirs, but if PEMEX fails to reinitiate production in time, so do we.  
Here, it is important to describe the situation that demonstrates the dominant role of 
PEMEX-Petrochemicals in the locality. Despite the possible interpretation of the 
interruption of supply as a breach of contract, rarely do affected firms take legal action 
against PEMEX-Petrochemicals since it would take years for the dispute to be settled, 
and more importantly, it would further deteriorate transactional relationships. While 
PEMEX argues the situation is the result of technical problems, IDESA is in a different 
position as it may face sanctions if it fails to comply with contractual obligations. The 
unreliability of PEMEX as supplier therefore forces IDESA to devote some of its 
resources to devising plans to maintain stocks and invest in storage facilities so that 
even when the plant is not running IDESA can maintain the supply of glycols to users. 
All in all, the point to consider is that private firms operate on an uneven playing field 
with regard to compliance with the regulatory framework, which compromises the 
prospects for upgrading and performance.  
A REVIEW OF THE FERTILISER INDUSTRY IN THE LOCALITY 
If the liberalisation of the Mexican economy is thought to have delivered mixed 
economic results, the fertiliser industry could be considered to epitomise the most 
disturbing face of this liberalisation. In the Veracruz petrochemical cluster two 
companies merit special attention in this regard: Soluciones Químicas para el Campo y 
la Industria (SQCI) and Agromex. These are former state-owned firms dedicated to the 
production of nitrogen fertilisers and whose fate has been determined by the 
implementation of market orientated policies over the course of the last two decades. 
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Unlike Fefermex and Agrofermex, local firms that also produce fertilisers but have 
managed to complement their input supply matrix with imports and secure markets for 
their products, SQCI and Agromex are not in the same position. The firms rely heavily 
on industrial raw materials provided by PEMEX-Petrochemicals and serve a chain in 
which imports are their main competition. The conjunction of these two factors has 
exerted a major impact on the fertiliser sector in the country, and particularly on SQCI 
and Agromex. 
In order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the sector‟s problems, at this 
point it is necessary to move beyond the regional context. The uncertainty resulting 
from policies for the pricing of natural gas on the domestic market and trends in the 
international price for fertilisers have seriously affected local players with SQCI and 
Agromex having little power to deal with the repercussions. Since the end of the 1990s 
these factors have effectively determined whether firms can continue operations or must 
close down. A succinct analysis of the firms‟ trajectories helps to demonstrate both the 
implications economic liberalisation policies have had at the local level and the 
vulnerability of local firms relying on a single input supplier.  
A brief historical context 
Although the genesis of the fertiliser industry is rooted in the constitution of Guanos y 
Fertilizantes de México, a government-owned company that emerged in 1943, the sector 
really came into its own over the course of the following decades with the participation 
of private investors. The setting up of Fertilizantes Monclova in 1956, Fertilizantes del 
Istmo in 1960, and Fertilizantes del Bajío in 1963 facilitated the distribution of 
fertilisers to distant agricultural regions since these companies established facilities in 
the north, east and south of the country. Despite the participation of private capital in 
the sector, Gustavo Díaz Ordaz, Mexico‟s President from 1966 to 1972, nationalised the 
existing firms to form Fertilizantes Mexicanos (Fertimex) in line with the government 
strategy of playing a greater role in economic matters (Clouthier 1983).  
Fertimex was intended to encourage the production, distribution and supply of fertilisers 
to agricultural producers and the newly created firm built facilities throughout the 
country. As far as the Veracruz cluster is concerned, the current plants of SQCI (1964) 
and Agronitrogenados (1982) initially operated under the ownership of Fertimex. At the 
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time the plants were established, location was determined by access to raw materials 
supplied by PEMEX. In 1991, in accordance with the privatisation program undertaken 
by the government, Fertimex subsidiaries were handed over to private capital. The site 
at Minatitlán was acquired by SQCI, whereas Grupo Acerero del Norte, the largest steel 
maker in Mexico, bought the plant in Coatzacoalcos (Agromex).    
Soluciones Químicas para el Campo y la Industria (SQCI) 
Soluciones Químicas para el Campo y la Industria (SQCI) is a Mexican firm in the 
municipality of Minatitlán that produces nitrogen-based compounds such as urea, 
ammonium nitrate and nitric acid
93. The company‟s most important product is urea; a 
compound used either as fertiliser in its own right or as an ingredient for multi-
component fertilisers. The required inputs feeding SQCI production lines are ammonia 
and carbon dioxide, both supplied by the petrochemical complex of Cosoleacaque; and 
sulphuric acid, a feedstock produced by Agrogen, a firm located in the state of 
Querétaro, in Mexico‟s central region.  
Figure 8.3 SQCI backward and forward linkages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
 
 
  Source: Based on the author‟s database.  
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 The installed capacity is 270,000 tonnes per annum in the case of the urea plant; 110,000 for the 
production of nitric acid; and 140,000 for the production of ammonium nitrate.  
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SQCI (Figure 8.3) is embedded in a chain whose precursor is the natural gas provided 
by PEMEX-Gas. The fortunes of the firm are therefore vulnerable to variations in the 
price of this commodity. Back in the mid 1990s, shortly after the government privatised 
Fertimex plants, the price of ammonia skyrocketed. As the government tied the 
domestic price of natural gas to prices on the southern coast of the United States - 
among the highest in the world at that point of time - the production costs of a wide 
range of by-products mirrored this trend. Ammonia, the most important input for the 
making of fertilisers, deserves special attention. The price of ammonia peaked in 1996 
when it recorded a 67 percent increase in comparison with a year earlier (Figure 8.4), 
according to PEMEX (2003, 2009). This surge led to the shutting down of both 
ammonia plants at the petrochemical complex of Cosoleacaque and most existing 
fertiliser plants in Mexico over the course of the following years. Even though the price 
of ammonia followed a downward trend in subsequent years, it still made the production 
of fertilisers economically unviable. As a result of this policy, the business environment 
for the fertiliser industry dramatically deteriorated, turning Mexico into a net importer 
of fertilisers.  
Figure 8.4  Ammonia price index 
 
Source: PEMEX (2003, 2009).  
Note: Based on prices at the Cosoleacaque petrochemical complex in Mexican pesos. 
This panorama was largely feared by the private sector despite the government‟s 
argument that its decision would result in a more competitive industry when fertiliser 
plants were privatised in the early 1990s. The claim at that time was that further 
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fertiliser value chain the spinoff of state-owned ammonia plants was necessary. The 
administration of Carlos Salinas, Mexico‟s President at the time rejected the proposal. 
Nevertheless, the scenario described above is not sufficient to demonstrate the debacle 
of the fertiliser industry in Mexico since factors such as the structure of the domestic 
natural gas market and the type of policies rich natural gas countries put into practice 
must also be taken into account. Regarding the first factor, it is more profitable for the 
government, which relies heavily on hydrocarbon revenues, to tie the domestic price of 
natural gas to that in the United States. In that manner the government can capture a 
much larger rent, as described by Juan Jose Pestaña Mendoza, the plant manager: 
 It is alleged that the cost for PEMEX to produce gas is probably in the range of 
 $2-3 per million BTU. Reasonable profits would set the price of natural gas 30 
 percent higher than its production cost, but the structure of the market allows 
 Mexican policy makers to set a much higher price in line with those in the U.S. - 
 3 or 4 times the production cost for PEMEX.  
At the other end of the spectrum the dilemma is also linked to strategies introduced by 
other natural gas producing countries, of which Russia is a case in point. Russian 
authorities sought to stimulate their economy through increasing output of hydrocarbon 
resources. In the mid 1990s, when the price of natural gas stood at approximately $9-10 
per million BTU in North America, the price in Russia was estimated to be as low as $1. 
Even though prices in Russia have soared since then, it is understood that the gap 
continues to be considerable. In the light of these arguments, the question that arises is 
as to what determines prices in different regions and it is argued the difference might be 
based not only on supply (the extent of gas reserves and output)
94
 and demand, but also 
on the particular role the economic structure of each country plays in setting prices. In 
the case of Mexico, pricing policy instruments follow the guidelines of an economy 
integrated with that of the United States. Russia, on the other hand, decided to expand 
its economy by establishing a highly competitive natural gas price and developing 
existing fields – policies aimed at fostering the growth of associated industrial sectors. 
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 As the world‟s largest exporter of natural gas, Russia has some ability to dictate prices. Europe, and 
more specifically former Soviet states, is heavily dependent on the supply of Russian gas (Gelb 2007, 
January 5).  
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As a result, Russia‟s natural gas output has climbed during this period and the country 
has become a major player in the fertiliser industry
95
.  
Although the problems of the sector merit a more detailed debate, it is evident that 
critical components of the aggregate context have marked the development of the 
fertiliser industry in Mexico. In respect to that issue, Pestaña Mendoza explained how 
domestic production costs and falling international prices have played a central:   
 Let‟s infer that the difference between international prices and domestic 
 production costs of urea ranges from $60 to $80, which happens to be the firm‟s 
 profit per ton. Now let‟s say that the domestic production cost of urea is $100, 
 while imports from Russia are priced at $200. That means the domestic price 
 should range from $110 to $200. If the price of the national urea is higher, it 
 would not be competitive against the Russian urea. If the international price is 
 more competitive that the one we can offer so it is not convenient for us to 
 produce. If the price we have is $100 and international prices are close or lower 
 than that, domestic users would not buy urea from us – and that is what has been 
 occurring for the last fifteen years as raw material [ammonia] prices have 
 increased and urea international prices have fallen sharply.  
Turning now to the discussion on SCQI, past incidents involving the firm clearly 
illustrates what the sector has had to confront. Following the rise in the price of raw 
materials, the company was forced to cease operations in 1997 and 1998 since the 
production of fertilisers was no longer profitable. As a result the financial standing of 
SCQI deteriorated and it was unable to pay the salaries of workers, who in response 
went on strike for a period of three years. After negotiations with the union, the strike 
was called off in 2001 and SQCI re-commenced operations the following year with the 
intention of capitalising on falling ammonia prices. SQCI resumed production for a 
period of just five months as the three plants were once again closed down in August 
2002 when the price of ammonia once again began to surge. Most workers decided to 
abandon the firm at this point. However, three years later the situation had improved 
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 The information provided by the interviewee regarding prices of natural gas in North America and 
Russia and production costs in Mexico may not be accurate, but it does reflect the conditions leading to 
the shutting down of fertiliser plants in Mexico.   
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slightly and in 2005 SQCI was able to re-start production at its nitric acid
96
 and 
ammonium acid plants, although both operated at 30 percent of capacity until 2006. In 
2007 the price of nitrogen-based fertilisers increased, prompting SQCI to re-commence 
production of urea in April of that year. By the end of 2007 the overall output of the 
company reached 153,000 tonnes with urea representing more than half of that figure. 
For the twelve months to May 2008, the three SQCI plants were reported to be working 
at 90-93 percent of installed capacity. This suddenly favourable business climate can be 
attributed to a number of factors. Not only did the price of fertilisers in Mexico double 
in comparison to a year earlier, the price of urea produced in natural gas rich countries 
also began to rise from the end of 2006 making imports from Russia and other countries 
less attractive. As late as May 2008 SQCI was the only urea producer in the country.  
In short, the latter scenario demonstrates that national and supranational determinants 
significantly influence both the co-ordination of transactional relationships between 
Cosoleacaque and SQCI and the overall performance of firms.  
At the local level, SQCI also faces challenges. With regard to ammonia, the most 
important input, the Cosoleacaque petrochemical complex is the sole supplier in the 
country and this restriction places SQCI in a very vulnerable position since it relies 
exclusively on PEMEX for its supply. While Cosoleacaque has never reported a 
shortage of ammonia, such transactional dependence does raise concerns since the 
supply may be interrupted if PEMEX shuts down ammonia plants for maintenance, 
something it does at short notice. However, when PEMEX is carrying out maintenance 
works on one plant, it does keep another running. Cosoleacaque also has tanks for 
storing input, guaranteeing the supply for several days and ensuring the supply of 
ammonia is not interrupted. Nevertheless, the widespread belief that PEMEX is an 
erratic supplier is viewed as a factor that weakens trust between firms.  
With respect to certain capabilities of SQCI, it is worth pointing out that the firm lacks 
infrastructure for the storage of inputs. Since the supplier and buyer are situated in close 
proximity it was considered from the very beginning that the optimal means for 
transporting ammonia was through a pipeline and it is reported that SQCI plants run on 
the daily supply from Cosoleacaque. In the case of a more serious contingency in which 
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 Nitric acid itself is both an input for the making of ammonium nitrate and/or a final product. 
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PEMEX is unable to produce ammonia and/or carbon dioxide, although this has not 
been the case, SQCI would have no option but to bring production to a standstill. The 
fact that SQCI is unable to store ammonia appears to be a stumbling block for if the 
firm decided to import ammonia this would involve highly structured logistics that 
SQCI has not undertaken in the past. It would imply storing ammonia at the port of 
Coatzacoalcos, situated 27 km from the plant, and devising a consumption schedule for 
its daily requirements. In so doing, the firm would incur additional operating costs that 
would further hamper its competitive standing. In the end, it appears that SQCI has no 
other alternative but to remain dependent on the supply of ammonia from PEMEX-
Petrochemicals.  
As one can observe, SQCI‟s degree of transactional dependence is not only associated 
with its capabilities, but also with the policy setting that has marked the development of 
state-owned firms in recent years. Despite the opening of the sector in the 1990s, 
PEMEX continues to be the only producer (and supplier) of ammonia on the domestic 
market. The fate of SQCI is another example of the captive relationships prevailing in 
the Veracruz cluster.  
Agromex 
In a context of market orientated policies, if one is to mention the hardest hit firm in the 
Veracruz cluster, Agromex would be a sound candidate for top spot. The company, 
which commenced operations in 1982 under the control of Fertimex, endured the 
implications of a deteriorating business environment that led to the cessation of 
production in 1998. Before that, nitrogen fertilisers such as urea and ammonium nitrate 
were the main production lines.  
Of all the private firms in the Veracruz cluster, Agromex arguably has the most strategic 
positioning. It is not only situated at the heart of the industrial corridor of the Pajaritos 
petrochemical complex in Coatzacoalcos, it is also on the banks of the Pajaritos lagoon 
which affords it access to the Gulf of Mexico. At the time of its conception in the early 
1980s, two factors determined the location of the firm. As output was expected to stand 
at more than a million tonnes of fertilisers per annum
97
, the government estimated that 
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 There are 2 urea plants with a production capacity of 450,000 tonnes per annum each. The ammonium 
nitrate plant can yield 270,000 tonnes per annum. 
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much of it would be consumed in the distant north-eastern and north-western regions of 
the country, where the most productive agricultural regions are situated. The 
construction of a pier at the lagoon greatly facilitated the marketing of production. 
Furthermore, it is widely acknowledged that the supply of natural gas was plentiful at 
that time - a factor that stimulated the expansion of associated industrial sectors in the 
locality and elsewhere. These two factors were of great importance for the building of 
world class urea plants in the municipality of Coatzacoalcos.  
Agromex remained under state ownership until 1992 when Grupo Acerero del Norte 
(GAN), a steel maker with headquarters in the northern state of Coahuila, acquired the 
firm. Under the new administration, output peaked at 1.08 million tonnes of urea in 
1996. In terms of employment, large numbers of temporal workers had to be hired at 
times of high production with the figure reportedly climbing from 650 full time workers 
to almost 1,200. Nonetheless, as noted in the last subsection, the sector deteriorated 
rapidly the following year and Agromex failed to operate for much of 1997. Something 
similar occurred in 1998 when output dropped to 750 thousand tonnes and in 1999 
fertiliser plants were in production for only six months due to a combination of events. 
At the national level, for example, the government introduced policies that proved 
counterproductive for the sector by referencing the price of natural gas to that in the 
United States. At one point the price of natural gas is reported to have stood at $2 but it 
soon climbed to $4-5 and then to $10 per million BTU. The price of ammonia, the main 
input used by Agromex, mirrored this trend. On the other hand, policy makers also 
encouraged the use of natural gas in electricity generation, a move in line with the 
environmental provisions of NAFTA, thereby reducing the supply to petrochemical 
plants (Chapter 7). At the international level, the prices of nitrogen fertilisers from 
countries of the former Soviet bloc were competitive and distributers were keener on 
importing urea from Russia and satellite countries than buying it from domestic 
producers such as Agromex. These factors prompted calls for the introduction of a tariff 
barrier, but the government argued such a move would further increase the price of 
agricultural inputs for farmers.  
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This combination of factors is summarised by Rigoberto Robles Cabrera, the operations 
manager of the firm, who contended that: 
There was a time in which one could find fertilisers at very competitive prices 
abroad, while the domestic price of gas was sky high. [...] it was very expensive 
for us to produce fertilisers and very cheap to import from countries such as 
Russia and Ukraine. That is why the domestic market became flooded with 
imports and we were put out of business. We could not compete [...]. 
In the wake of these events, Agromex was compelled to bring its production to a halt in 
1999 - a scenario that worsened its financial standing. In the end, as the company could 
not afford to pay the salaries of its 650 unionised workers, a strike broke out soon 
afterwards. Despite the closing down of production facilities, Agromex was in a 
position to generate revenues. In 1992 the parent company, Grupo Acerero del Norte, 
also acquired the rights to use a dock by the Pajaritos lagoon. As the rest of the urea 
plants in the country faced the same situation, imports increased. Paradoxically, this 
dock was then placed at the service of companies buying fertilisers from abroad - the 
former clients of Agromex. In this way the firm managed to meet its payroll obligations. 
However, as things did not improve over the course of subsequent years the plants have 
remained closed and the main source of income for Agromex continued to be the dock. 
The offloading and loading of ships along with product storage services became the 
firm‟s core business. As a result of this panorama hundreds of workers had to be laid 
off. In February 2008, Agromex was reported to have 130 unionised and 20 non-
unionised workers.  
In the Veracruz cluster, Agromex is not the only firm with facilities for the production 
of nitrogen fertilisers as SQCI runs a much smaller urea plant in the neighbouring city 
of Minatitlán, as mentioned earlier. It is worth mentioning that even though both firms 
faced the same challenges after the liberalisation of natural gas prices in 1996, SQCI 
managed to re-initiate operations in 2007 due to higher prices for urea and a less 
competitive price for natural gas in rich producing countries. While it was believed 
possible for Agromex to start producing urea again since the size of its plants and the 
infrastructure available would lead to greater efficiency. But the plants have remained 
idle for a decade. The cost of repairing damage to plants is what may prevent Grupo 
Acerero del Norte from re-initiating production. Despite claims in early 2010 by a 
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prominent figure of the union
98
 that represents local private petrochemical firms to the 
effect that Agromex may re-initiate operations after an investment of $35 million 
(Chinas Cordova 2010), this investment did not materialise in the end. Agromex is 
arguably the most illustrative example of the extent to which determinants external to 
the locality can influence the performance of firms.  
VERTICAL INTEGRATION AMONG PRIVATE FIRMS  
In general terms, the role of public petrochemical complexes is to supply basic inputs to 
private firms in the region, which at the same time process them into intermediate 
compounds. These intermediate compounds are used by other firms, mainly situated 
close to large consumer centres, for the manufacture of final goods. The intermediate 
phase of the process of transforming basic petrochemicals into tangible goods may 
involve more than one link, or firm. This form of industrial organisation is present in the 
Veracruz cluster as Tereftalatos and DAK Americas are petrochemical firms that have 
merged with the intention of taking a long-standing strategic alliance to the next level. 
Agrofermex and Fefermex, both fertiliser firms, have taken a similar path.  
Tereftalatos Mexicanos and DAK Americas 
Like many of the other private firms situated in the Veracruz cluster, Tereftalatos 
Mexicanos (Temex) and Eastman Química (currently DAK Americas) were conceived 
with the intention of further processing industrial raw materials produced by the 
petrochemical division of PEMEX
99
 in the locality and taking advantage of other local 
externalities. The fact that the La Cangrejera petrochemical complex produced the 
inputs demanded by the two companies determined their location in the municipality of 
Cosoleacaque. It is widely recognised that the production processes of Temex and DAK 
Americas are strongly linked to one another with Temex dedicated to the manufacture 
of terephthalic acid (TPA), the input required by DAK Americas to produce 
polyethylene terephthalate
100
 (PET) – a compound extensively used in the bottling and 
textiles industries. A diagram of where both firms are located along the value chain 
would show Temex as the second link and DAK Americas as the third -  with the La 
                                                 
98
 Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Industria Química y Petroquímica, Carboquímica, Similares y Conexos 
de la República Mexicana. 
99
 In the following sections, I will use the terms PEMEX and PEMEX-Petrochemicals interchangeably.  
100
 Commonly known as polyester fibre or Dacron (Burdick and Leffler 1990) 
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Cangrejera complex first (Figure 8.5). This prompted Alpek, the parent company that 
controls Temex, to acquire Eastman Química. Although such vertical integration 
(functional upgrading)
101
 benefitted both companies in terms of technical co-operation 
and simplified management practices, there is an issue that jeopardises the running of 
plants for, to varying degrees, PEMEX-Petrochemicals is an important provider of 
inputs for Temex and DAK Americas.  
As PEMEX-Petrochemicals is a fundamental component in the history and operations 
of both firms, it is therefore necessary to consider the circumstances in which Temex 
and Eastman Química were formed and the way PEMEX-Petrochemicals has been 
linked to them since their inception. Temex, for example, began operations in 1978 – a 
time when the government sought to encourage the industrialisation of hydrocarbons. In 
the case of DAK Americas, the establishment of its PET plant in 1996 was the result of 
a business opportunity arising from the processing of TPA by Temex.  
In a more specific account, the setting up of Temex is associated with the projected 
construction of paraxylene plants at the Cosoleacaque and La Cangrejera complexes in 
the 1970s. It is important to point out that paraxylene is an essential input in the 
manufacturing process of TPA. During this period, as the government sought to 
stimulate expansion of the industrial base associated with the production of paraxylene, 
the construction of a PTA plant appeared to be an appealing development. The 
government crafted a scheme of tax incentives with the aim of drawing the interest of 
potential investors. Nacional Financiera, a Mexican development bank, and Somex, a 
state-run Mexican conglomerate at that time, teamed up with Celanese, a Dallas-based 
chemical firm, the International Finance Corporation of the World Bank and British 
Petroleum to create Tereftalatos Mexicanos
102
 - a firm that would use paraxylene in its 
production process. The capital constituting Temex was both public and private and 
despite government participation the company was managed as a private entity – a 
condition that private investors demanded in order to make the venture possible.  
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 In the case of the Veracruz cluster, I use the term functional upgrading to refer to the ability of firms to 
integrate vertically, which implies the production of more downstream intermediate inputs (Figure 2.3). 
The GVC literature, on the other hand, uses the same concept when firms acquire new functions in the 
chain such as design and marketing. This also indicates vertical integration.  
102
 Nacional Financiera held 23 percent of the company‟s shares, Somex 28 percent, Celanese 24 percent, 
the World Bank 16 percent and British Petroleum 9 percent, according to fieldwork findings.  
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In its early stages the firm faced difficulties concerning input supply as the construction 
program of PEMEX paraxylene plants was way behind schedule. Regardless of the fact 
these plants were planned to commence production in 1975, production did not begin 
until 1982 - four years after the launch of Temex. Meanwhile, the company had no 
alternative but to run on imported inputs.  
In 1988 Temex was acquired
103
 by Grupo Alfa, one of the largest conglomerates in 
Mexico. During the first half of the 1980s, Grupo Alfa faced trying times as a result of 
the deterioration of the economic climate in the country (Chapter 6). After undergoing a 
restructuring process, it reorganised its investment portfolio into four business groups, 
leading to the creation of its petrochemical arm: ALPEK
104
 - the subsidiary that controls 
Temex.  
As to DAK Americas, the firm is situated down the value chain as it turns Temex TPA 
into PET. It commenced operations in 1996 under foreign ownership. Eastman 
Chemical Company (ECC), a Tennessee-headquartered firm, sought to expand its 
business portfolio in Mexico given the favourable conditions. In the 1990s the 
conglomerate saw an opportunity for the production of PET - a compound used in the 
bottling of soft drinks. At that time, it is estimated that the consumption of soft drinks in 
Mexico was growing at a rate of 12-15 percent per annum – a figure that made the 
sector attractive. Furthermore, what also favoured ECC was the fact that the bottling 
sector in Mexico was increasingly shifting from the use of glass to PET. These were 
without a doubt the drivers that ECC took into consideration for the establishment of the 
PET plant.  
The other important issue to solve was location and ECC considered two sites: 
Altamira, a petrochemical enclave close to the United States border, and Cosoleacaque 
in the state of Veracruz. The decision was made on the grounds of technical services 
and input supply. Given that ECC wanted to focus on the production of PET, it was 
important to have access to a series of technical services for the running of the facilities. 
Temex was in a position to offer such services and a strategic alliance between the two 
companies was established as a result.  
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 Of all the previous holders, British Petroleum was the only one that decided to keep its share.  
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 This information on Grupo Alfa was obtained from its website: 
http://www.alfa.com.mx/ingles/qsomos/hist_1998.htm (Accessed on 12 May 2010).  
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Figure 8.5 The integration of Tereftalatos and DAK Americas 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
  Source: Based on the author‟s database.   
On the supply side, the making of PET requires not only TPA, but also ethylene glycol. 
Alpek, the parent company of Temex, planned to install another TPA plant in Altamira, 
but the locality lacked ethylene glycol whereas in the Veracruz cluster the Cangrejera 
petrochemical complex and Industrias Derivadas del Etileno (IDESA), a private firm, 
could supply this compound. The availability of inputs proved to be a driver in the 
decision of ECC and the plant was installed in the municipality of Cosoleacaque - 
situated a stone's throw away from the Temex TPA plant and 35km from ethylene 
glycol suppliers. 
Since its conception in 1996, Eastman Química established a sound association with 
Temex and this laid the foundations for further integration. In the years to come, Grupo 
Alfa, the controlling conglomerate of Alpek, benefitted from a period of favourable 
economic conditions and it sought to strengthen its business segments through 
acquisitions. In 2007, as Alpek pushed for a functional upgrading of its operations, the 
petrochemical arm of Grupo Alfa acquired Eastman Química and the name of the 
company was changed to DAK Americas. While the acquisition created synergies for 
both firms, certain supply challenges persisted as the configuration of the input supply 
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matrix of both DAK Americas
105
 and Temex is somewhat different. The former firm has 
outlined a strategy favouring the participation of private firms as main providers: Temex 
itself, which provides TPA, and IDESA, a firm located in the neighbouring municipality 
of Coatzacoalcos that supplies ethylene glycol. Although PEMEX-Petrochemicals also 
produces ethylene glycol, DAK Americas has sought to reduce its exposure to the risks 
of having the state-owned firm as a partner. IDESA is therefore the main supplier of that 
particular input. With respect to suppliers, Rubén Muñoz Méndez, plant manager at 
DAK Americas, believes that „the mechanisms governing its relationship with private 
firms are arguably more trustworthy than those with PEMEX-Petrochemicals‟.  
With regard to the issue of the Temex supply matrix, the firm faces a more complicated 
setting and the availability of paraxylene in the locality is a major concern. The 
paraxylene installed capacity at the Cangrejera petrochemical complex is reported by 
the National Association of the Chemical Industry (ANIQ 2008) to stand at 240 
thousand tonnes per annum. However, despite the existence of a domestic market that 
demands paraxylene, output plummeted between 2005 and 2008. PEMEX (2010a) 
indicates that La Cangrejera yielded 220 thousand tonnes in 2005, but by 2008 output 
had dropped to 112 thousand tonnes
106
 – a quantity dwarfed by the needs of Temex. If 
the TPA plant, which can yield 600 thousand tonnes per year, operates at full capacity, 
paraxylene consumption is estimated to reach 400 thousand tonnes annually. 
Considering its 2008 output, PEMEX would only be able to supply about 25 percent of 
what Temex consumes. At that time, the extent of Temex transactional dependence on 
La Cangrejera is illustrated by the fact that this state-owned firm was the only domestic 
paraxylene producer – a factor that forced Temex to import 75 percent of its 
requirements. It is estimated that Alpek alone, which also has another TPA plant in 
Altamira, imported over 800 thousand tonnes of paraxylene in 2007. That figure 
represented more than seven times the output La Cangrejera complex yielded in 2008.   
While the aforementioned facts reveal that PEMEX-Petrochemicals is far from being 
the supplier that firms expect, Temex and DAK Americas have to some extent 
weathered the storm. Both firms keep their plants running through schemes that secure 
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 According to the interviewee, the installed capacity of DAK Americas for the production of PET is 
150,000 tonnes a year, marketing 80 percent of the output domestically and 20 percent abroad.  
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 As of 2009, it is reported that PEMEX-Petrochemicals ceased production of paraxylene (PEMEX 
2010a).  
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the provision of inputs, but this comes at a cost. The fact that La Cangrejera is not in a 
position to cope with Temex demand has repercussions elsewhere as paraxylene imports 
are skyrocketing. It can be observed in Figure 8.6 that imports climbed from $489 
million in 2005 to $945 million in 2009 - a rise of 93 percent over a period of four 
years. Throughout that period, U.S.-based firms provided 96 percent of Mexico‟s 
paraxylene requirements. If the import figure mentioned above is accurate, ALPEK is 
arguably the only importer of paraxylene in Mexico.   
Figure 8.6 Paraxylene Imports, 2005-2009 ($) 
 
World USA 
Overall volume 
(tonnes) 
2005 489,051,412 489,051,364 646,972 
2006 674,830,776 660,871,785 892,742 
2007 891,048,774 820,993,968 820,141 
2008 906,498,482 806,090,875 796,943 
2009 945,413,786 945,412,512 773,962 
 
Source: United Nations Commodity Trade Statistical Database. 
The latter scenario corresponds to fieldwork conducted in 2008. Information for 2009 
indicates that PEMEX has ceased production of paraxylene at the La Cangrejera 
complex and it can be therefore concluded that ALPEK sources almost all its 
paraxylene needs in the United States. While it is unclear why this production line was 
shut down, previous experience would indicate that government officials may have 
claimed process technology was obsolete, as Rey Romay has argued (1996). The point 
to consider here is that the role of PEMEX-Petrochemicals fails to encourage the 
performance of buyer firms and for Temex and many other companies in the Veracruz 
cluster, a more reliable supply of inputs from state-owned firms would be a form of 
upgrading in itself.  
The import of paraxylene from the U.S. implies another set of circumstances worth 
describing that serves to contextualise the diminished competitiveness of PEMEX-
Petrochemicals. Adolfo Pérez Vidal, plant manager at Temex, depicted this issue in a 
revealing manner: 
 [...] paraxylene is obtained from the processing of aromatics, which is a group of 
 crude-derived basic petrochemical products. In the United States, aromatics 
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 replaced the use of methyl tert-butyl ether to increase the octane of petrol, and 
 this resulted in a limited supply of derived compounds, including paraxylene 
 [...]. The price of paraxylene skyrocketed as it was linked to that of petrol. [...] 
 but Temex continues to import paraxylene from the United States as the final 
 price per tonne decreases in line with a discount scheme set by suppliers, and 
 Temex benefits from it since it is able to acquire large volumes [over 800 
 thousand tonnes in 2007].  
And that is one of the advantages that the company is offered abroad. At home, the 
picture is rather different. While PEMEX-Petrochemicals production facilities are 
situated within 35 km of the Temex TPA plant, the state-owned firm is unable to set a 
competitive price for paraxylene per tonne for instance the local supply is allegedly 
more expensive than inputs from the United States.  
Notwithstanding the latter scenario, and given the empirical evidence collected during 
fieldwork, it is believed that Temex would continue to source inputs in the locality if 
PEMEX had not ceased production of paraxylene. It is evident that spatial proximity is 
also a determinant that strengths the captive nature of transactional relationships in the 
Veracruz cluster. 
Fefermex and Agrofermex 
Another example of how private firms in the Veracruz cluster vertically integrate 
operations is that of Fefermex and Agrofermex - sister firms whose production 
processes in some measure associated with one another. But before embarking on this 
analysis it is necessary to address the fact that Fefermex is a much larger company than 
Agrofermex in terms of installed capacity and production lines. Fefermex is constituted 
by facilities for the production of petrochemical inputs such as sulphuric acid, methyl 
methacrylate monomer (MMM), and acetone phenol. Sulphuric acid is the product 
linking both firms, as shown in Figure 8.7. This compound, along with ammonia 
supplied by the Cosoleacaque complex, is what Agrofermex uses in the making of 
ammonium sulphate
107
 - the firm‟s only production line. This suggests that the extent of 
integration between the two companies is not as wide-ranging as that of Temex and 
DAK Americas.  
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 Ammonium sulphate is a final product used as fertiliser.  
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As with most of the firms in the Veracruz cluster, what led to the establishment of 
Fefermex in 1975 and Agrofermex in 1963 in the municipality of Cosoleacaque was the 
opportunity presented by the processing of raw materials by PEMEX. Both firms 
depend heavily on input supply from the state-owned company, although this is even 
more pronounced in the case of Fefermex as its three production lines are linked to 
PEMEX-Petrochemicals (Figure 8.7). It is this transactional dependency that has 
disrupted the firm‟s operations from the start since PEMEX has proved to be an 
unpredictable supplier. Much of the discussion in this subsection is in fact dedicated to 
putting this situation into context and a brief review of past incidents will to a great 
extent help describe the circumstances that led to the merging of these firms. 
Figure 8.7 The structure of Fefermex and Agrofermex 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Based on the author‟s database.   
Fefermex is a petrochemical company that began operations in 2004, although the 
origins of the existing infrastructure can be traced back to 1975 when Fenoquimia, the 
previous owner of the complex, first established facilities to produce acetone
108
 phenol. 
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In 1976 the firm expanded its capacity with the construction of the methyl methacrylate 
monomer plant
109
 (MMM) and the sulphuric acid and acetone cyanohydrin plants. 
These two plants were originally established to feed the production of MMM, although 
sulphuric acid is also used in the making of ammonium sulphate at Agrofermex (Figure 
8.7). 
The reason why Resistol and Celanese, the early parent companies of Fenoquimia, 
decided to establish the firm in the locality was the fact that certain inputs were being 
produced at the Cosoleacaque petrochemical. Cinta Céspedes, director of the 
petrochemical division of Fefermex, explained that:  
During these years PEMEX operated a plant for the production of acrylic nitrile, 
a by-product of which is hydrocyanic acid, the input required to run the acetone 
cyanohydrin plant. It therefore made sense for the controlling companies to 
establish Fenoquimia close to the Cosoleacaque complex [located less than 10 
km from Fenoquimia].  
However, things took a turn for the worst. Resistol and Celanese could not anticipate 
that the situation would deteriorate shortly after this, in 1980, when PEMEX decided to 
shut down the acrylonitrile plant at the Cosoleacaque complex. Cinta Céspedes recalled 
that:  
 Fenoquimia had no option but to re-allocate the production of acetone 
 cyanohydrin and since PEMEX owned another acrylonitrile plant at its Tula 
 Refinery [a site situated over 500km away from Fenoquimia in the country‟s 
 highlands] Fenoquimia built another acetone cyanohydrin plant adjacent to the 
 Tula refinery, closing down the one in the Veracruz cluster.  
Once the problem of producing acetone cyanohydrin was solved, the MMM plant 
continued to operate normally until 2002 when Fenoquimia found itself in a very 
complicated situation once again when PEMEX, the only domestic producer of 
acrylonitrile, decided to shut down its Tula plant. In the wake of this unfortunate series 
of events, the firm had no alternative than to close down its acetone cyanohydrin plant. 
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 MMM is the input used in the production of acrylic sheet.  
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From that moment on the company had to devise a scheme for importing input in order 
to keep the MMM plant operating. The strategy it devised proved successful until 2004.  
In the case of the acetone phenol plant, the story is basically the same. The plant entered 
into operation in 1975 and ran on imported input. By the early 1980s it is reported that 
PEMEX-Petrochemicals commenced production of cumene
110
 at the Cangrejera 
petrochemical complex situated in the municipality of Coatzacoalcos, but the capacity 
of the plant was dwarfed by the requirements of Fenoquimia. The acetone phenol plant 
then relied on supply from PEMEX-Petrochemicals and imports until 1998 when 
PEMEX argued that the scale of the cumene plant and the obsolete technology made 
production unviable and the plant was closed down. As a result, Fenoquimia had to 
continue managing its acetone phenol plant with imported cumene, a strategy that 
eventually weakened the standing of the firm since it entailed additional logistical costs.  
Furthermore, it is widely acknowledged the cycle of the petrochemical industry 
deteriorated during the early years of the past decade since high prices for raw materials 
accompanied a period of low prices for intermediate products. This gloomy picture is 
what forced Fenoquimia to eventually announce the temporary closure of its acetone 
phenol plant in 2002.  
To make matters worse, around that time the company faced accusations of breach of 
contract in connection with the MMM plant. In that respect Cinta Céspedes summed up 
how events unfolded: 
The dispute was settled in court and the verdict was adverse for Fenoquimia 
with the payment of damages representing a substantial drain on the company‟s 
resources, prompting shareholders to re-evaluate their investment portfolio. [...] 
petrochemical assets were no longer considered strategic and the four plants 
were shut down in 2004.  
An important interpretation of the above is that the establishment, rise and fall of 
Fenoquimia were greatly determined by the role of PEMEX as supplier. In the case of 
the Veracruz cluster, the evidence analysed demonstrates that the flow of inputs from 
supplier (PEMEX-Petrochemicals) to buyer is not a factor that should be taken for 
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 Cumene is a by-product of crude.   
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granted and that is a statement widely accepted among high ranking officials at local 
private firms. A case in point is Cirilo Domínguez, production coordinator at 
Agrofermex, who stressed that:  
PEMEX is a very unreliable supplier of industrial raw materials, though this is 
because of rough [sectoral] policies [institutionalised in previous years]. [...] 
keep in mind that every six years [presidential periods] we have different ideas 
as to what to do with the oil industry, and that cannot continue happening, the oil 
industry must be managed independently [from political interests]. 
The latter clearly illustrates that Domínguez is well aware of how external determinants 
can shape local dynamics such as upgrading prospects for firms and the quality of 
transactional relationships between state-owned complexes and buyers.   
Furthermore, the decision of Fenoquimia to shut down its acetone cyanohydrin plant in 
the Veracruz cluster and construct another in Tula is an unambiguous indication of the 
extent to which the firms is transactionally dependent on the supplier. Once again, the 
fact that PEMEX-Petrochemicals was the only domestic producer of acrylonitrile was 
determinant in turning Fenoquimia into a captive buyer at that time.  
Of the four production lines Fenoquimia shut down, the sulphuric acid plant drew the 
interest of Agrofermex, a neighbouring firm. Throughout the history of Fenoquimia it is 
reported that this plant operated with great success. Sulphur, the required input, is 
produced in large quantities in the locality by the Minatitlán Refinery, and the supply is 
arguably consistent. The fact that sulphuric acid feeds the production of ammonium 
sulphate, a compound produced by Agrofermex, represented an opportunity for 
Fenoquimia to continue operating and for the interested firm to expand operations 
(functional upgrading). At first, the intention of Agrofermex was to lease the plant for a 
year. As the deal proved beneficial for both firms, Consorcio Alfa Omega, the 
controlling group of Agrofermex, decided to acquire not only the sulphuric acid plant 
but also the entire assets of Fenoquimia. The acquisition was completed by the end of 
2004 and the company was renamed Fefermex.  
Since the conception of Fefermex, the new administration programmed investments to 
restart operations and expand capacity. On December 11, 2008, Consorcio Alfa Omega 
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inaugurated a second sulphuric acid plant, re-opened the MMM and the acetone phenol 
plant, and laid the first stone for the construction of two ammonium sulphate plants
111
. 
To this end, the import of inputs was deemed essential. As for the production of MMM, 
Fefermex outlined a scheme to run the plant on acetone cyanohydrin imported from the 
United States. In the same way, methanol, another relevant raw material in the making 
of MMM, would be bought in the United States with the possibility of it being supplied 
by PEMEX at a later stage. The acetone phenol plant was expected to rely on a mixture 
of suppliers. At an early point, the plant would work with cumene sourced in the United 
States but eventually the feedstock would be acquired from PEMEX-Petrochemicals, 
which is reported to have unveiled plans to reinitiate production at the Morelos 
petrochemical complex. In the case of the sulphuric acid plants, the Minatitlán Refinery 
would continue to supply the input.  
From the perspective of Agrofermex, it can be concluded that the devastating outcomes 
associated with captive relationships between Fenoquimia and PEMEX-Petrochemicals 
represented an opportunity for Consorcio Alfa Omega to expand operations, introduce 
further vertical integration (functional upgrading), and move into more sophisticated 
product lines.  
MEXICHEM DERIVADOS - A PRIVATE FIRM AS VALUE CHAIN 
PRECURSOR  
Although one of the characteristics of the Veracruz cluster is that public firms normally 
supply basic inputs, Mexichem Derivados does not fit that profile and is viewed as the 
precursor of a value chain. Mexichem Derivados produces chlorine which is a 
compound that PEMEX requires to run a vinyl chloride plant (VCM). VCM is at the 
same time used in the making of polyvinyl chloride (PVC) - a type of plastic used for a 
broad range of goods including floor coverings, pipes, clothes, and bags, and it is in this 
way that Mexichem Derivados inserts itself into the PVC value chain. The firm, situated 
in the industrial corridor of the Pajaritos petrochemical complex in Coatzacoalcos, is a 
subsidiary of Mexichem
112
, one of Mexico‟s largest petrochemical conglomerates. One 
interesting point that deserves attention here is that several of the firms controlled by 
Mexichem form part of the PVC value chain originating in the locality, which is to say 
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 As reported by www.latinpetroleum.com (June 10, 2010).  
112
 Mexichem is a Mexican chemical conglomerate. 
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that Mexichem Derivados is part of a conglomerate that has sought to vertically 
integrate its operations. Nonetheless, before elaborating on this issue it is necessary to 
explain the roots of Mexichem Derivados.  
The origins of Mexichem Derivados can be traced back to the early 1980s when the 
name of the company was Cloros de Tehuantepec, although in order to offer a detailed 
account of the company‟s origins it is necessary to take into account the wider empirical 
context. Towards the end of the 1960s the government was interested in developing the 
chlorine-PVC value chain and PEMEX brought a vinyl chloride plant into operation at 
the Pajaritos petrochemical complex in 1968 - one of the company‟s first production 
lines in Coatzacoalcos. The capacity of the plant was 70 thousand tonnes per annum 
(ANIQ 2008) and the input necessary for running the VCM plant was chlorine – a 
compound produced at a PEMEX plant adjacent to the Pajaritos petrochemical complex. 
During this period PEMEX decided to spinoff the chlorine plant, which was acquired in 
1967 by CYDSA
113
, a Mexican chemical conglomerate. As the demand for VCM grew 
over the course of the following years the government considered building a much 
larger plant. In tune with the expansion of state-controlled petrochemical firms, PEMEX 
completed the construction of a 200,000-tonnes-per-annum
114
 vinyl chloride plant in 
1982. The plant was named Clorados 3 and would consume a much larger amount of 
chloride, making the government aware of the fact that the construction of a supply 
plant was urgent. The planning of chlorine-producing facilities began in 1978 and the 
project drew the interest of Grupo Somex, a state-owned corporation with interests in 
several sectors of the economy, and Nafinsa, a state-owned development bank. What 
also prompted the building of a chlorine plant in Coatzacoalcos was the fact that salt 
brine
115
, the required input, could be obtained in the locality. A company called 
Azufrera Panamericana mined sulphur and sodium chloride at Jaltipán, a municipality 
located 40 km away from Coatzacoalcos, thereby facilitating construction of the 
chlorine plant. On January 18, 1981, Cloros de Tehuantepec began operations with a 
capacity of 678 tonnes per day.  
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 The company that emerged from that spin off was named Industria Química del Istmo (IQUISA), 
which is also located in the industrial corridor adjacent to the Pajaritos petrochemical complex that 
commenced operations in 1968, according to the company‟s website. CYDSA is a Mexican conglomerate 
that controls IQUISA. (Accessed on October 18, 2009) 
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For several years Cloros de Tehuantepec remained under the management of Grupo 
Somex in the form of a state-owned company. In 1987, in tune with the government‟s 
privatisation program, the plant was acquired by Pennwalt
116
, a chemical conglomerate 
whose holdings also included smaller chlorine plants in Jalisco and the State of 
Mexico
117
. From that time on the fate of Cloros de Tehuantepec would be linked to that 
of Antonio Del Valle, one of the shareholders of Pennwalt and the former owner of 
Bancrecer, one of the banks the government nationalised in 1982 in the midst of the 
debt crisis. 
When describing how Mexichem Derivados forms part of a vertically integrated 
conglomerate, it is important to mention certain key developments with regard to the 
participation of Antonio Del Valle in the banking sector. The national banking system 
remained under public ownership for a period of ten years until President Carlos Salinas 
(1988-1994) decided to re-privatise banks in 1992, a decision that represented an 
opportunity for Antonio Del Valle and his partners to re-enter banking. They did so by 
acquiring Banco Internacional (Bital) - a transaction that involved a payout of $300 
million. Over a period of ten years Bital established the largest network of branches in 
Mexico, drawing the interest of international financial institutions wishing to expand 
their global presence. In 2002 HSBC, a London-based bank, acquired a controlling 
interest in Bital. The participation of Antonio Del Valle at Bital is reported to have been 
settled with shares in chemical firms the bank had taken over in previous years. These 
firms, situated in the states of Tlaxcala and Puebla, formed a conglomerate that was 
known in the 1990s as Mexichem, and their main production line was PVC. That 
marked the moment when Antonio Del Valle sought to expand the firm‟s operations by 
vertically integrating the subsidiaries. In 2004, Cloros de Tehuantepec became 
Mexichem Derivados (Ortega 2008) - a firm with the potential to consolidate the 
development of the PVC value chain (Figure 8.8). 
Mexichem accelerated its growth throughout the second half of the last decade and the 
firm‟s acquisitions proved determinant to that end. The conglomerate bought firms with 
operations not only in Mexico, but also in countries such as Argentina, Colombia, Chile, 
Brazil, Peru, the United States and the United Kingdom (CNNExpansion, February 2, 
2010). The driver behind this strategy was to push for „greater vertical integration 
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 Jalisco and the State of Mexico are states situated on the country‟s central plateau.  
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synergies and add value to the raw materials produced by the company‟, as stated in the 
company‟s 2006 annual report. In so doing, particular emphasis has been placed on the 
chlorine-PVC value chain - the business line that yields more than half of Mexichem 
revenues. However, the company‟s integration lacked a specific link in the chain: the 
production of VCM that PEMEX carries out at the La Cangrejera petrochemical 
complex. Antonio Del Valle, Chairman of the Board of Directors, believed that the role 
of PEMEX in the structure of the value chain was a factor hampering his company‟s 
competitiveness (Ortega 2008).  
Figure 8.8 Chlorine-PVC vertical integration  
 
  
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Source: Based on the author‟s database and the firm‟s website (June 15, 2009). 
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Vinílicas. The subsequent incorporation of Cloros de Tehuantepec in 2004 was a step 
towards strengthening the standing of Mexichem in that sector. The conglomerate 
continued the integration of associated firms into its structure and in order to merge the 
upstream links of the value chain, the acquisition of Union Minera del Sur
118
, a 
company in the neighbouring city of Jaltipán with deposits of sodium chloride, the 
fundamental input in the making of chlorine at Mexichem Derivados, seemed logical.  
In line with such a strategy, the firm embarked on an aggressive plan of acquisitions in 
Mexico and abroad targeting downstream players. It is reported on the company‟s 
website that Grupo Primex, a Mexican firm that produces vinyl resins for the domestic 
market, was acquired in 2005. Mexichem was particularly busy in 2007, acquiring 
Amanco, a Brazilian maker of PVC pipes with subsidiaries in other Latin American 
countries; Petco, a Colombian petrochemical company that produces vinyl resins; 50 
percent of Geon Polimeros, a maker of PVC products; and DVG Industria e Comercio, a 
Brazilian maker of rigid PVC pipes
119
. The vertical integration of Mexichem does not 
stop with the manufacture of PVC products since the business model also incorporate 
PVC specific applications. Through its Amanco subsidiary in Argentina, Mexichem was 
ready to provide solutions for the conveyance of fluids throughout Latin America - a 
service demanded in the agricultural and construction sectors (Ortega 2008). Although 
these firms do not represent the entire universe of Mexichem acquisitions in recent 
years, they clearly demonstrate the firm‟s strategy: integration of most of the links of 
the chloride-PVC value chain. In this respect Figure 8.8 illustrates the course of action 
taken by the conglomerate to add value to its basic inputs. From the extraction of 
sodium chloride at Union Minera del Sur and chlorine produced at Mexichem 
Derivados to firms located in the Veracruz cluster and water conveyance and 
agricultural solutions.  
Nonetheless, the conglomerate‟s most profitable business line has a missing link, as 
briefly mentioned above. Mexichem Derivados supplies chlorine to the Pajaritos 
petrochemical complex, which blends it with ethylene to produce vinyl chloride (VCM). 
PEMEX then sells VCM to Mexichem PVC subsidiaries. VCM is transported by rail to 
Puebla and Tlaxcala and by ship to Altamira and Colombia, where Mexichem has 
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 Information obtained from Mexichem website: 
http://www.mexichem.com/web_mexichem/empresa.php?page=gobierno.php (June 15, 2009). 
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manufacturing sites. With regard to how the chlorine-PVC value chain is structured, Del 
Valle is quoted in a 2008 report by the CNNExpansion online magazine as saying „this 
scheme is completely illogical, it is not competitive‟. In the wake of this context, three 
scenarios could be contemplated. One would be to lease the Clorados 3 plant from 
PEMEX, but the concern is that such a move would irritate the oil workers union, as 
Ortega puts it (2008). The second scenario would be to build a PVC plant in 
Coatzacoalcos. Even though this is by far the most plausible answer, the firm does not 
plan to build in the short term. The idea was seriously considered at the time Mexichem 
acquired Cloros de Tehuantepec, as Contreras Milán, plant manager at Mexichem 
Derivados, explained: 
[...] a sum of $170 million had been authorised by the shareholders for the 
development, but planning was brought to a halt as PEMEX-Petrochemicals was 
not in a position to guarantee the long term supply of VCM [a fundamental 
ingredient for the PVC project]. PEMEX-Petrochemicals is not trustworthy as 
supplier.  
As the venture failed to materialise, the logistical costs for the integration of the 
chlorine-PVC chain were higher for the company. The projected PVC plant in 
Coatzacoalcos, as Contreras Milán continued to clarify, „would have entailed the 
shutting down of PVC subsidiaries in Puebla and Tlaxcala and the firm would no longer 
have had to pay insurance and transportation costs.‟  
The third option would be the construction of a VCM plant by Mexichem - an 
alternative that seems logical in terms of the configuration of the value chain but 
complicated when other factors are considered. One of these factors is that ethylene, the 
input combined with chloride to produce VCM, is only produced by PEMEX-
Petrochemicals for the domestic market. Although ethylene is considered the precursor 
of the most important PEMEX petrochemical value chain, output has stagnated over the 
last ten years and there are no signs that the situation will change in the short and 
medium term. The supply of this to the VCM plant would therefore be compromised. 
To make matters worse, exports of ethylene are sizeable with PEMEX-Petrochemicals 
exporting 141 thousand tonnes worth $52.6 million in 2009 (United Nations Trade 
Commodity Statistics Database, 2010). From this perspective, the construction of a 
VCM plant run by private investors is not conceivable with today‟s levels of ethylene 
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production and exports and it seems that for the time being Mexichem will continue to 
deal with PEMEX-Petrochemicals in the chlorine-PVC value chain. With regard to this 
statement, it is important to emphasise the dual role of La Cangrejera since the state-
owned petrochemical complex is both a client of Mexichem Derivados and a supplier to 
other subsidiaries of the conglomerate (Figure 8.8). Similar to many of the other 
PEMEX petrochemical plants, the VCM plant often undergoes maintenance works that 
may cease production and a technical stoppage means the main client of Mexichem 
Derivados stops consuming chloride and at the same time cuts off the supply of VCM to 
other subsidiaries of the conglomerate. The repercussions are distressing for the entire 
value chain since Mexichem Derivados must find new markets for its chloride 
production and PVC subsidiaries must find new sources of VCM supply. Despite the 
fact technical stoppages at the VCM plant have affected the performance of Mexichem 
Derivados; the interviewee was not in a position to provide more information in 
connection with this point. Instead, it was recalled a time in which PEMEX-
Petrochemicals stopped operations of the VCM plant for a period of six months between 
2003 and 2004 due to maintenance works. On that occasion, what allowed Mexichem 
Derivados to continue producing were the implications of bad weather conditions on the 
southern coast of the United States. The hurricane season seriously affected chlorine 
producers and forced them to shut down their plants for several months. Mexichem 
Derivados took advantage of the situation and channelled its output to that market.  By 
the time operations returned to normal on the U.S. southern coast, PEMEX had re-
commenced production at its facilities.  
Similar to many of the other firms in the locality, the degree of transactional 
dependence experienced by Mexichem Derivados is significant. The firm plays the role 
of supplier and in the end, as the evidence indicates, Mexichem Derivados participates 
in a captive relationship whereby PEMEX-Petrochemicals, the only producer of VCM 
in the country, is the player that greatly influences the co-ordination of input 
transactions.   
CONCLUDING REMARKS  
The development of private petrochemical firms in the Veracruz cluster is not only 
hindered by the political economy of the country described in previous chapters. The 
mechanisms and practices used by PEMEX-Petrochemicals to co-ordinate input 
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transactions have also played an important role. In that respect, the erratic supply of 
inputs, the hazardous nature of petrochemical raw materials, and the fact that state-
owned firms are frequently the only local sourcing alternative are among the factors that 
have clearly constrained both the performance of private firms and their prospects for 
upgrading. Nonetheless, it must be addressed that certain firms, such as Temex and 
DAK Americas, have managed to weather these adverse conditions although the 
exposure of their input matrix to PEMEX-Petrochemicals production processes is 
limited. Other firms, such as Beta, IDESA and SQCI, on the other hand, have fewer 
alternatives since their transactional dependence is considerably higher. In general 
terms, however, it can be deduced that the nature of local and external determinants 
(that shape the quality of relationships) have prevented both adequate articulation of 
local value-adding activities and the expansion of output in the Veracruz cluster. 
By contextualising the trajectories of firms, transactional dependence, and the captive 
nature of inter-firm linkages, this chapter has linked the empirical evidence of the case 
study with arguments forming part of the global value chain approach. In a similar way, 
the empirical evidence discussed here was used to demonstrate that in order to 
understand the development of clustered firms - principally those operating in a 
developing country context - it is necessary to consider the economic, institutional, and 
political setting. The petrochemical cluster situated in the Mexican state of Veracruz is 
an example of this.   
 
 
 
213 
  
9 
FINAL REMARKS 
 
 
In this thesis I argue that sectoral, national, and supranational determinants have 
played a significant role in shaping both performance of petrochemical firms in the 
Veracruz cluster and development of value chains of petrochemical origin. I also 
contend that traditional approaches to examining industrial clusters in less advanced 
countries are inclined to play down the importance of the domestic economic, 
institutional, and political setting. For example, in the field of regional science and 
business studies, as pointed out in Chapter 3, advocates stress the weight of local 
externalities and co-operation between firms and associated institutions in driving the 
upgrading prospects of companies. The global value chain theory adopts a similar 
approach. Since this stream of literature emerges at a time when the geographical 
organisation of production is increasingly reconfigured by the globalisation of the world 
economy, the subject of discussion has centred on cross-national linkages that brand-
marketers and retailers from the industrialised world establish with their counterparts 
(suppliers) in less advanced countries, taking no account of national determinants of 
development.  
Having said this, one fundamental question arises: is upgrading in developing country 
firms therefore related to the mechanisms through which cross-national relationships are 
co-ordinated? While the existing empirical evidence is enthusiastic in that respect, little 
if any attention is paid to the indigenous factors that outline i) the capabilities of firms 
engaging in (global) circuits of production, distribution and exchange and ii) 
governance structures of vertical intra-cluster relationships.  
The significance of studying the trajectory of the Veracruz cluster and the nature of 
transactional relationships between PEMEX-Petrochemicals and local firms lies in the 
fact that both are heavily influenced by determinants (external to our case study) 
inherent in the development path Mexico has followed over the past five decades. This 
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thesis contends that an analysis of Mexico‟s political economy is fundamental for 
understanding the rationale behind prevailing governance structures in the Veracruz 
petrochemical cluster. This approach to examining industrial clusters in developing 
country settings has been to a significant extent disregarded in the relevant literature, 
and that is linked to one of the overarching contributions of this thesis: to have 
complemented the operationalisation of value chain concepts with an analysis of 
political, economic, and institutional determinants pertaining to Mexico‟s development.  
LOOKING AT THE BROADER PICTURE: THE ESTABLISHMENT AND 
RISE, FALL AND STAGNATION OF MEXICO’S PETROCHEMICAL 
INDUSTRY 
The phases of establishment and rise, fall, and stagnation of the country‟s petrochemical 
industry - to which the pool of state-owned and private firms in the Veracruz cluster are 
central - have taken place under economic foundations that at first underlined import-
substituting industrialisation strategies and then resorted to market-orientated policies, 
as illustrated in Figure 9.1. 
From the 1960s to the early 1980s the industrialisation of hydrocarbon resources (into 
basic petrochemical inputs) was at the epicentre of the economic strategy. The 
government promoted the setting up and expansion of a wider base of economic 
activities (value chains) in order to encourage vertical articulation of the national 
industrial apparatus. Throughout that period, petrochemical output grew from 56 
thousand tonnes in 1960 to 10,590 thousand tonnes in 1982 (PEMEX 1978, 1991, 
Snoeck 1986). Installed capacity, on the other hand, expanded from 2,340 thousand 
tonnes in 1970 to 14,883 thousand tonnes in 1982 (Snoeck 1986) – 70 percent of which 
was situated in southern Veracruz (PEMEX 1983). The availability of industrial raw 
materials in the locality drew the interest of private petrochemical firms to the point that 
21.4 percent of the country‟s installed capacity to process secondary petrochemicals 
products was located in the state of Veracruz by 1982 (IEPES 1982). Furthermore, 65 
percent of the local private firms currently associated with the production processes of 
PEMEX-Petrochemicals began operation during these years. If one takes into 
consideration these figures, it is clear that the Veracruz cluster in particular and the 
petrochemical industry in general mushroomed under the tutelage of the state.  
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Figure 9.1 Evolution of PEMEX petrochemical output, 1960-2009 
  (000‟ tonnes) 
 
  Source: PEMEX (1977, 1991, 2004, 2010a) and the author‟s database.  
Although this development was accompanied by favourable economic circumstances, 
the increasing borrowing requirements of the public sector to finance industrial 
expansion and the changing nature of the external environment (higher international 
interest rates coupled with falling crude prices) dramatically worsened the financial 
imbalances of the government by the early 1980s (Lustig 1998). All these circumstances 
contributed to sending the country into economic turmoil in 1982. The extent of the 
collapse not only brought economic growth to a halt, the government also abandoned 
import-substituting industrialisation. As Mexico embraced market-orientated policies 
from that moment on, the role of PEMEX and its petrochemical industry with respect to 
the articulation of associated value chains was set to take a turn for the worst in the 
forthcoming years.  
The new context of development entailed the state in diminishing its involvement in 
economic planning. To that end, policy prescriptions of the International Monetary 
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production of which was initially reserved to the state - as secondary petrochemical 
inputs opened up the sector to private capital. In the long run, one of the most 
detrimental consequences of this policy is that investment inflows did not materialise to 
the extent the government had estimated, leaving PEMEX as the only domestic 
producer of key petrochemical inputs up to the present day. As observed in Chapter 8, 
the degree of transactional dependence that several local firms experience with respect 
to state-owned firms is fundamentally rooted in these circumstances; and this clearly 
illustrates the extent to which external determinants, that is, the institutionalisation of 
sectoral regulatory policies in the wake of a changing development context, impinge on 
the character of inter-firm linkages in the Veracruz petrochemical cluster.  
Government officials also resorted to trade liberalisation. The North American Free 
Trade Agreement is undoubtedly the most significant case in point. While Mexico 
viewed NAFTA as the instrument that would reassure the character of the economic 
liberalisation program inaugurated by Miguel De La Madrid (1982-1988) and extended 
by Carlos Salinas (1988-1994) (Haber et al. 2008), the U.S.‟s assessment was that it 
would be the mechanism which would eventually facilitate greater access to Mexico‟s 
hydrocarbon wealth. The latter must be understood in the light of the increasing 
dependency of the U.S. on imported oil from volatile regions at that point of time. Prior 
to and during NAFTA negotiations, the Mexican government accelerated the 
deregulation of the petrochemical and oil sector. In relation to the former, policy makers 
further narrowed down the list of basic petrochemicals in 1989 and 1992, which by 
extension entailed the opening up of the sector to foreign investors (DOF 13/10/1986, 
DOF 17/10/1992, Maxfield and Schapiro 1998). With respect to oil, President Carlos 
Salinas enacted a law that horizontally reorganised PEMEX into four subsidiaries, 
introducing guidelines to set the price of inputs in accordance to international 
references. The regulatory framework that emerged from these policies not only 
represented the avenue that could lead to further deregulation (Ángeles Cornejo 2001), 
it also contributed to delineating the complex context in which vertical transactional 
linkages in the Veracruz cluster are currently embedded. The latter is demonstrated by 
the dissolution of the natural gas-ammonia-fertiliser value chain since the second half of 
the 1990s.  
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Another external driver of local governance that must be considered at this stage is the 
increasing use of natural gas – a precursor in the making of a broad range of 
petrochemical inputs such as ammonia and ethylene oxide - for the generation of 
energy. It is widely understood that environmental concerns and a growing domestic 
consumption are the forces behind the upsurge. It is estimated that the weight of 
combined cycle plants, which run on natural gas, in the composition of the energy 
matrix of the country grew from 6.94 percent in 1996 to slightly over 50 percent in 
2009. This figure is in line with the proportion of gas PEMEX supplies to the power 
sector in terms of its overall output, which rose from 18.96 percent in 1994 to 31.21 
percent in 2000 and to a staggering 50.42 percent in 2009 (PEMEX 2001, 2010a, 
Secretaría de Energía 2007, 2010). While it remains problematic to appraise the extent 
to which the mounting use of natural gas for energy generation has constrained the 
availability of petrochemical raw materials in the Veracruz cluster, the issue to highlight 
is that this scenario has undoubtedly put further pressure on PEMEX-Petrochemicals to 
meet user firms‟ demands.   
The tax burden of PEMEX and the low level of tax collection in the country, as 
previously discussed in Chapter 7, are also drivers of great consequence. Since the 
Mexican government has failed to capture a larger share of the GDP in the form of taxes 
to finance public spending, PEMEX revenues serve to fill the gap. During the 2000-
2009 period, a third of government income was provided by PEMEX (Banxico n.d.). 
This heavy tax burden prevents Mexico‟s largest company from reinvesting its own 
royalties in key areas such as refining and exploration. As to the latter, a fundamental 
repercussion is related to crude output, which has decrease from 3.383 mbpd in 2004 to 
2.576 mbpd in 2010 (PEMEX 2010b). The fiscal approach with which PEMEX is 
managed and the high international crude prices in the last six years (Figure 7.5) have 
made policy makers prioritise crude exports with the intention to generate capital 
inflows to maintain the public machinery running. Of the total exports from 2005 to 
2009, which accounted for 52.68 percent of overall PEMEX crude output throughout 
the period, exports to the U.S. accounted for 80.9 percent – an even larger share than 
that in the post-NAFTA era in the 1990s (Figure 6.5) In this setting the point to 
emphasise is that the Mexican government continues to encourage the generation of 
revenues through exports (to the U.S.) at the expense of supplying crude to 
petrochemical complexes, as Figure 7.4 illustrates.   
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PEMEX AND THE UNITED STATES ENERGY SECURITY STRATEGY 
Since NAFTA came into effect in 1994, the entanglement of PEMEX into the U.S. 
energy security strategy became accentuated. Of the total exports from 1994 to 2000, 
which accounted for 53.1 percent of overall PEMEX output throughout the period, 
exports to the world‟s largest energy consumer averaged 76.64 percent – an explosive 
jump in comparison to the 1980-93 period when the share of exports to the U.S. 
averaged 54.41 percent. This entailed a paradoxical implication for Mexico – a major 
oil producer. The amount of Mexican crude processed at U.S. refineries was frequently 
larger than that refined by Mexico itself. From 1988 to 1993 exports to the U.S. 
accounted for 59 percent of the crude processed by PEMEX. From 1994 to 2000 the 
proportion soared to an average of 92 percent (PEMEX 1989, 1990, 2000, 2010a). With 
respect to state-owned petrochemical complexes in Veracruz, the latter scenario 
compromised the availability of crude (naphthas) for the making of inputs. The amount 
of crude processed by PEMEX-Petrochemicals decreased from 206 thousand barrels in 
1994 to 136 thousand barrels in 2000 and to 97 thousand barrels in 2009 (Figure 7.4). 
As a result the production of aromatics, which are naphtha by-products, plummeted 
from 1,700 thousand tonnes in 1994 to 667 thousand tonnes in 2000. This asphyxiated 
the performance of local firms such as Temex and Fefermex since the production of 
paraxylene and cumene ceased during this period (Chapter 8). The making of other 
important aromatic compounds such as benzene, toluene, xylene, and styrene also 
dropped dramatically – a drift that has continued until present. In 2000 the aggregate 
PEMEX-Petrochemicals production of these inputs represented just 45.15 percent of 
that in 1994. As late as 2009 the figure plunged to 36.46 percent in relation to the year 
NAFTA came into effect (PEMEX 2003, 2010a). All things considered, it can be 
concluded that limited availability of industrial raw materials in the Veracruz cluster 
and therefore the erratic role of state-owned firms as suppliers are stumbling blocks in 
one way or another associated with both the entanglement of PEMEX into the U.S. 
energy security strategy and the policy setting that emerged in the wake of economic 
liberalisation.  
Likewise, it is worth pointing out that the political economy of the country is also 
strongly linked to the dynamics of the complex relationship with the United States, 
Mexico‟s largest trade partner. A central ingredient of this relationship is the mutual 
219 
  
energy dependency – a paradoxical situation for the oil national industry. While Mexico 
exports crude to its northern neighbour, the U.S. exports natural gas and value-added 
hydrocarbon products to Mexico (Figure 7.13). This is an indication that crude exports 
in the end serve to feed the industrial apparatus of the U.S., encourage the international 
expansion of U.S. oil firms and, last but not least, boost the prospects of U.S. oil firms 
to eventually capture a larger share of the growing Mexican petrochemical market. The 
vertical integration of PEMEX, to which the petrochemical complexes situated in the 
state of Veracruz are a fundamental component, may be therefore viewed as 
representing a risk to the long-term availability of crude for U.S. firms. For instance, a 
barrel of oil (naphthas) processed at petrochemical plants in Mexico could be 
interpreted in the following ways: it is a barrel that U.S. firms do not turn into 
petrochemical inputs and/or refined products that could later cater for the sizeable 
Mexican market; it is a barrel that the U.S. would presumably have to source from 
either politically and/or socially volatile regions or less reliable/friendly suppliers. The 
dismantling of the Mexican state-owned petrochemical industry (and development of 
the Veracruz cluster) must be therefore understood in the wake of this multi-
dimensional context.  
POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
This thesis has illustrated the adverse aggregate environment in which the Veracruz 
cluster is embedded. It is important to ask: how can PEMEX-Petrochemicals and local 
private firms enhance their prospects to upgrade? To achieve this end, would it therefore 
necessary to change the economic, political, and institutional setting? If so, what does it 
imply? As noted in Chapter 7, one of the most significant shortcomings of the Mexican 
state is the heavy dependence of public spending on oil revenues, with this representing 
a third of the government income. Ultimately, the driving force behind this situation is 
the lack of consensus among political actors that would serve to approve a 
comprehensive tax reform. In 1990 the share of tax collection is reported to have stood 
at 11.4 percent of GDP. By the year 2000 the figure was 11 percent. The UN Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL) has estimated that Mexico 
collected 9.4 percent
120
 of its GDP as late as 2008 - a figure dwarfed by other Latin 
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American countries. While this drawback has persisted for decades, no major structural 
amendment has been institutionalised in recent years. And the outlook has been 
aggravated as crude output has plummeted by approximately 24 percent from 2004 to 
2010, that is, from 3,383 bpd to 2,576 bpd over a span of six years (Figure 7.4).  
Generally speaking, this deadlock is somewhat associated with the national political 
scene. Mexico began to experience a democratic transition in 1997 when the party that 
held power since 1929 – the Revolutionary Institutional Party (PRI) – failed to obtain an 
absolute majority at the Chamber of Deputies for the first time and when Vicente Fox, 
the candidate from the conservative National Action Party (PAN), defeated the PRI at 
the presidential election in 2000. A critical inadequacy is that since then Mexico has 
been ruled by hung legislative bodies where no single political party has held the 
required majority to approve structural reforms and this has been exacerbated by the 
lack of consensus among key political actors. The fact that state-owned petrochemical 
complexes are erratic suppliers of raw materials in southern Veracruz is similarly 
related to the fiscal approach with which policymaker have administered PEMEX, 
which at the same time is rooted in a political system whose members have failed to 
orchestrate a comprehensive tax reform. In this environment of limited resources, the 
government has prioritised public spending over the requirements of PEMEX to re-
invest its own revenues in strategic areas, with the petrochemical division a case in 
point.   
What are the broader implications of the setting just described? The most damaging 
consequence of the adverse scenario confronted by PEMEX is undeniably the growth of 
imports of hydrocarbon by-products. In 2009 imports of refined, petrochemical 
products, and products of petrochemical origin amounted to $26.35 billion and 
outstripped the amount of crude exports, which stood at $25.66 billion. A year later 
crude exports climbed to $35.91 billion whereas imports from January to November 
totalled $33.45 billion. The point is that the ability of PEMEX to capture larger sums of 
revenue in 2010 has been attributed to a jump in the international price of crude (Figure 
7.5) – a factor that is beyond the control of policy makers. On the other hand, imports of 
hydrocarbon by-products grew larger as Mexico bounced back from the economic 
slowdown experienced in 2009. All this illustrates that economic gains from crude 
exports are offset by the increasing domestic demand of refined, petrochemical 
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products, and products of petrochemical origin, revealing the limited capacity of 
PEMEX to add value to its own hydrocarbon resources.  
The fact that Mexico can be seen as a mere supplier of crude and a net importer of 
value-added hydrocarbon by-products leads us to argue that policymakers and 
government officials have serously failed to appreciate the weight of vertically 
articulating the activities of PEMEX, that is, exploration, production, refining, and 
marketing. Contrary to this approach, David Shields (2005), who is a journalist and 
private consultant in energy matters in Mexico, claims that vertical integration as well 
as production and commercialisation of value-added products are the strategies that 
major oil firms have followed to expand internationally and boost revenues. While 
PEMEX concentrates on production and exports of crude, companies such as Exxon 
Mobil and Royal Dutch Shell have focused on refining and marketing. As regards 
distillation capacity, PEMEX, which yields two to three times more crude than its 
private counterparts, refines up to 1,540 thousand barrels per day (bpd), whereas Exxon 
Mobil and Royal Dutch Shell possess facilities to process up to 6,271 and 3,639 bpd, 
respectively (PEMEX 2011). By concentrating on downstream value-adding activities 
Royal Dutch Shell and Exxon Mobil generated $285.12 and $284.65 billion, 
respectively. By focusing on upstream activities PEMEX yielded $80.72 billion 
(Shields 2005, PEMEX 2011). When these figures are taken into account, it becomes 
apparent that the government strategy concerning PEMEX has failed to deliver the 
expected results. There is no doubt that the restructuration of PEMEX into four 
subsidiaries and the lack of investment in exploration and upgrading refining capacity 
are determinants that have constrained the firm‟s ability to generate revenue and 
compromised vertical articulation of the country‟s industrial apparatus.  
With respect to the dynamics in the Veracruz cluster, it is evident that the scenario 
depicted above has played an important role in deteriorating the current standing of 
PEMEX-Petrochemicals and thus the quality of vertical linkages. As discussed in 
Chapter 8, local private firms are locked into captive relationships with state-owned 
firms. It is certain that this type of inter-firm governance has constrained the 
performance of private firms, particularly in the case of those that are transactionally 
dependent on PEMEX-Petrochemicals. Hence the question that arises is as to what is 
the scope for petrochemical private firms to upgrade. Despite the fact that firms have 
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managed to move into more sophisticated product lines (Beta) and integrated vertically 
(Temex - DAK Americas, Agrofermex - Fefermex), it is claimed that a major boost 
would be to enhance the quality of input transactions. This is to say that a more reliable 
supply of raw materials on the part of PEMEX-Petrochemicals would surely be a form 
of upgrading in itself.  
Nevertheless, as noted lines above, upgrading the supplying capacities of state-owned 
firms is an issue highly linked to political issues and therefore complicated to achieve 
under the existing environment. If PEMEX is to continue to contribute to the country‟s 
development, what is badly needed is an adequate tax regime permitting investment in 
critical areas of the firm such as exploration, research and refining. To that end, political 
actors must put aside group interests and orchestrate and implement a comprehensive 
tax reform.  
HORIZONTAL CO-OPERATION  
Given that the supply of petrochemical inputs is a widespread predicament faced by 
most firms in the locality, one might expect a high degree of inter-firm co-operation on 
the buying side. However, the evidence indicates that the importance of horizontal co-
operation among firms (and between firms and associated institutions) is fragile. To put 
this into context is important to underline that the extent to which local firms are 
affected by the unpredictable character of PEMEX as supplier widely varies from one 
case to another. This is believed to be associated with the extent of product 
fragmentation within the cluster. While fertiliser-producing firms confront skyrocketed 
input prices of ammonia, other buyer firms may have to deal with the closing down of 
particular state-owned facilities, or to operate at a low capacity utilisation due to the 
insufficient production at PEMEX-Petrochemicals. Furthermore, the wide range of 
intermediate inputs derived from basic petrochemicals yielded by PEMEX shapes the 
constitution of the Veracruz cluster in terms of the number of value chains, or rather, 
local vertical linkages. Buyer firms in the locality belong to different value chains as 
they process different basic inputs that are turned into an even larger number of 
intermediate products that either serve different industries or have specific applications. 
In relation to marketing their own output and access to inputs, for example, local buyer 
firms do not compete with one another. In that sense, horizontal co-operation may be 
more relevant in industrial clusters where participants, in this case local private firms, 
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have more bargaining power and input supply and output are more homogeneous. In 
industrial clusters where local suppliers rule transactional relationships and input supply 
and output is rather heterogeneous, there is reason to believe that horizontal co-
operation would tend to be weak.  
The latter examples are robust grounds on which horizontal linkages among local firms 
can be built, but the disproportionate influence of PEMEX-Petrochemicals over the rest 
of the actors, along with the fact that the decision-making process is greatly centralised 
in the hands of government officials at the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of 
Energy in Mexico City, is very likely to weigh down any collective action in the 
locality.  
POTENTIAL RESEARCH DIRECTIONS IN THE FUTURE  
Discussion in this thesis has reiterated the fact that most of the available empirical 
evidence concentrates on examining value chains in which buyers from the 
industrialised world farm out manufacturing activities to firms in less advanced 
countries, where the former exercises a high degree of control over the production 
process. Another distinction concerning this body of literature is that the firms analysed 
tend to be privately owned. In that respect this thesis looked at a case study that 
somewhat differs from what emerges from conventional empirical evidence in value 
chains, that is, inter-firm linkages within an industrial cluster that are governed by state-
owned suppliers. This is what indicates the sort of potential research directions this 
work might motivate. I believe that the analytical and conceptual framework I 
developed here could contribute to analysing inter-firm relationships in which the 
participation of the state is significant. In this particular context the question worth 
addressing is: what sort of value chains will the researcher be dealing with? When the 
state intervenes at the point of production, Gereffi (1994: 101) claims that value chains 
are very likely to be driven by producers – like the output-input linkages in the Veracruz 
cluster.   
That said, examples of value chains in which state participation is predominant can be 
found in many developing countries, for example, in the petrochemical and copper 
industry in Venezuela and Chile, which correspondingly could offer empirical evidence 
worth considering.  
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Closely resembling the Mexican experience, the development of the petrochemical 
industry in Venezuela has been led by the state. The La Corporación Petroquímica de 
Venezuela (PEQUIVEN) is the petrochemical subsidiary of Petróleos de Venezuela 
(PDVSA), the state-owned oil and natural gas firm. PEQUIVEN owns three 
petrochemical complexes situated in different locations of the country and produces 
petrochemical precursors that clustered firms use in their own industrial processes
121
. 
The extent to which the state is involved in petrochemical value chains is illustrated not 
only by the ownership character of PEQUIVEN, but also by the fact that PDVSA 
provides 55 percent of government revenues, according to Venezuela‟s profile at the 
CIA World Factbook
122
. In studying governance structures that arise in transactional 
relationships between PEQUIVEN and buyer firms, it will be of critical importance to 
consider the path of development that Venezuela has pursued in recent times. This 
would require special attention to be paid to the degree of state intervention.  
Another empirical case worth looking at is the copper industry in Chile. While the state 
participates in this sector through the Corporación Nacional del Cobre (CODELCO), 
Chile‟s state-owned mining company and world‟s largest copper producer (CODELCO 
2010), private firms are also actors of sizeable importance. Overall, copper provides a 
third of government revenues, with CODELCO alone representing 13 percent 
(Bloomberg, May 2, 2011). The latter figure indicates that Chile‟s government is to 
some extent less dependent on copper revenues than Venezuela with respect to oil. 
Additionally, conventional wisdom indicates that the role of the Chilean government is 
less interventionist than Venezuela‟s. Given the state-owned nature of CODELCO and 
the approach to development adopted by Chile in recent decades, the question that arises 
is: what types of governance structures in the copper value chain are likely to prevail? 
Could we find differences in the quality of transactional relationships between Chile‟s 
CODELCO and buyer firms of cooper in comparison to Venezuela‟s PEQUIVEN and 
buyer firms of petrochemical products? Could there be any particular determinants 
inherent in these two cases shaping governance structures rarely discussed in value 
chain literature as in the case of the Veracruz cluster? 
                                                 
121
 Data obtained from the company‟s website http://www.pequiven.com/pqv/ (July 12, 2011). 
122
 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ve.html (July 13, 2011).  
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To address these questions it will be necessary to situate the analysis within the local 
context of development, that is, to discuss economic, political, and institutional factors 
determining how inter-firm relationships are co-ordinated in such value chains. For 
instance, issues like the democratic transition and the instigation of market-orientated 
policies in Chile could help us understand the development of the copper industry. With 
respect to Venezuela, it will be similarly instructive to explore the impact of socialist 
and interventionist policies embraced by the current administration on the vertical 
integration of the country‟s hydrocarbon industry.  
CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE THESIS 
This thesis lays down an approach to examine governance of inter-firm linkages in a 
manner that conventional studies around value chains tend to underestimate. In 
reviewing existing empirical studies, it is clear that the analysis focuses on value chains 
from the perspective of how power relationships among firms serve to shape the co-
ordination of value-adding activities and the extent to which suppliers in developing 
countries can enhance production capabilities. And the discussion is generally inclined 
to isolate the implications of local determinants for the quality of inter-firm input 
transactions. Is boosting production capabilities of developing country firms not 
influenced by the national context of development? This thesis embraces a critical 
position in that respect and contends that understanding the prospects of developing 
country firms to attain greater levels of productivity and competitiveness require us to 
shed light on the home-grown context of development. One of the contributions of this 
thesis is to have crafted an analytical framework that complements the global value 
chain approach with analysis of the political, economic, and institutional environment of 
Mexico to examine the trajectory of the Veracruz petrochemical cluster and distinguish 
governance structures of vertical transactional relationships between state-owned and 
private petrochemical firms in the locality.  
In addition to the inherent characteristics of the petrochemical industry in southern 
Veracruz, that is, the degree of product fragmentation, the hazardous nature of inputs, 
and spatial proximity, the present analysis illustrates that external factors must be 
considered when analysing industrial clusters embedded in a developing country 
context. In that regard it is worth reiterating that Chapter 5, 6 and 7 scrutinises how the 
extent of state intervention in the light of import-substituting industrialisation policies in 
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the 1960s and 1970s, the oil boom in the second half of the 1970s, the economic 
liberalisation process embarked on by Mexico in the 1980s and 1990s and its lingering 
implications, the institutionalisation of sectoral regulatory policies, the reliance of the 
government on oil revenues, the implications of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement, and the U.S. energy security strategy contributed to outlining the 
development of petrochemical firms in southern Veracruz and local power relationships. 
The approach I implemented in this thesis demonstrates thoroughly that the prospects 
for upgrading in developing country firms are not only associated with the type of 
governance structures characterising input transactions, as the GVC literature suggests, 
but also with the indigenous context of development.  
On the conceptual front this thesis also makes an important contribution. As noted in 
Chapter 3, two types of value chain are recognised, that is, buyer-driven and producer-
driven. While empirical studies have been largely concentrated on exploring the first 
type of production organisation, producer-driven chains have received little if any 
attention. The theoretical framework introduced by Gereffi et al. (2005), which 
distinguishes five types of governance structures exclusively concerning buyer-driven 
chains (Figure 3.1), and the empirical evidence embodied by the Veracruz 
petrochemical cluster helped conceptualise the type of governance prevailing in 
transactional relationships between state-owned firms and private local firms. The 
conclusion is that those local firms that use raw materials supplied by PEMEX-
Petrochemicals are viewed as captive buyers since the cost of switching suppliers is 
rather high. The latter is ultimately exacerbated by the fact that state-owned 
petrochemical complexes exercise a disproportionate degree of control over input 
transactions – power asymmetry attributed to the hazardous nature of inputs, spatial 
proximity between suppliers and buyers, and the worth of external determinants. For 
instance, the second contribution of this thesis is to have conceptualised (Figure 3.2) 
and analysed producer-driven intra-cluster relationships in a context of significant state 
intervention.   
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